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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I examine theoretical underpinnings to policies of equality of 
opportunity and in so doing, offer the case for: a) including classism within the 
realm of equality of opportunity policy; b) a re-evaluation of ethnic monitoring 
procedures to embrace contemporary concerns about the category construct of 
ethnic identity; c) the development of an ethics of sex relations to complement 
strategies to combat material sexism. In supporting my case I explore 
enlightenment conceptions of equality against contemporary late and post- 
modern debates about difference and otherness. This exploration includes an 
assessment of Italian and French theories of sex difference. I conclude with an 
assessment. of the tension between social and private determinants of 
disadvantage and inequality. 
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Chapter One 
A FRAMEWORK FOR EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE 
1. Otherness 
It would seem that discussion about whether humans are naturally equal 
or naturally unequal is as old as human discussion itself (Lenski, 1966). Political 
and to some extent religious discourse returns to this question because it asks, in 
part, the purpose of our place on this earth. Whom do we serve? God? Men? 
Masters? Kings? Ourselves? The community? Our answer can have much to 
do with the voluntarist parts of our destiny. If a woman is in a marriage in which 
she believes that she must serve her husband, her life will be given over to such 
service willingly (at least on the conscious level). If she does not believe in such 
servility but is, say, structurally subordinated in her marriage, her life will be 
affected by the tension between what she has got and what she believes she 
should have - indeed this may finally determine her exit from marriage. I merely 
make the point here that we are all positioned in the debate on equality, be this 
conscious or not and that this positioning is consequential to our lives. We place 
ourselves as much as we are placed and this placing creates the vantage point 
from which we see others and ourselves. This truth is well told in Hans 
Andersen's Emperor's New Clothes. When the child pointed out the absence of 
the emperor's clothes, he exposed more than a regal complex of grandiosity; 
revelation of the emperors naked self revealed his commonality with other 
humans (at least male ones) and effected both a repositioning of himself and his 
subjects. The tailors were able to dupe the emperor and the crowd for a while 
because they understood something about the strength of the ranked 
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imagination. A similar message can be found in the fable of Meninius Agrippa. 
Rebellious Plebs were persuaded to lay down their arms on hearing a story about 
society's need for a subordinate class like themselves (Cooter, 1982). 
Equality is an attitudinal question as much as it is a structural one. This is 
why equal opportunity policies for implementation tend to include scope for 
awareness training. People have to be recruited to an intellectual and emotional 
commitment to equality if they are to commit themselves behaviourally to it. 
Such a commitment requires a degree of conscious reflection on the many 
unsettled positions modernity has produced around the question of equality. This 
chapter examines some of the debate such positions have stimulated with 
particular reference to the opposing views provided by Nietzsche and Rousseau 
with the aim of generating a conception of equality for the chapters that follow. 
2. Equalityphobia 
There are polar positions in the equality debate: the first argues that such 
inequalities that exist are 'man-made' and can therefore be unmade; the second, 
argues that unequal relations are an essential motor of human society. What is 
striking about the debates is the level of emotion present on by both sides. The 
equality debate is not a dispassionate one. In assessing, for instance, arguments 
from the right (Letwin, 1983), what appears to emerge is a fear and revulsion of 
egalitarian ideals. Indeed, the debate on equality from the theoretical and political 
right is permeated with a kind of nervous disorder, a sort of equalityphobia, 
expressed in the fears that talent, strength, genius, art, science and choice will be 
crushed by an egalitarian project. It would seem that writers opposed to equality 
are anxious that much will go in their own lives if egalitarian practices are 
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established. For such writers, inequality motors human vitality while egalitarian 
relations sap and flatten creative life forces (Letwin, 1983). This essentially 
Nietzschian position is convinced of the necessity of slavery for society. 
Achievements must be made on the backs of those who cannot or will not 
achieve themselves. The authentic role of the economic and cultural have-nots is 
in the service of the haves. This is as much a human arrangement as it is a 
social one for the seething mass that is humanity is genetically organised for the 
growth of slaves and masters. Some people are born with the will to get up and 
go and others sink into ordinary life; it thus becomes the destiny of the latter to 
serve the more courageous and energetic. The 'priests of equality', including 
Christian ones, turn their backs on this unpalatable truth because either they lack 
the nerve to enjoy their privileges or they are too consumed with envy to be at 
peace with their lower station. Egalitarianism is an ascetic morality that wants to 
extinguish the heat in the human kitchen so that we are all in the lukewarmth of 
standardised and frugal living. No-one excels and no-one goes under in such a 
"reign of nothingness" (Nietzche, 1956, p. 208). 
For Nietzsche (1956) inequality is virile and egalitarianism is effeminate 
because it abandons the drive for mastery. In his attack on Christian ascetic 
morality, Nietzsche defends the right of achievers to achieve, of the bold to be 
bold and of the artist to tread on others for his (in Nietzsche it must be his) own 
flourishment. The eagle must be permitted to soar. The egalitarian drive . to tame 
life renders life lifeless: 
No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically 
'unjust', since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and 
destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. (Nietzsche, 1956, 
p. 208) 
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Nietzsche and those inspired by him (see chapter 2) claim that 
egalitarianism is a utopian belief whose goody-goodyness denies the many 
forces, dark as well as light, within humanity. A more ruthless and rigorous 
examination. of human society will reveal that it simply cannot live up to the 
egalitarian ideal and indeed would die, spiritually at least, if it were to. 
From the level at which they are pitched, these arguments have something 
of a seductive appeal for they confront the belly of the beast humanity. "Man 
harbours too much horror; the earth has been a lunatic asylum for too long. " 
writes Nietzsche (p. 227). Indeed this is so but is it the error of Nietzschians to 
naturalise the asylum? Is it possible that the lunacy of which Nietzsche speaks 
and indeed his own lunacy derives not from the natural fruits of mankind's 
creative will to power but from a perverse drive to mastery that turns a species 
into cannibals? Symbolically speaking, we eat our own (Ignatieff, 1990). We 
have structured humanity so that it can turn some humans into the fodder of 
others. Women for men; children for adults; workers for the bourgeois; black for 
white; Jews for arians. Perhaps the horror "man harbours" is a horror deriving 
from the. spoils of these kinds of fracticide, femicide, and infanticide which he 
knows to be against the preservation of humanity. Inequality, argued Rousseau 
(1973) has made men "like ravenous wolves, which, having once tasted human 
flesh, despise every other food and thenceforth seek only men to devour" (p. 96). 
Can not these horrors, then, be traced back to the divisive practices the right 
claim to be natural? At the heart of inegalitarianism is a commitment to the view 
that equal relations are- against the nature of humanity. The egalitarian case 
argues the reverse. 
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3. Equality. a Procrustean ideal? 
Flew (1983) critiques the egalitarian position for centring on an 'original 
position' about 'man's original equality. While this is a reasonable charge (it is 
certainly true of Rousseau 1973 and Rawls, 1972), it may be made too of the 
inegalitarians who depend on a conception of a natural hierarchy. These 
opposing approaches share a decisionist anxiety about the natural state of 
humanity. Perhaps what needs to be shattered are the certainties of both sides 
of the debate and adherence to a more agnostic approach about origins. There 
is, for instance, truth to Flew's characterisation. of some egalitarianism as 
Procrustean; he has captured perhaps an egalitarianian zeal to fit and fix 
humans at some common point so that everyone is positioned to take and 
receive the same. But there is likewise a defence of difference from the right that 
refuses to countenance the possibility of difference and equality coexisting. 
Indeed, the very core of right thinking against equality lays here. It believes that 
the politics of equality are the politics of levelling and that the levelling will always 
be downwards so that it will extinguish the good, the best and the naturally 
differentiated in society. A connected anxiety for the right here is that giving 
everybody the same will remove the incentives inequality creates for people to 
compete for rewards (Davis and Moore, 1945). Must progress and achievement 
proceed through otherising in this way? This is a particularly important question 
for educationalists to confront because it has practical implications. 
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4. Negating the other 
If we look, for instance, at the case of gender and educational 
achievement, it would seem that achievement is motored by inequality. There 
is evidence that boys do best in mixed sex schools and girls do best in single sex 
schools. The reasons, suggests Spender (1982) and Stanworth (1983) are that 
girls represent a 'negative reference point' for the boys. The presence of girls 
makes boys feel good about their abilities even before they are tested. If this is 
the case, it points to the fact that inequality does not lead to the flourishment of 
the best and the good but the flourishment of the advantaged. Reed (1991) and 
King (1992) make similar points about 'white achievement' at the expense of 
negating 'black talent' (chapter 3). And Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) analyse 
class-based achievement in similar vein (chapter 2). The view that the 
advantaged are advantaged because they are better is not sustained by 
evidence. What is often represented as healthy competition is often unhealthy 
inequality. Thriving on otherising students who are 'different' (female, black, 
working class for instance) is destined to distort achievement and 'excellence' 
(and thus its products) with the forces of a superiority complex. 
5. Creative Differences 
Differentiation in the human population clearly exists but it. is invariably a 
classified differentiation that obeys laws of rank in the minds of the right. We 
need to classify, argues Lucas (1983) to feel safe (p. 101). But who feels safe? 
Whose need does classification serve? For Lucas society must give people a 
sense of where they belong in pecking orders. If I do not know that I am above 
my students, below my management, above shopkeepers, below Prince Charles, 
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I will not know where I stand. Varied and fluid though they are, my places in the 
hierarchy are what give me ontological security. If we are all the same, we may 
turn on each other: 
Egalitarians fail to recognise the deep social needs that give rise to 
such distinctions - bur need to classify people in order that we may know what to expect from them and how far it is safe to relax our 
guard against them.. . The effect of egalitarian principles is to ensure that each man is treated as every man's enemy (Lucas, 1983 p. 10). 
Lucas makes a familiar conservative equation between equality and 
anarchy. William Golding (1962) famously turned this equation into the theme of 
his novel Lord of the Flies. Hitherto 'well-bred' boys turned into dogs eating dogs, 
when they found themselves returned to 'a state of nature' by shipwrecked 
circumstances. Hierarchies, Lucas claims, create the necessary social 
distances to ward off latent human enmity because they form the parts of the 
whole. Without hierarchies, there is no whole to keep people from warring. 
Lucas' polemic retells the fable of Meninius Agrippa but a stratified order is only 
one way of achieving social cohesion, and one that has more negative than 
creative tension within it if we use the evidence of social conflict to gauge it. 
Differential roles need not be hierarchically arranged and certainly need not be 
subject to crude classifications such as male, female, black and white. 
Egalitarianism can admit differentiation within humanity without committing 
itself to hierarchy or classifications of this sort. It would be absurd, in my view, to 
posit a society in which differentiation disappears. The modern world is too 
complex to permit us all to do the same, even if this were desirable. A division of 
labour is required (though not necessarily by hand and . brain in the classist 
divisions I discuss in the next chapter) and will throw up differentiations of skills 
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and expertise. Further, as I discuss in chapters 4 and 5, egalitarianism can admit 
differences of sex without hierarchising them. Added to this, people's social 
legacies and the many ways in which they are dispositionally and psychically 
differentiated can never be flattened to one level (see chapter 6). Whatever the 
origins, the present heterogeneous nature of humanity cannot be willed away 
and is more likely to infinitely reconfigure from this heterogeneity thah it is to 
merge into homogeneity. If there are egalitarians who want such homogeneity - 
as the right argues - they are indeed opting for an impossible ideal. Generally, 
however, this ideal is a caricature of the egalitarian case. A more plausible 
egalitarian hope is that the reconfigurations do not constantly reproduce patterns 
of discrimination by sex, class, 'race' and so forth and that they become more 
interesting and fluid for all of us. At least let us bring in fresh lunacies!. The right 
case against equality cannot permit this possibility because it is too rooted in its 
sense of natural hierarchy with respect to these divisions. It is also a case that 
rests on a moral panic about the devastating consequences of egalitarianism 
Letwin (1983) for instance, warns that if egalitarians "have their way, the ultimate 
outcome will be a decline into widespread poverty and tyranny" (p. 70). 
6. Whose Ressentiment? 
What is presented by the right generally is the spectre of sinister social 
engineering motivated by the 'Jealous God of Equality' (Lucas, 1983). This 
charge has much to do with Nietzsche's (1956) concept of ressentiment. In his 
critique of what he calls slave morality, Nietzsche argues that those who suffer 
(generically the herd or the sick for Nietzsche) seek release from their suffering 
by blaming others: "Somebody must be responsible for my discomfort"(p. 264) and 
that this has the effect of dulling the pain that their failure to self-actualise 
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produces. "Every suffering sheep says to himself, "I suffer; it must be 
somebody's fault" (p. 264). The dispossessed repress a recognition of their own 
lack of moral fibre by blaming the privileged other for their plight. 
When the disadvantaged are charged with ressentiment or plain envy, it is 
invariably a charge made by those who are culturally and/or materially privileged. 
Could this be a work of projection? Perhaps reducing the egalitarian ideal to an 
attitude problem of the have-nots diverts attention from the anxieties of the 
haves. In a statement that conflates equality with sameness, Lucas (1983) 
complains that: "In a totally egalitarian society I am always potentially redundant, 
I am merely a unit, not a unique individual" (p. 88). This lament betrays a refusal 
to recognise that structures of inequality already reduce some to 'merely a unit', 
particularly on the labour market. Sameness is a class experience 
(Benyon, 1973). University lecturers are not sacked on the Friday and replaced 
the following Monday by a cheaper'hand' in the way that factory workers can be. 
Not yet at least. 
It is an important theme of this thesis that the scope for individuation is 
unevenly spread by the existence of inequality. The conservative view is that 
only some humans are destined to individuate. This is patently clear in 
Nietzsche's (1956) distinction between the sick and the healthy in the human 
litter. Those who fail to thrive, who lack the will to power, must give way to those 
with 'intellectual authority' : "the right to exist of the full-toned bell is a thousand 
times greater than that of a cracked, miscast one" (p. 261). Arguably, 
Equalityphobia is a retentive impulse of the privileged who do not want to let go 
for fear that in sharing what they have, they will lose their very selves. What is 
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theorised as a moralist position of the dispossessed, i. e. ressentiment may be 
much more or at least as much a psychic problem of the possessed. 
It should be added, however, that equalityphobia is not entirely without 
foundation. There are egalitarians who offer bitter and angry discourses in which 
they relish the prospect of a day of reckoning whereupon the privileged will have 
to dirty their hands too. Such sentiments call to mind the likes of Stalin and Mao 
Tse Tung who established programmes for the re-education of the privileged 
with the effect of brutally reversing rather than solving problems of inequality. 
One of the dangers of the egalitarian case in this respect lies in a focus on justice 
rather than on human flourishment. There needs to be more emphasis on the 
fact that stubborn hierarchies blunt creativity because everyone caught in its 
structures must develop one dimension at the expense of others. Of course, 
issues of justice are important but any bridge that can be made across the 
oppressor/oppressed divide presents the case for equality in less attritional ways. 
In short the 'privileged' side needs to see privilege as loss as much as anything 
else. I elaborate on this particularly with respect to sex difference in chapters 4 
and 5. 
If right thinkers bring deep anxieties to their thinking on equality, so too do 
those on the left. There is latent aggression - and indeed at times exposed 
aggression - in the egalitarian case and Nietzsche captured something of this 
problem in his concept of a slave morality. It would be healthier to own this fact 
than to insist upon discontinuities between the ideal and its degeneration into 
levelling by death and violence. The reign of terror was connected to the 
enlightenment by at least a thread and probably more. Likewise, Stalinism to 
Marxism. The accusatory practices of some anti-racist and anti-sexist 
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'awareness training' can be aggressively moralist (Sivanandan, 1985). 
Ressentiment may well stir in the hearts of those without and it may well explode 
into aggression, often with devastating consequences for all. Ressentiment may 
also block many an individual from confronting her own power, capacities and 
responsibilities to self-actualise. Nietzsche's error was to claim that ressentiment 
inheres in nature's routine production of lesser mortals. A less sweeping and a 
less inverted projection would accept that resentment is a sentiment available to 
those without but that not all avail themselves of it. It would seem that underlying 
Nietzsche's view of a codependence between disadvantage and rightful 
advantage is that primal fear so often couched in prejudice by the privileged, 
namely fear of the mob, mingled, in Nietzsche's case, with misogyny. As I show 
in chapter two, this is well captured by Carey's (1992) study of the British 
intelligentsia, much of which was influenced by Nietzsche. Similarly, Chiswick's 
(1981) research shows that the 'enlightenment' view of le peuple was not entirely 
enlightened. 
7 The Scope of Equality of Opportunity 
Given that our understandings about . equality are as affective as much as 
they are cognitive, how can they be rendered constructive and creative? How, 
for instance, do we engage with actually existing inequalities so that they neither 
immobilise nor daunt us or produce a moralist violence that is fated to invert the 
problem we seek to tackle? 
There are those on the left of the equality debate who argue that the idea 
of equal opportunities is antithetical to egalitarian aims because it cannot ensure 
equality of outcome. Real egalitarianism is not concerned with 'who is best' for 
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the job, school or public office, rather it wants a reward-free world in which all is 
evenly distributed regardless of ability or occupation. Lewis (1978) for instance, 
argues, that " equality of opportunity legislates for inequalities because it places 
the burden of achievement on individuals rather than governments" (p. 48). 
There is truth to this line of argument of course because, as Lewis (1978) writes, 
the disadvantaged are disadvantaged because they suffer 'situational 
impediments' such as being poor. Radical egalitarianism wants to tackle these 
situational impediments in order to engineer a society of common starting lines: 
The left critique of equality of opportunity legislation or policy is that it fixes 
its own starting lines on an uneven playing field (which is capitalism). While this 
is largely true, there is a fallacious side to this critique for it inflates the goals of 
equality of opportunity policies. Quite simply, honestly formulated policies for 
equality of opportunity do not pretend to bring about egalitarianism or indeed to 
combat the roots of capitalism. The key aim of such policies is to eliminate 
prejudice and discrimination in its selection and treatment of people in public 
institutions. 
While it is true that policies for the equality of opportunity are incapable of 
equalising outcomes, they may help to free up people's relations with 'others' and 
I think that this is their key value. Equality of opportunity concepts have much to 
do with enlightenment messages about human malleability and potential to which 
one can add a late/post modern concept of difference and others (Rattansi, 
1994). Generally speaking, no fixed face or body need be seen as the 'right' one 
for certain destinies. There is a level at which right wing thinking on human 
destiny converges on this point because it supports the meritocratic ideal that all 
can enter the race. This is a contradictory convergence, however, because it 
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clashes with a set of prejudices about classifiable innate abilities, particularly with 
respect to women, ethnic groups and social class. On the one hand, there is the 
capitalist. ideal of the ' self-made man', of the rags to riches possibilities held out 
by a system that rewards effort and merit alone. On the other hand, another 
capitalist ideal about the necessity of a division of labour is interwoven with an 
older view that allotted places within it have an ascribed aspect as well as an 
achieved one. Whereas the enlightenment ideal (to which it did not rise) is that 
no-one is born to their destiny, the right-wing premise is that some are, some are 
not (see chapter two). 
Policies of equality of opportunity, then, do not critique the structures of 
capitalism, but they do present a challenge, however modest, to the ways in 
which such structures are populated. Although this field of reform has attracted 
its fundamentalists, as I discuss in my conclusion, it has also become an 
important site for the generation of a discourse about ethical relations among 
humans: it has raised concerns about language, images, behaviour, 
assumptions, prejudice, selection and interpersonal relations at many levels and 
in many places. Importantly, such policies keep alive the question of how we 
relate to others and indeed to ourselves. 
8. J-J Rousseau: Self-love and love of the other. 
Concepts of equality of opportunity are rooted in largely humanist 
judgements about how we view each other. Just as much of the rightwing case 
can be traced to a Nietzschean understanding of humanity, so the egalitarian 
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case can be said to be Rousseauian in its orientation. Rousseau was not 
against inequality in the sense that he believed it to be eradicable or indeed 
desirous of eradication. In contrast to Nietszche, however, Rousseau 
(1973,1979) thought that social inequalities tended to diminish the authentically 
human from flourishing (myopically, Rousseau left women out of this formula - 
see chapter four). Whereas Nietszche saw envy as a churlish impulse of those 
who failed to mobilise their own acts, Rousseau (1973) believed it to be at the 
heart of the modern human condition. Envy inhabits that space between need 
and desire which is created out of the social differentiations of any developed 
society. Modernity has produced the gaze for and of the other. Humans living 'in 
a state of nature' have no need to regard each other evaluatively because they 
eat, sleep, shelter and couple according to natural and existential need; they are 
uninvolved in social exchange or social arrangements; they live for themselves 
and their self regard (armour de soi) is uncontaminated by their regard of others 
or presuppositions about the regard of others for them. What changes with 
social organisation, that is with the advent of society, writes Rousseau (1973), is 
a ground shift in the way people see. themselves. Self-identities are constructed 
in relation to others: 
The savage lives in himself; the man of society always out of 
himself; cannot live but in opinion of others, and it is, if I may say so, 
from their judgement alone that he derives the sentiment of his own 
existence. (Rousseau, 1973, p. 71) 
Nietzsche (1956) would agree that modern humans otherise in this kind of 
fashion but he sees this as a healthy means for the will to power that will self- 
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actualise the talented (Diprose, 1989): I can do it because I am better than 
him/them/her! In Contrast, Rousseau (1973) locates otherising in a hunger 
produced by a 'multiplicity of new wants' that divert humans from self- 
actualisation to a self-love (amour propre) that is parasitical on the other. The 
desire for what others have (envy) turns the self into a rapacious brute: 
Insatiable ambition, the thirst of raising their respective fortunes, not 
so much from real want as from the desire to surpass others, 
inspired all men with a vile propensity to injure one another 
(Rousseau, 1973, p. 96). 
"I want what he has got because he has got it" refuses the deeper question "what 
do I want? ". Moreover, for Rousseau (1973), a pernicious side of this 'insatiable 
ambition' lies not in the jealousies of the dispossessed but in the keeping that 
paraded as giving in the form of benevolence among the possessed: 
.. and with a secret jealousy, which is the more dangerous, as it puts on the mask of benevolence, to carry its point with greater security. 
(Rousseau, 1973, p. 96). 
This is giving in order not to share. Modernity has incited in humans the 'secret 
desire' to profit at the expense of others and to conceal this desire in an 
economical giving that will hide what is kept. We have become positioned within 
a Darwinian logic which Nietszche has naturalised and which Rousseau has 
historicised. Importantly, however, unlike a utopian egalitarianism that believes 
that the gap between need and desire can be closed, Rousseau did not suggest 
that history can be rewound. To discover the genealogy of inequality is not to 
solve it as reversible (which utopian socialism does) but to regard it as mutable. 
The state of nature can never be reproduced in a state of society. We now live 
with plenitude and scarcity, with mine and thine. "Rousseau's redistribute politics" 
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writes Ignatieff (1990) "were always cautious and prudent" (p. 114). This is evident 
in a number of places but particularly in Rousseau's defence of hereditary 
property rights. Though the capture of private property is an original violence in 
Rousseau, the politics of appropriation merely introduces a new violence. In the 
light of a reign of terror that was unleashed in the name of 'egalite', such a 
position turned out to be a prophetic one. For Rousseau, you have to dig the 
uneven playing field on which you stand and you do so in the first instance, with 
the principle of equality before the law. Though he gave the issue of formal 
equality his own slant, Rousseau's conception of it belonged to the general 
enlightenment principle about a human being's entitlement to equal rights and 
dignity. Such a conception remains at the heart of many nations' constitutions 
and is embodied in Article I of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights which could have been written by almost any enlightenment 
philosophe: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should ' act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. (in Eide, 1992, p. 41) 
What distinguishes Nietszche from Rousseau, among other things, is that 
while the former sees the constitution of the self as an "after-effect, of evaluating 
the other's difference" (Diprose, 1989, p. 30), the latter claims that love of fellow- 
citizens as a'common species will return the self to its authentic state because 
comparison among men produces affected personalities where "to be and to 
seem became two totally different things". (1973, P. 95). 
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What the United Nation's declaration calls "a spirit of brotherhood" and 
what equality of opportunity policy calls 'equal regard' echo the enlightenment call 
for "love of fellow-citizens" as a core sentiment for individuals and a basis for the 
self to flourish wherever he is socially positioned. This is a humanist, not a 
socialist sentiment of course; it counsels us, as Rousseau's Emile was 
counselled (see chapter two) to see ourselves in others so that we maintain 
dispositions of due humility towards self and others. Clever people, it is said, are 
impressed by their difference from others; the wise are struck by their 
commonalities with them (Tawney, 1964). 
While, Rousseau (1979) was against a reshuffle of the existing ranked 
pack, he did believe that the kind of otherising that lead to rank and fortune 
needed to be tackled. No human is a natural slave because slavery is counter- 
human. Those who take the evidence at face value, make opportunist readings 
of man-made inequality: 
politicians.. attribute to man a natural propensity to servitude 
because the slaves within their observation bear the yoke with 
patience (Rousseau, 1979, p. 102) 
For Rousseau (1973), rank is not objectionable if it is honourably and 
deservedly sustained and if it is not a source of self-aggrandisement at the cost of 
others. However, we are placed in the social order, we must not lose sight of our 
core commonalities. as humans. This 'personal equality' introduces, at least, a 
challenge to authoritarianism. Though such a challenge is not a frontal attack on 
hierarchies, it can, to revert to the tale of the Emperor, make them transparent. 
We have yet to discover fully what changes can be wrought out of an increase in 
more stripped conditions between ruler and ruled. It may be that a challenge to 
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the epiphenomenal character of power relations will yield more results than new 
attempts to storm the Bastille. Though there are clear limits here, there is a 
sense in which you can talk your way. out of some of the effects of structural 
determinants because power is wielded symbolically and finds its own 
intersubjective space (Goffman, 1968). Although there is much of Rousseau that 
wants it both ways, namely class without classism (Staraboski, 1988, Ignatieff, 
1990) and equality without sex equality (Wollstonecraft, 1985, Pateman, 1989, 
Fermon, 1994) Rousseau remains useful for a recognition of this space. 
9. Equality ethics 
The promise of policies of equal opportunity is to combat discrimination 
and this involves an ethical commitment to equal regard. Even if situational 
impediments prevent many from walking through the doors formally opened by 
equal opportunity policies, at least they can permit a fresh breeze into the room in 
terms of a more democratic setting for interpersonal relations. This ought to 
have some knock-on effect on people's life chances. 
Giddens (1994) argues for a "generative model of equality" that fits with 
this view (see chapter 6). He suggests that neither left nor right have adequately 
addressed how human beings can or do self-actualise where they stand, in the 
here and now, be they affluent or poor. Giddens argues that we must look more 
closely at the connection between people's self-relation and their relations with 
others. What Gidden's (1994) calls 'dialogic democracy' is a phenomenon of our 
post-traditional world wherein self-respect enables the other to encounter the 
other, either in a 'pact of the sexes' or in a spirit of cosmopolitanism where 
difference does not extinguish commonality. It is within the space opened out by 
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dialogic democracy, that all humans, at least all above the subsistence level, can 
begin to thrive for themselves (see chapter 6). 
Giddens (1994) recommends that we go 'beyond left and right' to generate 
an ethics that recognises "the sanctity of human life and the universal right to 
happiness and self-actualisation" (p. 235). In many ways, the spirit of this 
sentiment has guided much that I have discussed in the following chapters. A 
central theme of this thesis is wrought out of the tension between the personally 
achievable and the socially restrictive. And the question of the sanctity of human 
life is very much at the core of chapters 4 and 5 as a question of sex difference. 
10. Difference and sameness 
Theoretically, though I have made use of what Rattansi (1994) calls the 
"post-modern frame" I do not share the postmodernist disdain for enlightenment 
humanism. Indeed, I have tried to forge a path between humanist conceptions on 
the one hand and more recent theorising of differences on the other. My own 
treatment of difference differs from the postmodernist view in two key respects. 
Firstly, I think that Giddens' (1991) conception of the 'late-modern' subject as one 
that has acquired skills of self-reflexivity is more useful than that of the 
postmodernist decentred subject. While it is doubtless true that we are driven by 
all kinds of forces beyond our control and what we think we 'know' is more often 
who we are, my observations in education lead me to agree with Giddens that 
more and more people are finding their own paths, interrogating their needs and 
attempting to control their destiny as far as they can. In this sense too, people 
are not simply thrown into difference, rather they make their differences, to some 
extent at least. This question is particularly highlighted around that of ethnic 
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identity as I show in chapter 3. The challenge to the fixities of ethnic identity has 
come from those who argue that its very artificiality permits the subject to play 
with her cultural location in creative relation to other cultural forces. This play will 
be in tension with the forces of racism, of course; I try to sustain this problem in 
my exploration of ethnic. identity construction, particularly with respect to the 
practice of ethnic monitoring. 
My second divergence from the post-modernist frame is elaborated in 
chapters 4 and 5 where I approach the question of sex difference as an originary 
one. In. these chapters, I have used such a perspective (particularly Luce 
Irigaray's) to tease out the parodox of sameness and difference that I think is 
exemplified in male and female relations. Unlike the postmodernist view of 
gender as plastic, I side with Irigaray's (1993(a)1993(b) case that women need to 
be recognised qua women to come into subjectivity. I have organised this issue 
around the question of sexual harassment in chapter five because I think that 
however sceptical one might be about an originary sex difference, few would 
contest that something is wanting in the ways in which men and women 
encounter each other. If we begin to formulate an ethics of sex relations, I 
argue, where we really stand as male and female, and what we want from 
ourselves and each other, might emerge with more clarity. 
'Chapter 6, attempts to draw in one of the strands throughout this thesis. 
think that equality discourses need to give space for the individual to breathe if 
they are to increase their credibility. In large part, this is because the differences 
between us are also the differences of our unique psycho-social make-up. 
Notwithstanding social determinations that roughly obey laws of causation and 
that 'explain' our predicaments, to be human is to be unique too. In this respect, 
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I agree with the post-modernist objection to the grand narratives that seek to 
explain the predicament and even mission of whole groups of people, as if they 
were an undifferentiated mass with a single destiny. Differentiation through 
individuation, I argue in the next chapter, is an under-theorised question 
particularly with respect to class. 
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Chapter 2 
CLASSISM 
1. Equality of Opportunity and Class 
Although the problem of equality is deeply connected to that of social class, the 
concept of equality of opportunity distances itself from much of this connection. It is 
in this respect that the ideal of equality of opportunity parts company from that of 
egalitarianism, as discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas the latter ideal would 
have social classes dissolve, the former holds out the more modest hope that class 
membership will be the outcome of fair competition. In political terms, egalitarianism 
is wedded to certain forms of socialism while the concept of equality of opportunity 
derives from a liberal, meritocratic view. In the first, class struggle is central to social 
change. In the second, individual endeavour must motor change. While a 
meritocratic perspective challenges feudal class fixities, it does not oppose class 
divisions as such. Indeed, meritocrats aspire to replace a feudal aristocracy with an 
aristocracy of achievement. Within such an aspiration, education, particularly 
schooling, is pivotal because it is perceived to be the site where ability is actualised 
and where achievers rise to their earned place at the top, regardless of origins 
(Herrnstein, 1973), Much of the sociology of education contests this meritocratic 
assumption with evidence that points. to the reproduction of class privilege within 
schooling and the difficulties of transcending this through personal effort (Bernstein, 
1974 Young and Whitty, 1976, Bowles and Gintis, 1976, Willis, 1977 Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1977, Halsey et. al. 1980, Apple, 1982). On the one hand, given the weight 
of this scholarship, it is notable that policies of equality of opportunity within 
educational institutions rarely highlight social class in their founding statements. In 
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some such statements, class is omitted entirely and even where it is mentioned, there 
is little clarity as to what this might mean in terms of policy beyond the question of 
financial barriers. On the other hand, this neglect is coherent with the conceptual 
dependence of the idea of equality of opportunity on that of meritocracy. In the logic 
of this dependence, class divisions and thus class discrimination are implicitly 
encouraged. Class privilege can be defended so long as it is the earned reward of 
ability. Ironically, a discourse that declares war on discrimination in many spheres, 
secretes class discrimination at its core. 
Rather than denounce the ideology of meritocracy and the limits it presents to 
policies of equality of opportunity with respect to class, I want to suggest a path that 
can give expression to class issues within such policies. This entails an exploration 
of class oppression that is distinctive from, though connected to, the more dominant 
social scientific perspectives on class. This means exploring questions which are 
more central to other discourses on oppression. Here I am thinking particularly of the 
notions of natural inferiority on which racists and sexists depend for their arguments 
and the classificatory frames that they deploy to deny individuation and heterogeneity. 
This chapter confronts such notions and such a frame with respect to social class 
and in so doing aims to draw the analysis of sex, 'race' and class more closely 
together as 'isms'. To this end, I argue below that resistances need to be made to 
the temptations to overwork 'class' in the construction of identities. Crucially, class 
membership and the division of labour on which it rests need to be denatured. If 
class analysis forgets the artificiality of class, it will itself become classist. 
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2. Classism 
The complexities of the capitalist division of labour require that-people must be 
suitable for jobs rather than vice versa. This order has been highlighted particularly, 
those with disabilities who find themselves debarred from productive, waged life by 
the abstract and normative criteria set for a job. The labour market enables those 
who fit the criteria and does not bend easily to individual circumstances to facilitate 
take-up of work. As Oliver (1990) has pointed out this creates a reading of disability 
in terms of a series of disqualifications. Not what can you do in your wheelchair but 
what can't you do in it. The case of disability and labour reveals starkly that people. 
are subject to occupations. This power relation in which the thing (the job) holds 
sway over the human is so widely accepted that when it is disrupted, it becomes a 
shocking event. For instance, when a nurse is discovered to have been performing 
appendectomies as reported in the press (The Independent on Sunday, 13 January, 
1995) there is no fresh examination or negotiation of the parameters that define 
'nurse' or 'doctor', despite this clear display of overlapped competence. Though the 
expertise with which the nurse performed this operation was not challenged, she was 
suspended. Her transgression was in her audacious subordination of the meaning 
and limits of the category 'nurse' to her real competencies and perhaps even her 
desire to flourish as a human being by exercising them. The doctor who entrusted 
the nurse to operate had also violated for he had threatened the privileged, class 
boundaries of the job 'doctor' and contested the limited, class and gender ones of the 
job 'nurse'. 
Studies on disablement have drawn attention to the tyranny of an occupational 
order that seeks to fit people into jobs from an abstract view of 'ablebodiedness'. It 
is worth recalling alongside these studies that jobs in modern society also create 
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disablement through a division of labour by class. Many working class people find 
themselves in work that makes little call on their full physical and intellectual 
capabilities. Such people, once described by Marx as 'crippled monstrosities' 
(1976, p. 481) remain disabled not least, by the survival of a view that what they do is 
part of their natural destiny. Because this class linkage to the question of jobs is 
missing in equality of opportunity discourses, it limits what can be said about 
occupational gatekeeping generally and class prejudice particularly. For instance, 
the attempt to diminish racist or sexist outcomes in education or employment will 
often be depressed by understated problems of class and occupational fixities. In 
the case of racism, it needs to be borne in mind that most black people in Britain are 
also located in the working class both by origin and by the downward mobility racism 
has thrust upon them. (Braham et. al. 1992, Wrench and Solomos, 1993 ). And 
women tend to remain at the bottom of each class stratum in a buffer zone (Abbot 
and Sapsford, 1987) that cushions men from downward mobility. By this evidence 
alone, challenging racist and sexist structures clearly requires that some questioning 
of the occupational order and the class prejudices that it produces needs to be made. 
Generally, however, there appears to be a lack of an appreciation of how class 
prejudice helps to sustain class fixities. 
Although it is the interplay between prejudices and structures that is so often 
challenged by those contesting discriminatory practices in the case of racism and 
sexism, the problem of class prejudice is rarely articulated within such a challenge. 
While, therefore, policies of equality of opportunity combat naturalised linkages. 
between an apparently ascribed status and that of a 'rightful' station (e. g. woman born 
to secretary, ) the class element of the 'station' itself is left unquestioned. In short, 
female secretary is problematised but not secretary. It is largely in the 
unproblematising of the latter that class prejudice can flourish. 
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The labour market, education, indeed society itself, rests on a production 
system that divides jobs along a manual and mental labour continuum. Crudely, 
this will mean that those on the manual end of the continuum are likely to have the 
least rewarding work in economic, status and job-interest terms. And those on the 
mental end of the continuum are likely to have the most rewarding work in these 
terms. The problem of class discrimination clearly derives from the structural and 
economic foundations of this division of labour and much has been written on this 
both in classical and contemporary sociology (Giddens and Held, 1992). What needs 
to supplement our understanding of such class discrimination and what is missing 
from equality discourses, is the 'classism' that provides some of its legitimation. I 
refer here to the prejudices that represent social classes as the natural or quasi 
natural outcomes of differential, intellectual and moral attributes within humanity. 
According to such prejudices, some people are 'born clever', some are not; some 
people have a developed moral self, others do not. From this view, the prejudiced 
mind supposes that the division of labour by class is a natural aspect of- humanity. 
This is the nub of classism. 
3. Classism and class analysis 
Contestation of the naturalisation of the capitalist production mode has been 
made in the class reproduction debate, noted above. One of the problems with these 
theories of class reproduction, however, and even with the more humanist correctives 
to its structuralist excesses (Willis, 1977, Giroux, 1989) lies in their own dependence 
on a classificatory view of class which prevents a complete denaturalisation of it. 
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More generally, theorists dedicated to class analysis, particularly Marxists, 
have tended to regard the 'isms' of equal opportunity discourses as untransferable to 
class. In particular, class analysts have tended to follow a concern for political and 
economic structures or cultural phenomenon that bear down on the working class as 
a collectivity. This concern, if an exclusive one, impedes an inquiry into the scope for 
individuation or class transcendence for working class individuals. This is not to deny 
the existence of a rich scholarship on class oppression, particularly in studies of 
alienation and working class culture ( e. g. Blauner, 1964, Meszaros, 1970, Hall and 
Jefferson, 1979, Hoggart, 1990, Aronowitz, 1992) or to deny the connections that are 
made with sexism and racism (e. g. Westwood, 1984, Gilroy, 1987, McRobbie, 1991) 
but to point to its resistance to a conceptual marriage with other spheres of 
oppression. This resistance is partly to do with the influence of marxism in class 
theorising and its privileging of class as a key social determinant with other spheres of 
oppression understood as symptoms of it (e. g. German, 1989). But for the purposes 
of my discussion, I have in mind particularly an underestimated relationship between 
the social and the subjective with respect to class and a consequent inability to spot 
the individual in the crowd. The scholarships on sexism and racism have tended to 
bring both the individual and the collective into their view, thereby enabling tensions 
between the psychic and the social to be interrogated. In contrast, there is no 
worked-up conception of 'classism' in class analysis to articulate what might 
undermine an individual who is objectified and naturalised as an exclusively classed 
subject. In this sense, much class analysis can be part of the problem if it ascribes 
an overwhelming class master status to those it designates working class. 
There is, then, a legacy of separate development between the analysis of 
class on the one hand, and of racism and sexism (and indeed other 'isms') on the 
other. This separate development has contributed to a degree of academic and 
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political competition. Thus marxian class analysis once dominated social science as 
a key site for examining inequality but was later challenged as a principal determinant 
of inequality in the light of growing awareness of problems of gender and 'race'. Such 
competition was commonly framed within the competing paradigms of Marxism and 
Weberianism and, of course, in the light of increased feminist and anti-racist 
scholarship (Giddens and Held, 1992). Although many attempted to bring the 
various sources of inequality together (e. g. Aronowitz, 1992, Grusky, 1994) they 
tended to be represented as relatively independent variables incapable of ontological 
commonality. In part, the collectivist analysis of class, however sensitively updated, 
was responsible for this incapability. For instance, a black, working class woman 
could be seen to suffer a triple oppression but the class variable was likely to be 
analytically split off from the others. As I have indicated, racism and sexism have 
been analytically situated in a psycho-social dynamic. Classic examples of this can 
be found in de Bois (1989), Fanon (1986), Wollstonecraft (1985) and de Beauvoir 
(1992). In contrast, the visibility of class oppression as an existential problem is 
seriously impaired by an emphasis on the socio-economic, collective status of class. 
Thus workers are less individuated and, when they are, it is frequently within the 
limits of class representation: a working class hero perhaps but rarely a hero. 
Invariably, being, feeling, living a working class life has come to be understood within 
a political or cultural study that overlooks the supraclass, i. e. the human, in such a 
life. This neglect derives partly from a marxism that is invested in working class 
people as agents for change beyond themselves rather than within themselves. 
Marxist class analysis is tied to an emancipatory vision of society which fixes 
its view of class in the past in terms of what must be ruptured (class society) and in 
the future in terms of what must be (classless society). This position is most simply 
put in the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1967) or Lenin's The State and 
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Revolution (1992) and as Giddens writes, it continues to inform left, radical thinking 
as a central idea (Giddens, 1994). Such a view carries the risk of overdetermining 
the working class as a collectivity (for only as such can it challenge class society) and 
underdetermining working class people as individuals (for they are subsumed to a 
greater good as a collective) and of fudging what it means to be an individual worker 
in the present. This view of the working class has been critiqued both in terms of the 
question of single agency and of the location of power and production (e. g. Foucault, 
1979, Gorz, 1982, Poster, 1994) but less so in terms of where it leaves the working 
class subject, actually and conceptually. Indeed, whether he is brought on to the 
centre stage of history or dismissed to its margins, the working class individual 
remains more object than subject. 
The problem of a collectivist view of workers can be found on both sides of the 
political spectrum though of course the value judgements made by them differ. From 
the right, workers are mindless units of labour, "the new stupid" as Aldous Huxley (in 
Carey, 1992, p. 16) described them; from 'the left, they are a collectivity of class 
warriors. This is perhaps an intrinsic risk in the analysis of class, be it marxist or not. 
The mere act of exploring the working class as a socio-economic and political entity 
freezes it into an object, producing a reified image through a violent abstraction from 
the real and differentiated lives of many people. As Gorz (1989) put it in relation to the 
sociological imagination: 
The sociologist... makes it impossible for himself to understand that 
each individual is also for himself a reality which exceeds what society 
gives him the means to say and do and that no one actually coincides 
with what the sociologists call their social 'identity' (Gorz, 1989, p. 176). 
For Gorz, there must be an imaginative leap beyond the unitary categories 
sociology constructs for an understanding of the limits of such categories. 
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Baudrillard (1983) makes a similar point in his assertion that the narrative of the 
masses has become more real than its object. 
Another difficulty within a class emancipationist analysis resides in a mixture of 
political and emotional dependence of left activists on the working class. The 
conviction that the working class has the sole agency for changing class society 
offloads the challenge of transformative practices from those who are not working 
class to those who are. Arguably, this is a questionable political 'gift' for those already 
burdened with more onerous work than other classes. While I do not want to 
suggest that working class people do not gain from political activism - indeed it is 
often a source of emotional and intellectual fulfilment - rather within this formula of 
class power, middle class people need not interrogate the investments they may have 
in depending on others to bring about radical change. Class politics of this kind 
offers a series of deferrals until revolution that leaves the existential full of preparatory 
activity but empty of a challenging present perhaps. Crudely, middle class radicals 
may encourage the working class but not themselves. The question of change 
becomes one of projection onto others. A critique of this political posture came 
particularly from feminists who stressed that a revolution without must connect to one 
within. The slogan 'the personal is political' directly targeted a class politics that 
neglected 'private' endeavours in this way (Rowbotham, 1973, Barratt, 1988). 
Recent trends in social and political science exhibit a fading faith in the notion 
of a special working class mission to change society. As Foucault's conception of 
power articulates, there is no single locus of great refusal (Foucault, 1979, Poster, 
1994). No class is discretely positioned and mutable by the other in struggle alone for 
classes, as I elaborate below, keep each other alive. Classes, King (1992) 
reminds us, are relational and artificial: 
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We may well discover a class which is 'for itself or 'against itself or 
even classes that know not what to do with themselves - but certainly 
not which exists 'in itself. A class in isolation, by excluding nothing, is 
nothing. All social strata are significantly artificial and each stratum 
acquires meaning by the quality of its interactions with the other or 
other(s) (King, 1992, p. 499). 
If the artificiality of class is forgotten, its study can slide easily into a class 
speciesist direction in which people's . 
class position becomes an exhaustive 
explanation of them. Notwithstanding its economic rationale, the political idea of the 
privileged agency of the working class drifts into a moralist speciesism. The working 
class is chosen because it is in the right place (at the point of production) at the right. 
time (developed capitalism) which gives it a defining historical mission from which 
individuated escape is either defeat or betrayal. Within such a politics, the integrity of 
working class individuals rests on their class status, not their human status. 
The inference that the working class is good because it is specially placed is 
perhaps inflated marxism. Certainly. what seems to have been lost from Marx is the 
understanding he offered of the damages which capitalism inflicts upon workers. 
There is no doubt that Marx believed the working class to be harmed emotionally, 
intellectually and physically by a system that demands so little of a worker's mental 
capacity and so much of her time and physical exertion (Marx, 1976, Part viii). 
These themes have been muted, inevitably perhaps, by those that choose the 
working class as a key to the transformation of society. Nobody wants to back a lame 
horse and Marxist politics is emotionally driven to consider the working class as more 
abled than disabled by its conditions of existence. In reality, of course, working class 
experiences interweave with other, human, experiences to produce a mixed bag that 
defies political simplifications. 
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Johnson (1979) touches on one of the difficulties here in his proposal for a 
more culturalist perspective on class where he suggests that Marxist politics fails to 
marry the worker both as object of capitalism and as subject of a political collectivity. 
This, Johnson argues, is a 'class and class-consciousness problematic' which 
creates a passive/active split in the worker: 
At the heart of this definition of class is the figure of the 'worker' or 'the 
labourer'.. In this guise the proletariat is understood, passively, as a 
creation of capital, thrown hither and thither by its movements; only in a 
second moment does it become active, a collective agency or force 'for 
itself (Johnson, 1979, p. 203). 
In this marxian formula, there is little room for a worker's human and unique 
formation of self. Indeed, the question of self-actualisation is spirited away with a 
faith in the more or less spontaneous arrival of collective actualisation through 
struggle. I do not want to suggest that all Marxists have been insensitive to the 
dynamic between self and collective realisation. In addressing the question of 
educating working class people, Gramsci, for instance, stressed the 'unprecedented 
difficulties ' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 43) they must overcome in order to transcend class 
restrictiveness. My point is rather that a sense of these unprecedented difficulties 
has. been downplayed in a politics of faith in the collectivity that. neglects personal and 
educational struggles for growth. 
While working class cultural studies have attempted to rescue working class 
people from the polarised choices that either overpoliticise or undersocialise them, 
their search for class cultures and countercultures tended to return them to a 
collectivist prism. However modified the analysis, it seemed that working class 
people were always getting on with being working class people. For instance, 
although Johnson posited cultural mediations by which class is constituted to 
overcome the passive/active split of marxian politics, his working class subjects can 
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only negotiate class restrictiveness, they do not transcend it or even yearn to do so. 
The kind of cultural studies Johnson represented were concerned with class triumph 
within oppression: 
It is a matter of historical record that working class culture has been 
built around the task of making fundamentally punishing conditions 
more habitable (Johnson, 1979 p. 237). 
I can see three problems with. this reading of working class culture and thus of 
working class life. Firstly, it may be true that many working class people have 
developed ways of 'making fundamentally punishing conditions more habitable' but is 
this a class, cultural response or is it about human adaptability and endurance? 
Secondly, is this proposition reliably generalisable? What people bring to punishing 
conditions is hard to- classify in culturally collectivist terms: Some may despair; some 
may become violent; some may weep; some may become resourceful; humorous and 
so forth. This sort of differentiated response to oppression renders the. idea of a 
collective, cultural one problematic. Thirdly, an assessment of how well people are 
doing in their oppression lacks ambition for them; they become otherised by 
evaluative standards that avoid universal application. Making do creatively is still 
making do -with less than others. Nelson Mandela (1994) heroically turned 
'fundamentally punishing conditions' into more habitable ones during his long term of 
imprisonment, but many shared his ambition to be free of them entirely. 
Whereas feminists and anti-racists have felt it legitimate and crucial to 
examine the psychic and intellectual damage produced by oppression, there was a 
phase of cultural studies which tended to focus more on working class flourishment 
than on a failure to thrive. (e. g. Hall and Jefferson, 1976, Corrig; an, 1979, Willis, 1977, 
McRobbie, 1991). Of course working class lives are not merely 'a reflex of defeat' 
(Willis, 1977, p. 52) but nor can they be entirely liberated from class restrictiveness and 
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the common agonies of human existence. If studies are inattentive to the wider 
human frame within which classed life is lived, they will do more to silence the scream 
of oppression than to expose it. Willy Russell(1981) understood this well in his play 
Educating Rita when he had Rita protest that there must be better tunes to know than 
those she had learnt in her working class milieu. While resourcefulness and 
intelligent survival are worth honouring in class analysis, there is a danger of 
overstating this. It would seem that there has been a shift of emphasis from the kind 
of analysis of working class life which could declare, for instance, that: 
Everything that the proletariat can do to improve his position is but a 
drop in the ocean compared with the floods of varing chances to which 
he is exposed, over which he has. not the slightest control (Engels, 
1969, p. 146). 
Or Gramsci's (1971) insistences on the problems of cultural inadequacy, to a 
perspective. that the working class is well developed, emotionally, culturally and 
intellectually. Clearly, some shift of analysis is warranted to account for the dramatic 
material, educational and technological changes since Engels and then Gramsci 
wrote, but has a resistance to a deficiency model lead us to deny that working class 
life is deficient? In the 1970s in particular, writers from the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies at Birmingham University tended to defend the-working class as a 
thriving, self-contained entity which has: 
... its own corporate culture, 
its own forms of social relationship, its 
characteristic institutions, values, modes of life (Hall and Jefferson, 
1976, p. 61). 
This picture of autonomous working class life visualises. its arrival, it becomes 
a class that is well-sorted and doing fine down mean streets. This status of 
separate, developed, class positioning overdetermines working class people as 
exclusively classed individuals. There is a danger too of a sort of colonial 
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anthropology here in which the natives are seen to be primitively happy. The routine 
and often arduous business of making do within conditions of cultural and material 
subsistence is read as exotic and good. By such a reading, just about any activity 
could be interpreted as meaningful resistance to class restrictiveness as opposed to 
a symptom of it. For example, hanging about, doing nothing, having a 'laff, not doing 
your homework, sharing makeup and girly giggling was fashionably packaged as 
'resistance through rituals' by this sociology (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, Corrigan, 1977, 
Willis, 1979, McRobbie, 1991). Implicit in such sociology, ennui, it seemed, was a 
middle class condition. Apparently, the ever resourceful, ever cheerful working class 
subject could stave off the anguish and tedium of having little by 'doing nothing' 
(Corrigan, 1977). 
From the dour post war studies of working class communities like Coal is Our 
Life (Dennis et. al. 1969) and Family and Kinship in East London (Young and 
Wilmot, 1962) or cultural deficiency studies in education (Jackson and Marsdon, 
1966), it would seem that a fresh wave of cultural studies bent the stick, turning 
disability into ability in a colourful assessment of disadvantage. Such a trend was 
facilitated, perhaps, by a higher education expansion at the time which enabled. 
emigres from the working class to offer social scientific research the voguish and 
romanticised asset of their roots. Whatever its origins, this kind of class gaze 
reinforced the risk of a close and friendly encounter with the conservative conviction 
that the working class is indeed separate and doing fine within its limits 
(Bantock, 1981). 
Clearly, attempts to restore some sense of independent vitality to the working 
class have been important and this was a laudable part of class cultural studies. 
Research like Richard Hoggart's (1990) pioneered theoretical vistas beyond the 
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cloth cap and what he felt to be a 'middle class Marxist' tendency to "part- pity and 
part-patronise working class people beyond any semblance of reality" (p. 16). Yet it 
was still a vista that was framed within a working class ontology. What is still 
conveyed is a sense that the working class has split off from the rest of classes and 
has settled into a companionable niche made hospitable by its own ingenuity. If 
Hoggart's work and others that followed, contested negative abstractions of the 
working class, they did so, perhaps, at the risk of positive abstraction and a retention 
of essentialist and collectivist imagery. 
4. Class Speciesism 
The view that the working class is a distinctive collective from the rest of 
humanity ultimately risks a speciesist explanation of class that invites general, 
stereotypical readings of a very large segment of society. The following quote from 
Berger, for instance, defines the central thrust of Reid's (1977) Sourcebook on Social 
Class Differences in Britain: 
Different classes in our society not only live differently quantitatively, 
they live in different styles qualitatively. A sociologist worth his (sic) 
salt... can make intelligent guesses about the type of pictures on the wall 
and books or magazines likely to be found on the shelves of the living 
room.. . predict the number of children sired 
by his subject and also 
whether the latter has sexual relations with his wife with the lights on or 
off. (Berger in. Reid, 1977, p. 18) 
This zealous piece of class determinism would have sexual intercourse 
(siring! ) submit to a classed principle of correlation. Apart from the methodological 
problems the search for linkages between class, sex and lighting arrangements 
might produce, the very pursuit of them is informed by an acute sense of class 
specieism. What is squeezed out, of course (apart from the female subject in this 
example) is any scope for individuation, even in the bedroom and what is overblown 
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is the concept of class itself. Although Berger refers to all classes in this statement, 
arguably working class people are more vulnerable to stereotypification precisely 
because they have been the focus of much social and political scientific attention 
(Roberts, 1978). 
An avoidance of class essentialism requires a closer examination of both the 
difficulties and the possibilities of individuation among working class people; and this 
means, among other things, playing with the paradox of suspending class in order to 
comprehend its parameters. The cultural theorist Paul Willis seems to have moved 
his own work in this direction. In contrast to his study of working class boys in a 
Midlands secondary school (Willis, 1977)in Common Culture, (Willis, 1990) Willis 
explores how working class people: 
want significance and satisfaction now necessarily partly as individuals 
and not as part of the army of other people's power (Willis, 1990, p. 17). 
Willis argues that increased individuation in working class life brings about a 
welcome fragmentation of classed life: 
The subversion and destruction - verbally, stylistically, expressively - of 
stereotypical views of homogeneous class cultures is to be welcomed. 
For the working class this is a victory. Certain freedoms and especially 
cultural ones, are felt and produce change, individually. This does not 
signify the end of classes and groups. It is in and from these positions 
and mutualities, and in different ways, that individuality grows and 
returns to it in surprising ways (Willis, 1990, p. 17). 
Willis strongly suggests here that we need to retain the concept of class but 
abandon a collectivist imagery of it. We have to remember that people are exploited, 
underpaid, cast out of work, poorly educated, disrespected and so forth. But we must 
remember too that many crawl under the class fence to escape or to return with their 
arms full of other class or supraclass goodies. There is a shift here from the class 
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cultural view of a working class life made larger by internal resistances to one that is 
enlarged by class transcendence. In Willis' Learning to Labour (1977), workers 
collectively fight capitalism, albeit in a 'partially penetrative' way. In Common Culture 
(1990), working class people fight for a place in the sun as self-actualised individuals 
and this turns class into a more fluid element of their lives. Thus the artificialities of 
class circumscribe a struggle for self-actualisation but not wholly. Giddens'(1991, 
1994), as I discuss in chapter 6 offers a complementary perspective to this view. 
If we cannot see the unique human in the working class individual, however 
sympathetic the gaze, she will always disappear into an undifferentiated 'mass'. 
Moreover, this gaze will serve to stress our own individuality at the cost of those 
whom we lump together. Carey (1992) put this problem well: 
The mass... is a metaphor, for the unknowable and invisible. We cannot 
see the mass. Crowds can be seen; but the mass is the crowd in its 
metaphysical aspect - the sum of all possible crowds - and that can take 
on conceptual form only as a metaphor. The metaphor of the mass 
serves the purpose of individual self-assertion because it turns other 
people into a conglomerate. It denies them the individuality which we 
ascribe to ourselves and to people we know (Carey, 1992, p. 21). 
Here Carey alerts us to the existence of the working class as the middle class 
Other. The twist in some left political traditions has been in the denigration of the 
middle class self (whatever that might mean) by the middle class individual himself in 
favour of a romanticised working class identity (Giddens, 1994). More diffuse, 
perhaps, is the kind of negative otherising of working class people that I discuss later 
with respect to Carey's (1992) and Sennet and Cobb's (1993) research. Such 
otherising is rooted in modernity's formation. 
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5. The roots of modern classism: The enlightenment 'people condition'. 
I think that a discourse which refuses to otherise or naturalise the working 
class is best developed within a concept of classism. It is, after all, classist to judge 
someone wholly through factors of class membership, be the judgement negative or 
positive. It is classist to ascribe to people natural class attributes, to homogenise a 
group, permitting little scope for individuation or differentiation. It is classist to behold 
the other as primarily a classed other. A discourse of classism admits class analysis - 
indeed insists upon it - but not class essentialism. To avoid slippage from the one to 
the other we need a historical imagination. All attempts to dismantle prejudice require 
that we begin with an exploration of its roots. 
Thompson's observation that the working class did not 'rise like the 
sun'(Thompson, 1968 p. 8) is a useful reminder of the artificiality of class. Unlike, male 
and female, the working class did not appear with the beginnings of humanity though 
it is often ahistoricised by functionalist sociology in this way. (Davis and Moor, 1945). 
It is true, however, that the existence of subordinate groups in society has an 
extremely long history; each new epoch or mode of production is more likely to be 
presented with a reconfiguration of the labouring classes than its invention. It is this 
process of reconfiguration that gives an impression of class fixity because it is 
generationally reproductive. But this socially inherited character of working classness 
is often refused against claims which argue the universality of class formation in 
history. The persistence of a phenomenon is taken to be evidence of its natural 
character even though, as Tumin (1967) put it: 
neither the ubiquity nor the antiquity of a phenomenon may be cited as 
grounds to consider it (class) inevitable or of value (Tumin, 1967, p. 
106). 
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That is not to say that the 'ubiquity' and 'antiquity' of class are inconsequential 
indeed it is this which facilitates class prejudice. As Williams (1976) points out with 
respect to the formation of modern concepts of class: 
"in modern usage, the sense of rank, though residual, is still active; in one 
kind of use class is still essentially defined by birth" (Williams, 1976, p. 66). 
It is important that we do not see this idea of class 'essentially defined by birth' 
merely as an ideological dredge from feudalism. The capitalist view of class is 
ambiguously positioned between class fixity and mobility to accommodate its dual 
needs for class movement and class stability. This ambiguity was part of the 
bourgeois revolutionary logic ( Bauman, 1987, Chiswick, 1981) as is revealed in its 
most intellectually progressive movement, viz. the enlightenment. Given that this 
was the period in which equality was launched as the companion to modernity, it is 
worth focussing on its deliberations on the question of class. Chiswick (1981) 
provides an extensive trawl of such deliberations. His research shows that the 
enlightenment movement for a more just society never intended that labourers would 
be its full beneficiaries. Chiswick describes this as the enlightnment problem of the 
'people condition'. On the one hand, the enlighteners wanted a more fluid society in 
which achieved status replaced ascribed status; on the other hand, it held onto 
something of an ascribed status for the masses because modern society required a 
good stock of labourers to turn its wheels. Ironically, the enlightenment movement 
produced. a fear of 'overeducation'. The right books were getting into the wrong 
hands. Hempson (1968) cites in evidence, "'the disgruntled Restif de la Bretonne": 
'In recent times the working people of the capital have become 
impossible to deal with, because they have read in our (sic) books 
truths too potent for them (Hempson, 1968, p. 138). 
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If labourers were to stay at their ploughs, they needed to believe in their station 
and be protected from the "disordered luxury" (Chiswick, 1986, p. 151) of education. 
Chiswick concludes that the enlightenment debates on education refused the 
movement's philosophical aspiration for a wholly enlightened population: 
If a significant minority in the enlightened community questioned the 
suitability of initiating the lower classes into the skills of literacy, there 
was near unanimity for the view that the people should not proceed 
beyond a rudimentary primary education and that the colleges remain 
closed to them (Chiswick, 1986, p. 148). 
Enlightenment humanism was very partial, then, because it denied a condition 
of humanity to most humans (see also Bauman, 1987). Moreover, the necessity of 
labour was expressed through a superiority complex that reinforced feudal 
conceptions of rank and virtue. According to the enlightenment dictionarists, for 
instance, the lower classes are: 
.. poor and 
ignorant, if not actually stupid. More than this, the people is 
not to be trusted, and may even be dangerous: "the people does not 
know what it wants"; "The common people of London is malicious"; "the 
common people, the rabble, the mob is malevolent and seditious" 
(Chiswick, 1986, p. 51). 
Though he provides' an important reminder of the deep seatedness of the 
history of class prejudice, it needs to be added that Chiswick's study suffers from a 
one-dimensional reading. Chiswick tends to flatten class ambivalence into 
unproblematic class prejudice. In doing so, he underestimates the environmentalist 
thrust of enlightenment thought and its political progressiveness. Firstly, a study of 
enlighteners like those of the Scottish Enlightenment reveal greater sensitivity to the 
conditioned nature of labourers. Marx, himself a child of the enlightenment, (Rattansi, 
1982) leant creatively upon theorists like Ferguson and Smith to press this point in his 
own explorations on socially induced intelligence. Smith, for instance, argued that: 
41 
The very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different 
professions when grown to maturity, is not upon many occasions so 
much the case as the effect of the division of labour. The difference 
between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a 
common street porter for example, seems to arise not so much from 
nature, as from habit, custom and education (Smith in Rattansi, 
1982, p. 18). 
This social view of 'different genius' is in dramatic contrast to that of the French 
philosophes reported in Chiswick. Partly, of course, the difference lays in the fact that 
Smith had in mind the formative proletariat from the first period of British manufacture, 
while the French enlighteners often renewed age-old prejudices about rural labourers 
(Hempson, 1968). A partial exception to this renewal lays in the work of Rousseau 
whose spiritual egalitarianism 1 discuss later. 
Secondly, there is the enlightenment concept of the citizen within which all men 
- and perhaps even women - are equal before the law. Although Chiswick rightly 
points to the 'limits of reform in the enlightenment' with respect to class, the proposed 
replacement of ascribed status with achieved status and the principles of political and 
legal equality constituted a real and progressive step. While it is true that some 
enlighteners were hesitant or even hostile to this step applying to labourers, this 
'brilliant and inquisitive age' (Hempson, 1968) must be understood too as one that 
raised more questions than it could answer. (Gay, 1964, Hulme and Jordanova, 1990, 
Hall and Gieben, 1992). 
For all its weaknesses, a return to enlightenment explorations into inequality is 
important because they represented a major attempt to break from predestined views 
of humanity. Manuel (1972) goes so far as to suggest that nineteenth. century 
organicism ruptured this attempt. There was, argues Manuel, a reversal from the 
eighteenth century view of men: 
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.. as more or less equal, or at least similar, in nature and hence in rights to the early nineteenth century emphasis upon human uniqueness, 
diversity, dissimilarity, culminating in theories of inequality and 
organicism (Manuel, 1972, p. 221). 
This is perhaps an overstated paradigm shift. As many have argued ( e. g. 
Bauman, 1987, Pateman, 1989, Starobinski, 1988, Hulme and Jordanova, 1990, 
Young R., 1992, Fermon, 1994) enlightenment humanism was insufficiently rigorous to 
contest its own cheauvanisms and its dogmatism. The enlightenment was also a 
revolt against rank that ended in freshly ranked tyrannies and the new religion of 
Reason. Arguably, organicist ideas were more than a theoretical response to the 
reign of terror's opportunist pursuit of egalite, liberte, et fratemite. The 
enlightenment, after all, helped to inspire a bourgeois revolution in which the 'people 
condition' was bound to be left at a loose end. Social theorists, like Durkheim (1984) 
merely picked up the thread to give a modern reading of class as 'natural' and 
necessary. 
Ultimately, the enlightenment movement produced an abstract egalitarianism 
that failed to ground itself in the flesh and blood of all. This abstraction bequeathed to 
nineteenth century theorists two possible directions: either its limits could be 
contested; or they could be justified. Either principles of equality needed to be 
extended to all members of humanity; or proof needed to be found as to why some 
were more equal than others. Various utopian, feminist, abolitionist and socialist 
movements attempted the first direction. Organicism was part of a scientist 
endeavour to prove the naturalness of class society and thus of inequality in 
fulfilment of the second direction. Arguably, it was, in part, the scientism embedded 
in the enlightenment concept of Reason that gave new credibility to the concept of 
class and of inherited ability as one of its organising principles. As Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1979) have argued, Reason drifted easily into scientist apology 
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whenever the enlighteners and their intellectual heirs refused to pursue rigorously the 
logic of enlightenment radicalism. In this sense, they argue that nineteenth century 
positivist perspectives such as those I discuss below were a failure of enlightenment 
nerve rather than a break from it. 
6. Organicist and Pseudo-scientific concepts of class 
Polarised interpretations of enlightenment ideas as comprising either a 
destructive, grand narrative or an unfinished project, squash its contradictory 
inheritances into a single meaning (Outhwaite, 1994). I think that it is more helpful 
to retain Adorno and Horkheimer's (1979) conception of the enlightenment movement 
as dialectical, capable both of debunking myths and producing new ones. With 
respect to class, this contradictory process is expressed in the concurrent 
enlightenment concepts of meritocracy and equality which I have discussed in chapter 
1. Crudely - and structural determinants aside - nineteenth century organcism is 
enabled by an unresolved tension from eighteenth century class narratives. From the 
fear of overeducation there was an easy transition to the nineteenth century 
convictions about inherited ability. Though the movement was not neatly sequential, 
there was a shift from fear of the mob to a containment of it, from 'they must not read 
these books' to 'they are unable to read these books' or, in more modified form and 
for the sake of gentrification, 'they cannot read as well as us'. In her assessment of 
nineteenth century 'scientific' activity, Bisseret (1979), for instance, concludes that 
modernity's legitimation for class inequality included a revised view of aptitude. 
Schools, Bisseret claims, needed the concept of hereditary aptitude for class 
selective procedures: 
According to a generally adopted system of interpretation, success or failure at 
school would be a manifestation of constitutional and hereditary intellectual 
aptitude (Bisseret, 1979, p. 6). 
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Aptitude, argues Bisseret, was the new organising category of an ascendant 
bourgeoisie which need to: 
consolidate itself as a class by denying to those whom it subjected to its 
political and economic power the essential qualities of intelligence, merit 
and responsibility, of which it availed itself and which justified its power 
(Bisseret, 1979, p. 12). 
Before the 19th century, aptitude meant a faculty conferred upon individuals 
such as the aptitude to practise law, or a divine freedom. But the concept lost this 
meaning along with a diminished belief in the Lockean concept of the tabula rasa. 
Aptitude was now seen as. an innate attribute, discernible in the bodies of individuals 
and thus available for scientific discovery through, for instance, the measurement of 
the skull. Such discoveries re-routed social disparities in a "new transcendental order 
of an irreducible and determinant biological nature" (Bisseret, 1979, p. 14). 
Nineteenth century pseudo-physiology relaunched the classed body as part of 
an organicist logic that claimed the parts to the whole of humanity to be natural 
classes. Class differences were seen to be complementary and integral to the 
organisational needs of humanity, particularly in terms of a division of labour. Using 
the physiologist Bichat's 'findings', Saint-Simon, for instance, argued that there was a 
natural professional class (having a dominant brain) an industrial class (having a 
sensory type brain) and a labouring class having a motor type brain ). For Saint- 
Simon the task of modern society was to ensure, through universal education, that 
people found their right water level. Whereas the feudal order ascribed status at 
birth, modern society would mobilise social processes such as education to identify 
natural aptitudes (Manuel, 1972). This is where class analysis and analysis of 
sexism and racism have important commonalties. 
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In his assessment of European anthropology, Stocking (1982), like Manuel, 
identified a break from environmentalist perspectives from the enlightenment to the 
launching of the concept of race by the 19th century. The 18th century anthropologist 
Degerando, he argues, . offers 
"no permanent hereditary differences between the 
groups of the human family"(Stocking, 1982, p. 28). A shift took place by the next 
century with the advent of physical anthropology, more interested in measuring the 
skulls and brains of black people than in their social relations. By the nineteenth 
century physical anthropology, starting with Cuvier, writes Stocking: 
... represented, 
indeed might even be said to have promulgated, the 
point of view which largely dominated biology in the first half of the 
same century; the essentially static, non revolutionary tradition of 
comparative anatomy (Stocking, 1982, p. 29). 
Comparative anatomy was a frontal attack on humanism for it posited the 
possibility of many 'races' within the human race. From the search for the distinctive 
and the inferior in 'foreign peoples' it was but a step to turn to the 'foreigners' at home. 
Cooter (1979) refers to a 'flood of literature' popularising physiology in 19th century 
Britain. The body came to be used in two ways. 
Firstly, as with Bichat, Saint-Simon and Cuvier, the body itself was examined 
for its distinctive morphology. There were many such endeavours throughout Europe, 
including those of the Italian criminologist Lombroso (Lombroso-Ferrero, 1911) whom 
I discuss later, though France was the pioneer of this physiology. Initially, men like 
Cannabis held on to an enlightenment concept of conditioned differences but this 
gave way to an unequivocally classifist approach from Bichat, the most influential 
founding father of physiology (Jones, 1990). Second, the body was seen as society 
itself. Such an approach was part of a general adherence to positivist explanations of 
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the world in which social scientists, notably August Comte, used the body as a 
metaphor. The argument is simple. Society is an organism in much the same way as 
the body: each has interdependent but hierarchically placed elements some of which 
are dispensable, others not. Cooter (1979) reminds us that the body metaphor was 
relaunched by modern theorists from a very old tradition. The fable of Menenius 
Agrippa "illustrates the great antiquity of the analogical exploitation of man's most 
available metaphor - his body"(Cooter, p. 74). This metaphor, continues Cooter, was 
"scientized into social theory, eventually evolving into 20th century functionalism" 
(Cooter, 1979, p. 73). 
Physiology determined the differences in bodies that compose the 
differentiated body of society. This is an issue dear to Foucault for it is precisely the 
development of classificatory sciences like physiology that lead to the intense labours 
of sorting, selecting, registering and testing that produced the disciplines and 
disciplinary order of modern society (Jones, 1990, pp. 98,99). The 'mad', the 
criminal' 'homosexuals', women and working class people had to be differentiated for 
their relegation to appropriate institutions or social spheres and for the flourishment of 
the modern sciences that must 'explain' them (Foucault, 1975,1990,1991). 
Racism, of course, has an enduring relationship with pseudo-physiology for 
many racists claim that the human species is biologically differentiated and unevenly 
evolved. Sexism too feeds off the prejudice that there is a biological differentiation 
between male and female with respect to innate ability. As Dyehouse (1981) has 
shown, 19th century physiology committed itself to the expansion of this differentiation 
in terms of brain size but crucially through the proposition that a reproductive system 
cannot work if the female brain is 'overtaxed'. Thus discourses against racism and 
sexism have had to maintain contestations with pseudo- physiological arguments. 
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Though they may change the details of the claims the basic idea of inferiority residing 
in the physiology of females and in groups racially defined, remains important for 
racists and sexists. In contrast, such biologism with respect to class is a relatively . 
uncontested view. 
Ironically, perhaps we underestimate the diffusion of biologist formulations on 
class because they have been part of a common sense discourse on inequality for so 
long. Indeed a first initiative to bring education to the adult labouring class was 
designed to promote class biologism. The Mechanics Institutions were established 
partly to communicate to working class people the scientific justification for their 
status as workers. It was felt that if people understood the physiological factors that 
determined their capacities, they would. become at peace with their station 
(Cooter, 1979). Additionally, there were many movements and social reformers of the 
19th century who, notwithstanding their radicalism in other respects, believed in the 
pseudo-physiological message about innate class. Cooter (1984, p. 84) instances 
Zetetics, Owenites, secularists and some chartists. Nineteenth century literature with 
a reputation for promoting social reform exhibited this belief too. 
When the Artful Dodger meets Oliver Twist, Dickens describes the former as a 
"snub-nosed, flat-browed, common-faced boy with rather bow legs and little sharp 
ugly eyes" whereas. Twist is a "pale, thin child" with a "good sturdy spirit". Rose 
et. al. (1984) point out the relationship. Dickens establishes in Oliver Twist with the 
body and with social class. Though Oliver Twist was brought up from birth in the 
deprived, rough and tumble of a workhouse, Dickens retains for him the sensibilities 
of the 'good breeding' he inherits from his mother whom he never knew. While the 
Dodger speaks Cockney "I know a 'spectable old genelman as lives there, wot'll give 
you lodgings for nothink... ", Twist "with tears standing in his eyes as he spoke" 
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produces the Queen's English "I have walked a long way. I have been walking these 
seven days"(Dickins in Rose, et. al. 1984 p. 17). When Oliver is restored to his class 
origins, he displays no behavioural difficulties from his former wayward life; he adapts 
intelligently and cooperatively to his new environment as if he had always been 
nurtured there. In contrast, the Artful Dodger is incorrigibly street-wise, sly and 
criminal. While newer versions of Oliver Twist have de-stereotyped the anti- 
semitically drawn Fagin, the classed characters of Twist and Dodger are faithful to 
Dicken's original ones. 
Rose et. al. (1 984) also instance Zola's L'Assommoir (The Dram-Shop), which 
is the story of a laundress's journey from rags to riches and back to rags. Here Zola 
gives a reverse story of original destiny with respect to female, classed, degeneration. 
While Oliver found his rightful place in the middle classes, the laundress fell back to. 
the gutter whence she came. Her return to rags was predestined "for a sloth arose 
in the laundress which returned her to type to the affinity for degradation and filth that 
passed into her blood from her drunken layabout father, Antoine Macquart" (Zola, in 
Rose et. al. 1984 p. 24). While the Artful Dodger attracted a certain sympathy and 
even envy for his criminal vitality, the laundress' fall was part of her classed 
womanhood. Zola permits no space in her decline for audience sympathy. She was 
like those nineteenth century women whose fall was seen to originate in an 
incomplete whiteness; they were thrownback, as the racist fantasy had it, from Africa. 
Gilman (1992) shows how Lombroso 'explained' European prostitution 
through racist comparative anatomy. Prostitutes are not so much 'fallen' working 
class women as unevolved humans like those inhabiting non-European shores. 
Lombroso connects the African woman with the 'abnormal' European prostitute. He 
purportedly examined the labia and found a common physiology in "the elongation of 
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the labia major in prostitutes" with the "apron of the disgusting Hottentots (Gilman, 
1992, p. 187). Like all 'criminals' for Lombroso, the prostitute is atavistic and the proof 
of this is to compare her with the so-called primitive African. In this disturbing essay, 
Gilman shows how physiologists managed to site black women and men and white 
working class women in the same colonially demarcated space: below Europe, below 
humanity. 
Different roads have been established from the nineteenth century endeavours 
of physiology with respect to social class into the twentieth century. There remains 
some interest in education in the body of the working class person. In the nineteen 
sixties The Ministry of Education, reporting on 'average' and 'below average' pupils 
alerted schoolteachers to the fact that the 'less than average pupil' would be smaller 
and would weigh less than the 'brighter pupil (Ministry of Education Report, 1963 p. 11). 
. 
This ' may, of course, be more based on assumptions about malnutrition than on 
physiological differences. As Steedman's (1990) study of Margaret McMillan shows, 
the physical condition of the working class was the subject of much concern and 
policy response from early twentieth century educators. Steedman's research 
indicates that some of this interest leant on the views popularised by Sant-Simon. It 
is clear too that concern also derived from an understanding of the conditioning 
influences on working class bodies, a conditioning that could be changed with good 
food, exercise and hygiene. The medicalisation of working class children that this 
concern created has established health checks and medical classifications within the 
schooling process. Such a practice keeps alive perhaps a. preoccupation with the 
supposed physical particularlies of disadvantaged children. It may. be that this 
preoccupation carries with it a tendency to over-observe ' appearances and under- 
examine the inner life of working class individuals. 
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The idea that we can 'see' intelligence or moral disposition in the face and the 
body of others is present in ordinary modern language: he looks bright; she looks 
dim. While it may be true that intelligence has a sheen and ignorance is dull, this can 
be said too of wealth and poverty or of happiness and misery respectively. Who 
knows what judgements we conflate in our classed impressions? How often are we 
guided, as with Dicken's narrative, to see the flaw before we know it. While it is 
clearly simplistic to read off character or intelligence from the exterior of a body, the 
impulse to do so may be hard to stem. What is at issue is not that we curb the 
impulse but that we make this reading self-conscious and critical; otherwise, we may 
bring to it a judgementalism about social class that is powerfully rooted in a history of 
prejudice of which we are barely aware. Moreover, if there are fewer today willing to 
buy the ridiculous claims of pseudo-physiology, there remain plenty who will buy 
explanations of the differentiated mind to complement a class gaze. 
7. Eugenics and concepts of inherited intelligence 
Just as nineteenth century physiology drew comparisons between the 'native' 
body within Europe. and the 'native' body without, so a related discipline, eugenics, 
sought to prove commonalties in the minds of both 'native' groups. Such an 
endeavour was linked to the sinister aim of population control; reduction of the lower 
orders and certain 'racial' groups could be justified on the basis of their innately low 
intelligence. Early immigration legislation in the United States, for instance, was 
based on a system of 'national origin quotas' that sought to restrict people of 
Southern and Eastern Europe and to encourage 'Nordics' because it was held by 
intelligence testers that the latter were more intelligent than the former. (Rose et. al. 
1984). These regional distinctions concealed class discrimination in a racist defence 
of limited access to the land of opportunity. This concealment accompanies much 
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immigrant gatekeeping because those who have needed to take their labour abroad 
most have so often been unable to sell it at home as rural or urban workers. This is 
not to deny the seriousness of the racism in such gatekeeping but to point to its extra 
potency and appeal when collapsed with class. It was not simply Italians or the Irish 
who were unwelcome but Italian and Irish labourers. 
Simon (1978) argues that the two theses concerning the innate intellectual 
inferiority of black people ( and various white, ethnic groups like the Irish) and that of 
working class people "are necessarily linked together in intelligence testing and have 
been from the very inception, of the mental testing movement" (Simon, 1978, p. xi). In 
a very detailed study of this question, Simon explores the continuity from Galton's 
racist and classist concepts of inherited intelligence of the nineteenth century through 
to Burt's influential 'findings' on inherited intelligence among working class people in 
this century. 
Burt was the most important proponent of the inherited intelligence thesis in 
Britain because he directly influenced the course of educational provision after the 
second world war (Hearnshaw, 1979). Burt's 'evidence' convinced Butler, the 
Minister of Education of the time, of the need for a tripartite system of schooling in 
Britain to reflect the assumed innate capacities of the social classes. The 1944 Butler 
Education Act inaugurated such a system. Secondary modern schools were created 
for the majority of working class children, for whom academic achievement was 
considered unreachable; technical. schools for upper working class children capable 
of craft training; and grammar schools for a few misplaced working class children and 
the majority of middle class children for whom an academic education was reserved. 
Children were selected at the age of eleven according to a test (the 11+) devised to 
gauge the kind of 'inherent' ability that could discern, for instance, the difference 
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between gems and gold or the proper duties of a parlour maid (Simon, 1978,1985). 
These tests were bound to privilege middle class children for there was always 
slippage from a test of 'intelligence' to one of knowledge, particularly in terms of 
vocabulary (Simon, 1978,1985). 
Rather like Saint-Simon, Burt believed in the notion that the population was 
naturally differentiated by ability and that schools must match this differentiation. 
Saint-Simon was open-minded about where this differentiation lay. Burt was sure that 
the majority of working class children suffered a problem of inherited low intelligence. 
Though the tripartite system has been dismantled in most of the country, its 
messages have not withered away and remain in the continual debates about 
inherited intelligence. There is still a widespread, common-sense belief in the view 
that intelligence is an inborn quality rather than an outcome of learning processes. 
Although there is much research to show that, for instance, IQ performance will vary 
according to the amount of coaching the performer has undertaken (Bowles and 
Gintis, 1976, Simon, 1978,1985), the notion of inherited aptitude continues to 
underpin some teachers' understanding of low achievement. Simon (1978) argues 
that the view that mental testing can produce a genuine reading of someone's 
capacities presents a major inhibition on effective teaching: 
If led astray by the theories of mental testing, and he (the teacher) believes 
that the level of a child's achievement is predetermined by the nature of his 
inborn abilities, then all he can aim to do' is to help' children to make their 
inborn abilities actual. He does not conceive that a child can rise above his 
inheritance. From the start, therefore, he does not set out to educate in a 
creative way (Simon, 1978, p. 105). 
Thus some teachers teach to a fixed ceiling. To make matters worse their 
pupils may collude in the process. It is not just teachers who may be 'led astray' by 
the idea that intelligence is an innate and readable quality in the individual. Those 
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who have the least to gain from such a view may be similarly lead. As I discuss later, 
Sennett and Cobbs'(1993) research shows how many working class people have 
internalised a conviction that they are less intelligent than middle class people. Such 
a conviction is fed from many quarters but as Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) have put 
it, cultural dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed. Those who 
think themselves unintelligent lack the means by which to critique this negative self- 
assessment. And those with the means are located in a system that confers upon 
them: 
... the supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as privileged 
(which) 
manages the more easily to convice the disinherited that they owe their 
scholastic and social destiny to their lack of gifts or merits, because in 
matters of culture absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being 
dispossessed (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, p. 210). 
Within such a field of ignorance, the working class appears to be cursed with 
something akin to stupidity and the middle class appears to be blessed with 
intelligence and genius. Carey (1992) has shown how late nineteenth and turn of the 
century writers subscribed to this class based view. There was, argues, Carey a fear 
and loathing of the 'masses' common to many writers. Men and women such as 
Virginia Woolf, D. H. Lawrence, E. E. Forster, T. S. Elliott and H. G. Wells, viewed 
themselves as a chosen race apart: 
The principle around which modernist literature and culture fashioned itself 
was the exclusion of the masses, the defeat of their power, the removal of their 
literacy, the denial of their humanity (Carey, 1992, p. 21). 
These writers felt themselves to be artistically and intellectually selected within 
a natural order that deprived most of creative capacities. Echoing an enlightenment 
scare, they too feared the 'over-education' of the masses and the vulgarisation of 
culture. This is well illuminated, suggests Carey, in E. E. Forster's character, Leonard 
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Bast, in Howards End. When Bast attempts to better his "cramped little mind" he dies 
of the effort explains Carey: 
Attacked by one of the upper class characters, he (Bast) symbolically 
grabs at a bookcase for support and it falls over on top of him, so that 
he dies of a heart attack. Such are the dangers of higher education, we 
gather, when it is pursued by the wrong people (Carey, 1992, p. 19). 
The problem for the writers Carey examines is one of quantity and quality. 
There are too many of 'them' and they have too little in the way of human attributes. 
In the light of this judgement, eugenics commanded an obvious appeal. "I hate 
common humanity" H. G. Wells has his Professor Keppel pronounce: 
this oatfish crowd which tramples the ground whence my cloud-capped 
pinnacles might rise. I am tired of humanity - beyond measure. Take it 
away. This gaping, stinking, bombing, shooting, throat-slitting, cringing 
brawl of gawky, under-nourished riff-raff. Clear the earth of them! 
(Wells in Carey, 1992, p. 139). 
Wells had another side to his analysis. Prejudice is often equivocal and Wells 
also movingly described homeward bound workers as 'wounded deer dripping blood' ( 
Wells in Carey, 1992 p. 141). Others, like ]Ezra Pound, were arrogantly clear about the 
inferiority of the masses and, conversely, the superiority of the artist: 
The artist has no longer any belief or suspicion that the mass, the half- 
educated simpering general.. . can in any way share 
his delights... 
Modern civilization has bred a race with brains like those of rabbits 
(Pound in Carey, 1992, p. 72).. 
While Carey's study is a useful reminder of the role of the intelligentsia in 
forwarding the case for its own superiority and that of working class idiocy, we do not 
have to go to high culture alone. Connections between class and ability permeate our 
cultural landscape. Take for instance the entertainment world's construction of quiz 
shows. Serious, intelligent, middle class shows like Mastermind (note that the name 
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connotes intelligence with class and masculinity) are presented with classical music, 
respectful modes of address and the prize of kudos rather than of cash. In contrast, 
working class shows like 'Blankety Blank' (which sounds like a children's programme ) 
treat audiences and contestants more informally, using first names, anecdotes rather 
than biography, and simple, somewhat patronising, questions. Prizes are big and 
presented by glamorous women. There is much razzmatazz. In popular 
entertainment, audiences are orchestrated to whoop excitedly. In middle class shows 
audiences clap Britishly. Even decorum is culturally organised by class 
It is still possible to find comedy representing stupidity by the adoption of a 
working class accent (if its Northern working class so much the better)., Newspapers 
offer similarly class coded messages. As Hoggart (1990) noted, the tabloid press is 
more designed for looking than it is for reading. While it may be that such press 
engages. with real differentials in terms of vocabulary, reading level and time available 
for reading, it goes beyond these considerations too. For instance, exposure of 
semi-naked women can be found in the serious press only when it is accompanied by 
an artistic legitimation. The page 3 girl is not merely sexist, it is classist; its implicit 
message to working class men is that they can hack nudes better than they can hack 
news. The presence of page 3 in the tabloid press develops an idea about working 
class male sexual appetites, just as its absence in the serious press conveys positive 
values about middle class, male, gender manners. Clearly, the middle class man 
can focus his mind without the intrusion of his body whereas his working class 
counterpart needs to be titillated into reading. Apparently, a connection must be 
made with the elemental self for those whose minds are judged to be insufficiently 
large to operate without a crassly organised libidinal economy coming to its aid. In 
the light of educational disadvantage, it is appropriate to problematise working class 
ability but it is clearly unhelpful to do so with the use of prejudice of this kind. 
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The whole question of ability and class argue Sennett and Cobb (1993) lies at 
the heart of class legitimation. People wear a 'badge of ability' which gives them 
rights over others. In their interviews with workers, these writers discovered that 
many working class people wrestle with two positions about their status. On the one 
hand, they know that their life chances were somehow restricted by their class 
circumstances; on the other hand, there lurks a suspicion that they are responsible 
for their class position because they lacked ability. "They are both angry and 
ambivalent about their right to be angry" (Sennet and Cobb, 1993 p. 79) as a 
consequence. Did the system turn them into unskilled workers or did they do it 
themselves? Sennett and Cobb argue that this predicament reduces many working 
class people's sense of dignity because they feel a limited freedom "to develop 
powers inside themselves" (p. 79). In Giddens' language this would be the power for 
self-reflexivity (Giddens, 1991). Working class people, Sennett and Cobb conclude, 
obey or defer to middle class people in both formal and informal social settings 
because they are ambivalent about their own rights which is crucially linked-to self 
belief about ability. Sennett and Cobb give an important update to the problem of 
prejudice. The condemnations of workers such as I have exampled from Carey were 
easy to reject as excessive. Few people feel themselves to be truly stupid. But this 
idea that the so-called mass is 'stupid' argue Sennett and Cobb, is covertly conveyed 
in the concept of 'average' and other terms of faint praise: 
Average, adequate, ordinary: it is a language wherein- personal 
recognition of the few is balanced by impersonal toleration of the many; 
it is a matter of good versus neutral (Sehnet and Cobb, 1993, pp. 67,68). 
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Of relevance here, is the contemporary educational settlement for levels of so- 
called competence for the many and excellence for the few (Hyland, 1994). More 
generally, 'ordinary people', has long been a euphemism for working class people, 
even by those who want them to perform extraordinary feats of class struggle. 
The body and the mind of the working class person, then, is distinctive and 
inferior in the classist imagination. The first line of physiological inquiry centred on 
the question of innate ability in the body; intelligence testing came later to verify 
theories of low intellect in the minds of working class people. These assumptions 
were often connected to the view that such inferiorities were harnessed to a debased 
moral character. 
8. Insensibility and the working class 
As we have seen Lombroso promoted the view that many members of the 
lower orders were throwbacks from an unevolved age.. Criminals, argued Lombroso, 
could be physiologically determined by all sorts of markers from hipsize to the 
measurement of the gap between the eyes. (Lombroso-Ferraro, 1911). The idea of 
the working class as less evolved and thus more bestial than other classes has not 
entirely disappeared with the decline in positivist criminology. Notions of working 
class animality, of a threatening physicality continue to feed the class prejudiced 
imagination in some quarters. When Ezra Pound refers to the working class as a. 
'race with brains like rabbits' he invokes images of promiscuity, of an indiscriminate 
sexual appetite that replaces intelligence and sensibility. These associations can still 
be found, particularly in relation to the more marginalised elements of the working 
class. Take for instance, the following pronouncement in a study of child abuse: 
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In families where the father is out of work and experiencing financial 
problems, or is ill and injured, he will be more often at home and is more 
likely to be depressed or drinking excessively than his counterparts in 
full employment. These factors may lead him to molest his children (In 
Bell, 1988, p. 42). 
Let us give this a fictitious middle class ring: 
In families where the father is on sabbatical leave and worried about his 
prospects of promotion, or is suffering from writer's block, he will be more often 
at home and is more likely to be depressed or buying more wine than his 
counterparts in his department. These factors may lead him to molest his 
children. - 
In the second it is more difficult to take seriously this concept of a demoralised 
spirit spiralling into child abuse because of a displacement from the normal rhythms of 
work. The first version is made plausible because it brings into its subtext familiar 
correlates between poverty, class and moral dissoluteness; it arouses a classist fear 
about working class male bestiality. Lombroso's atavistic man, stalking anew, only 
this time his licentious gaze has transferred from property to vulnerable children. 
The prejudice that working class people, especially males, have chaotic emotions, 
limited abilities to bond, to love, to restrain their desires, to nurture, care and feel - the 
negation of individualised responses for a uniform class position - retains some of its 
hold, particularly where it licenses brutalising practices in systems of punishment 
(Boyle, 1977). There remain elements of this view in educational practice too. 
Commenting on some conceptions of working class education, Elshtain complains 
that working class students are frequently perceived to be: 
distressed, lost, numb, depressed, isolated, helpless, dominated by 
feelings of worthlessness, inferiority, anxiety and invalidation, propelled 
by incompletely expressed and painful 'unfinished emotional business' 
(Elshtain 1978, p. 293). 
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These conditions, or at least some of them, may well describe some working 
class students but there is no reason to suppose that they do not describe students of 
other classes too. Emotional disadvantage, as I discuss in chapter 6 defies 
sociological simplicities. While it is reasonable to suggest that working class people, 
given their socio-economic conditions, may find themselves in fraught, emotional 
circumstances, including the inability to name their plight, it is not equally reasonable 
to conclude that these circumstances reduce their sensibilities. This is the nub of a 
class prejudice that legitimates the rough handling of those perceived to be innately 
rough. 
Sennett and Cobb (1993) give an account of a French aristocrat's surprise that 
a condemned peasant trembled 'during the preliminaries of the execution... he 
groaned and wailed incessantly, causing some amusement among the ladies and 
gentlemen come to see the spectacle" (p. 247). In commenting on this event, the 
authors conclude that this aristocrat: 
like other aristocrats of her circle, could view hangings with 
disinterested fascination, because the person being killed was a 
creature whose inner nature had little relation to her own (Sennett & 
Cobb, 1993 p. 247). 
I would suggest that this notion of a different 'inner nature' in working class 
people, one that is less sensitive, will persist as long as we have systems of 
differential treatment. We need not go to a dramatic and out-dated example of class 
prejudice from Sennett and Cobb alone for there is evidence enough in our present 
prison system to illustrate class differential rules of treatment (see for instance, 
Carlen, 1988). Were I to discuss contemporary punitive practices, I could doubtless 
produce more drama and more extremes of treatment but this would not implicate a 
wider section of society. For my purposes, it is more pressing to assess the 
60 
normalised authority relations that persist between the classes at the interpersonal 
level. Where there is evidence of extreme violence, symbolic violence tends to run 
closely on its heels though, ironically, it may be less discernible precisely because it is 
more ubiquitous than symptomatic, material outbursts. There is a level at which we 
can confront real violence because it is before our eyes whereas symbolic violence 
may only be felt as an illegitimate and normalised pain. My point (which is also 
Sennett and Cobb's of course) is that the interpersonal sphere of working class and 
middle class relations produces a. network of power at the mundane and quotidean 
level that may inflict more injuries than we are accustomed to recognise. In short, 
class is in the psyche as much as it is in the wage packet. Social and political theory 
has invariably privileged awareness and struggle around the latter in ignorance of its 
connection with the former. 
9. Glass and the master-servant dialectic 
Sennett and Cobb (1993) refer to the widespread presence of 'humbling' in 
contemporary society to refer to the ways in which the working class diminishes itself 
and is diminished by quasi-feudal power relations: 
Humbling, however is the most routine of modern occurrences, and it may be 
wondered if perhaps what we have seen in this book is the continuance of the 
morality of caste, with its wounding image of the dignity of man in a society 
without hereditary rights, without an aristocracy of leisure, or kings (Sennett 
and Cobb, 1993, p. 247/8). 
Here Sennett and Cobb are referring to what they feel to be the permeability of 
class relations in modern society, a permeability which rests on the view that some 
have more rights than others by virtue of 'personal ability'. Those in middle class 
occupations, for instance, may have the right to be addressed as 'sir' or 'madam' or 
to other signs of deference such as unnegotiated obedience to orders. It is not just 
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material wealth that is inequitably distributed in the capitalist order, but self-worth too. 
"Whatever dignity a man accords to his ruler he must necessarily deny himself', write 
Sennett and Cobb, (p. 77). The problem lies in a psycho-social dialectic between how 
workers are viewed and how this impacts on them in terms of an internalised 
ambivalence concerning self-worth. In such a dialectic, people develop a sense of 
responsibility for their class position and thus accept either the penalties or the 
privileges that attend it. This view could be interpreted as a reinvention of the 
deferential worker and doubtless there would be many who would object, rightly, to 
such a one-sided depiction of working class people. In my view, however, we can 
stay with Sennett and Cobb's drift if we interpret their findings as evidence of a 
current that will continue to run through class relations as an inseparable element of 
them. Such a current does not have to surface in patently obsequious behaviour and 
indeed classism is all the more insidious, perhaps, where it is not so stereotypically 
manifest. Moreover, resistance or submission to symbolic power varies from 
individual to individual which is why naming its existence is an important part of its 
defeat, as Hans Andersen's tale of The Emperor's New Clothes discloses. Just as 
equality of opportunity policies have helped individuals identify areas of prejudice like 
racism and sexism, so a recognition of class injuries can assist in the combating of 
class prejudice. 
If Sennett and Cobb can find class prejudice in. a country (U. S. A. ) often 
perceived to have begun its modern life with declassed pioneers and without the 
shackles of residual feudalism, I think it reasonable to suppose that Britain remains a 
site of such prejudice. In any event, class relations and class prejudice are 
inextricably linked. As with other spheres of prejudice, inequality is never simply 
structural since ideas play an important role in its survival. It is this combination of 
structure and idea that licences classed, discriminatory behaviour. 
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Many middle and upper class people arrogate for themselves the right to be superior 
and working class people concede this right through a humbling demeanour. The 
expression of these two positions may be very subtle or it may be extremely blunt. 
However it surfaces, it results in a set of 'moral burdens' and 'emotional 
hardships'(Sennett and Cobb, 1993, p. 76) which working class people must endure. 
Sennett and Cobb's work poses important challenges for the understanding of 
classist attitudes and structures and the formulation of responses to them. Firstly, it 
suggests an interrogation of interpersonal power and its origins. Secondly, it raises 
very considerable problems about the division of labour on which modern production 
rests. In terms of the first, I will explore what can be done in the realm of 'personal 
equality', using, in the first instance, Rousseau's conception of a spiritual 
egalitarianism which I have labelled 'egalitarianism of the heart'. In terms of the 
second, I assess some of the comments made by Arendt (1958) and Gorz (1989) on 
the deleterious effects of a system of production that divides humans into doers and 
thinkers. 
10. Egalitarianism of the Heart 
Though Chiswick (1982) was right to point out that most enlighteners wanted 
to retain a class of labourers, this did not exclude a conception of political equality. In 
the sphere of civil society, men (and possibly women) were to encounter each other 
as equals. Rousseau (1979) added his own slant to this conception of. equality 
which he elaborated in his famous founding text on progressive (at least for boys) 
education, Emile (1979). For the young Emile to be made 'humane', his model tutor 
must teach him about the human commonalities that transcend class. 
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It is the people who compose humankind. What is not the people is so 
slight a thing as not to be worth counting. Man is the same in all 
stations. If that is so, the stations having the most members merit the 
most respect. To the man who thinks, all the civil distinctions 
disappear. He sees the same passions, the same sentiments in the 
hodcarrier and the illustrious man. He discerns only a difference in 
language, only a more or less affected tone (Rousseau, 1979, p. 225). 
Any apparent differences between the classes, continues Rousseau, are 
largely a matter of self-presentation: 
... if some essential difference distinguishes them, it is to the disadvantage of 
. 
those who dissemble more. The people show themselves such as they are, 
and they are not loveable. But society people have to be disguised. If they 
were to show themselves such as they are, they would be disgusting 
(Rousseau, 1979, p. 225). 
Rousseau's case is that at heart, humanity is flawed and its flaws are 
exhibited merely differentially by class. Appearances are deceptive but whoever you 
prick, whatever his origins, he will bleed. Emile's education will doubtless privilege 
him socially but it must level his heart around this principle. Emile must be told: 
Respect your species. Be aware that it is composed essentially of a 
collection of peoples; that if all the kings and all the philsophers were 
taken away, their absence would hardly be noticeable; and that things 
would not be any the worse (Rousseau, 1979, p. 226). 
Emile's tutor must teach his pupil to: 
love all men, even those who despise men. Do things in such a way that he 
puts himself in no class but finds his bearings in all. Speak before him of 
humankind with tenderness, even with pity, but never with contempt. Man do 
not dishonour man! (Rousseau, 1979, p. 226) 
For those wanting to dissolve class itself, Rousseau's suggestions may seem 
to form a pale ambition. I can imagine some class strugglists would want to point out 
that merely treating people with equal respect is hardly going to topple the economic 
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conditions of exploitation. Staroboski (1988), for instance, critically discusses what 
he calls Rousseau's 'platonic egalitarianism' in La Nouvelle He/oise (p. 100) and 
indeed there is ä case to be made against Rousseau's faint hearted reformism (see 
also Ignatieff, 1990). Yet the findings in Sennett and Cobbett suggest that class 
prejudiced behaviour and views are an offence added to that of economic exploitation 
to compound working class hardship. In many respects, this hardship is, to borrow 
Friedan's term, a 'problem with no name' (Friedan, 1971) and creating a response to it 
provides the basis for its articulation. Moreover, as Rousseau (1979) conveyed, a 
class superiority complex creates an impoverished personality as much as an 
inferiority complex can. Emile is required to learn that those who place themselves 
above others will stunt their understanding of humanity and of self. There is, as 
Hegel (1949) famously analysed, an unhealthy interdependence in the master-slave 
dialectic which prevents either from flourishing autonomously. Thus combating 
classist behaviour and values, whether they are internalised or projected, works 
towards the creation of humanising forces that replace humbling with respect and 
equality of status among humans, as humans. In this regard; a postmodernism which 
declares outright war on humanism abandons the potentially productive tension 
between commonality and difference and, in the process, risks conflating real 
difference with illusory or epiphenomonal ones. Class differences are particularly 
susceptible to this conflation. 
If we survey the relations around us we will find much that reproduces the 
master-servant relationship, both symbolically and materially. Symbolically, this is in 
our language and in our postures either through the arrogation of class authority or 
through deferential. behaviour. Even resistances to class deference can remain 
trapped in a problem of class power because they can so easily slide into a child- 
parent simulation that reconfigures rather than avoids class. I have in mind here for 
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instance, a rebellious workforce that rebels behind the backs of managers because it 
lacks space and authority for dialogue. 
There are many ways in which some can assert their superiority and others 
can feel inferior. For instance, the grammatical mistake, writes Bisseret (1979), is a 
modern class divisive tool: 
One notices also that the very notion of mistakes and the idea of having 
to correct them came into existence above all after verbal- know-how 
had acquired a social value and had been controlled by a system of 
examinations instituted by the bourgeoisie when it came to power 
(Bisseret, 179, p. 67). 
An understanding of the symbolically interactive features of class society as in 
the management of conversation and 'correct' speech can point to a reformable field 
of intervention. In real terms, there are structures that cannot be dismantled 
overnight because the distribution of expertise, economic privilege and power is both 
complex and embedded. But there are structures that can be challenged today from 
the simple divisive ones like separate eating and washroom areas for managements 
to changes in language and social conventions. As feminism and related discourses 
have shown, discriminatory behaviour and language and discriminator y structures 
legitimate each other. We should not be so in awe of the power of the latter that we 
abstain from intervening in the former, not least because they are interdependent 
forms of power. 
Combating classism, then, requires that we are all treated with equal status as 
related human beings. This means that we have regard and respect for the other, be 
she cleaner or professor. At the same time, we can defer to expertise, experience, 
skills, talent, courage and so forth but this need not entail deferential behaviour 
deriving from a feudal belief in rank and station. If we interrogate contemporary 
manners and language between the classes both in the spheres of consumption and 
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production, we may find many instances of limited respect and residual feudalism. 
We may find conventions and practices that point to a 'morality of castes' (Sennett 
and Cobb, 1993) in which we expect and deliver different things to different people on 
the basis of their presumed caste membership. We may find different naming 
conventions, a difference in tone of address, gestural languages of power and modes 
of exclusion, different behavioural expectations and so forth. All these differences 
will affirm the division of labour as a natural one. Combating this naturalisation at the 
intersubjective and behavioural level such as I have discussed must be underpinned 
by an understanding of the limitations (and thus the injustices) that attach to the 
sphere of manual labour. 
11. Class and the Division of Labour 
As I have noted at the beginning of this chapter, modern, class society is 
secured by a fundamental division between mental and manual labour 
(Rattansi, 1982). The realm of the. first is largely a middle class preserve and the 
realm of the latter is largely a working class one although it also includes, at certain 
levels, middle class women confined to the domestic sphere. Obviously, the 
complexities of modern labour processes cannot separate these realms entirely but 
the class differences here lies not merely in the work content but in its public 
significance. In a sense, working class work is. paid reproductive labour and in this 
respect is closely related to the nature and problem of women's unwaged work. This 
relation accounts for a class and gender convergence around manual labour. There 
is a socio-economic affinity between the man or woman who contributes to the 
making of toilet seats and the woman in the home who cleans them. Each are 
making it possible for others to live their lives beyond the realm of necessity. Women 
who do unpaid domestic and childcare labour and working class men and women in 
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waged manual labour are servants to (rather than subjects of) creators and creativity. 
This linkage has been underestimated by a class analysis that counterposes the 
relative isolation of women in the home to the collectively sited worker in paid work. 
This counterposition is stressed because it is seen to make an important political 
difference; workers can combine easily while unwaged working women cannot 
(German, 1989). While not wanting to discount the significance of this political 
difference, the similarities between the working class and female condition in relation 
to reproduction may be worth more attention. These similarities have been 
overlooked by a political decision to value the point of production as a site of 
collective struggle rather than one of intellectual and physical malnourishment. 
Feminists have highlighted the problem of -reproductive labour, arguing, 
among other things, that it must be shared by men and women alike because it is the 
basis for life but not for living ( e. g. Oakley, 1990, Benjamin, 1990). A similar 
challenge to waged manual labour is rarely made unless, it is within a utopian 
formulation in which we may all fish in the morning and philosophise in the afternoon 
(Marx and Engels, 1967). While it is commonplace to hear calls for higher wages 
and better conditions for groups of workers, it is unusual to hear people call for the 
humanising and expanding of actual categories of work or for its more equitable 
distribution. The workplace is in need of equality circles perhaps. If feminists can 
argue that men and women should share the manual labour in the home, why has. 
such a point not been transferred to the office or the factory? If feminists can demand 
status and dignity for women, whatever their socio-economic position, why can this 
demand not be extended to working class people. Without these sorts of demands, 
we submit to the necessity of the 'people condition' to which Chiswick refers. We 
accept that the majority of people in society should be engaged in work that gives 
them little satisfaction while a minority are blessed with interesting and rewarding 
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work. We accept as a concomitant to this that the former must be sited below the 
latter even at the interpersonal level. In brief, we accept that master-servant relations 
are immutable and desirable ways of organising humanity. Gorz (1989) argues that 
this acceptance shapes the relationship between doers and thinkers into one of 
unhealthy codependence. Contemporary society, writes Gorz has constructed a 
labour market in which: 
... a mass of operatives, on the one hand, and a class of irreplaceable and overworked decision-makers and technicians who need a host of 
helpers to serve them personally in order to do their jobs, on the other 
Gorz, 1989, p. 7). 
Gorz agues that there is a kind of selfish hyperactivity on the part of middle 
class workers who monopolise the creative, interesting, rewarding work, relying on an 
ever casualised class of croissant, newspaper and pizza deliverers to keep them 
going. Servants' work claims Gorz has been socialised and industrialised but this 
does not: 
"alter the basic fact that these people (workers) are doing servants/ 
work, that is work which those who earn a decent living transfer, for 
their personal advantage and without gains in productivity, on to the 
people for whom there is no work in the economy" (Gorz, 1989, p. 7). 
Here Gorz is referring to obvious, unmediated servant-like work and he is 
making particular reference to the predicament of the casualised labour force. Yet in 
some form, many labourers, albeit through various mediations, are serving the non- 
labouring class. In the process, they are not only freeing up other classes, they are 
restricting themselves, or rather they are being restricted. This is the second 
problem. 
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Quite simply, the relegation to manual labour seriously damages the labourers 
intellectual health. This was well understood by Smith as we have seen in his 
comments on the relationship between intelligence and work. And as Marx (1976) 
wrote in a famous passage from Capital: 
The old peasantry and a skilled artisanry.. is converted into a crippled 
monstrosity... through the suppression of a whole world of productive drives 
and inclinations... the individual is divided up and transformed into the 
automatic motor of a detailed operation, thus realising the absurd fable of 
Menenius Agrippa, which presents man as a mere fragment of his own body 
(Marx, 1976, p. 481). 
Obviously, things have changed since the period of early manufacture which 
Marx examined; not least, workers in the industrialised world tend to have more time 
on their hands, more money to spend and more education behind them. This is a 
very general qualification, of course, because. the working class is itself differentiated 
by the distribution of cultural capital, unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled work and 
income as well as by gender, ethnicity and so forth. However, as Gorz' observations 
indicate, the relegation of a majority of the population to forms of manual labour in the 
service of a minority of the population that has more satisfying and more rewarding 
labour remains the basis of a class divided society (see also Gorz, 1976). This 
division produces an uneven distribution of socially produced, intelligence which is 
obscured by a meritocratic fiction. This problem has been lost on the class 
reproduction theorists of education for whom schooling conspires to produce class 
society. It is not so much that school produces 'low intelligence' in its selective 
procedures, its pedagogic methods, etc. rather work produces 'low intelligence' and 
this impacts back on schooling through inherited disadvantage. A reinforcing 
dynamic may follow to ensure a continuity of academic failure but it originates outside 
of school, suggesting that challenges have to be made to the organisation of work 
(Gorz, 1976). 
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Although work is not the only place where intelligence can flourish, it is an 
important one. Feminists have been more ready to connect intellectual scope with 
daily activity. Women, wrote Florence Nightingale (1979), suffer'death by intellectual 
starvation'(p. 41). In their struggle for the right to higher education and insertion in 
the professional classes, countless middle class women have travelled far since 
Nightingale's day. But is this pronouncement about intellectual starvation not true still 
of many working class people for whom their labours make few demands on their 
heads? Huw Benyon's (1973) study of Ford workers shows that we have little cause 
to think otherwise: 
In and out of the cars, up and over the line, check the line speed and 
the model mix. Your mind restlessly alert, because there's no 
guarantee. that the next car will be the same as the last, that a Thames 
van won't suddenly appear. But still a blank - you keep trying to blot out 
whats happening. " When I'm here my mind's a blank. I make it go 
blank".... the sheer audacious madness of a system based upon men 
like those wishing their lives away. I was never able, even remotely, to 
come to terms with the line (Benyon, 1973, p. 109). 
In The Human Condition, Arendt (1958) explores the 'necessity of labour', that 
is the necessity of species reproductive labour ( be it on the land or in the home) as 
one that has been historically 'resolved' by placing this necessity on the shoulders of 
some for the freedom of others. For instance, in Greek antiquity, slavery was seen as 
a necessary way in which free men could be free. Arendt (1958) argues that this 
ancient conception removes humans from their biological selves and thus from their 
very vitality as humans: 
On its most elementary level the 'toil and trouble' of obtaining the pleasures of 
'incorporating' the necessities' of life are so closely bound together in the 
biological life cycle, 'whose recurrent rhythm conditions human life in its unique 
and unilinear movement, that the perfect elimination of the pain and effort of 
labour would not only rob biological life of its most natural pleasures but 
deprive the specifically human life itself, together with the necessity to which it 
is bound, makes itself felt (Arendt, 1958, p. 120). 
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Crudely, if a human does not look after himself, he removes life from himself. 
"For mortals, the 'easy life of the gods' would be a lifeless life" (Arendt, 1958 p. 120). 
There are obvious resonances here with a feminist protest about the relegation of 
domestic labour to women which renders it possible for some men to move in the 
world like permanent hotel guests. Such a life places men out of touch with their 
biological selves. . 
Conversely, if life is only biological, if a human is merely 'animal 
laborans', that is merely a subject of necessity, of what Marx called 'dull economic 
compulsion', then she too is robbed of life for she never produces, she is never homo 
faber. Arendt's slant differs from Gorz in that the latter suggests that the middle class 
are producers, they are homo faber. In contrast, Arendt argues that modern 
consumer society (she was writing in post-war North America) reduces all to the 
condition of animal laborans because everybody works for necessity rather than to 
produce human artifacts. Whereas the Greeks thought that freedom from necessity 
was freedom to be artistic, scientific, philosophical and political, freedom in modern 
society is defined as hot-work. Creativity, argues Arendt, has been consigned to the 
realm of hobbies. Otherwise: 
Whatever we do we are supposed to do for the sake of 'making a living'; such 
is the verdict of society and the number of people, especially in the professions 
who might challenge it, has decreased rapidly (Arendt, 1958, pp 126/7). 
It seems to me that contemporary reality lies between Gorz and Arendt. While 
it is true that the middle classes do have productive (rather than reproductive) and 
creative aspects to their work, it is also true that the hyperactivity of which Gorz 
speaks above may well be. connected to the consumerism that Arendt argues 
perverts homo faber into animal laborans: 
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In our need for more and more rapid replacement of the worldly things 
around us, we can no longer afford to use them, to respect and 
preserve their inherent durability; we must consume, devour, as it were, 
our houses and furniture and cars as though they were the 'the good 
things' of nature which spoil uselessly if they are not drawn swiftly into 
the never-ending cycle of man's metabolism with nature (Arendt, 1958 
p. 125/6). 
In accepting that a perversion of this kind does seem to take place in modern 
culture, I think we should keep in mind too, Gorz's insistence that class exploitation is 
deepening as much of the reproductive labour for middle class people is placed on 
the shoulders of others. While it may be true that everyone is 'making a living' 
(Arendt, 1958 p. 127), the making of it is class differentiated. Middle class people may 
have debased the meaning of productive work, as Arendt has argued, but they are 
still holding on to a creative working life even though this may be under more threat 
today. Workers in education offer a good example of how middle class work is 
caught in the tension Arendt describes and is prone to the hyperactivism to which 
Gorz refers. That is to say, many teachers and lecturers continue to have a good 
share of creative work but many are also drowning in the present flurry of policy shifts 
which undermines the quality of their work. The new demands to measure, test, 
assess, account and administrate have created new tensions between the qualitative 
and the quantitative, so that this sphere of mental labour has indeed lost some of its 
privileged content (Stronach, 1995). 
Perhaps if we raise our heads above the division of labour within which we are 
all caught, we will see ways of reforming our working lives. In particular, a greater 
concern for what working class people have to do to parallel, for instance, the 
concern feminists have raised about what women are expected to do stimulates a 
concern for what everybody has to do and how work expectations are shaped. Such 
a concern should at the very least, lead us to conclude that however people are 
employed, if at all, there should be no extra punishments or rewards by way of an 
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uneven distribution of interpersonal authority and status. This returns us to the 
discourse raised by those combating prejudice against disablement, for it deepens the 
ambition that people must hold sway over jobs and not vice versa. In terms of 
working class people, this must include dignified measures of sovereignty over self as 
against authoritarian, class presumptuous demands for obedience or'humbling'. 
12. Farewell to classism? 
To summarise, I have tried to show how classism ramifies in a number of 
ways. How the way we view work, jobs, bodies, intelligence, human relations, moral 
character, sexual expressivity and status can all be vulnerable to a classist frame. 
Much of this frame will mingle with racism and sexism. I have explored some of the 
sources of classist constructions over time so as to illustrate their vintage and 
durability. I have pointed to the ways in which social science and class politics, can 
be susceptible to an overworked concept of class which risks stereotypical imagery 
and which makes its own contribution to class oppression: Finally, I have connected 
a discussion of the symbolic ways in which class is reinforced with the structural roots 
of class divisions in production. . 
My claim here is that the prime source of class 
inequality lies in the division between thinkers and doers and that this primary source 
potentially positions individuals cognitively, affectively and socially within master- 
servant relations. I argue that something can be done about some of this at least 
intersubjectively and on the basis of a recognition that class divisions and class 
membership are artificial. In the first instance, equality of opportunity policies can 
incorporate this kind of reform by an acknowledgement that class prejudice needs to 
be named. In this regard the problem of 'classism' may need to gain equal attention 
with those of racism, sexism and other acknowledged prejudices within equality of 
opportunity discourses. 
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It may be timely, as theorists of late or postmodernity would have it, to wave 
goodbye to the working class as a unitary entity. As we do so, however, we should 
not neglect to greet those who work in the least rewarding places in society (if they 
are able to work at all) on different and fresher ground. In so doing, we may begin to 
fracture the classificatory ways of seeing that permeate class relations and which 
situate many people as 'them', 'us' or 'other'. In the next chapter, I expand on this 
problem of classificatory restrictiveness through the increasingly problematic category 
of ethnicity. 
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Chapter 3 
ETHNIC MONITORING AND THE CLASSIFICATORY IMAGINATION 
1. Ethnic monitoring: bureaucratic identities? 
Those promoting equal opportunity work do so within a tension between 
questions of sameness and of difference. For instance, most equal opportunity 
statements will contain a guiding, humanist principle that calls for equal treatment of 
individuals regardless of differences; at the same time, there will be another principle, 
which is chiefly a multiculturalist one, that asserts the right of some to different needs. 
If this tension is to be a creative rather than conflictual one, it must be grappled with 
self-consciously so that sameness and difference are interplayed rather than 
contradictory. In this chapter, I suggest that such creativity demands a sensitivity to 
the problems of classification. The clearest policy issue here is that of monitoring 
and because ethnic monitoring is arguably the most problematic of monitored 
categories this will be my focus. What I discuss in this respect is both specific to the 
issue of ethnic monitoring and general to the problems of classification that surface 
with respect to equal opportunity discourses. It hardly needs to be added perhaps 
that the subject of monitoring is also the context here for a" discussion of equal 
opportunity policy responses to racism. 
After a period of political oscillation on the desirability and usefulness of ethnic 
monitoring, it has become a fundamental part of equality of opportunity policy in 
Britain (Gordon, 1992). This is particularly so with respect to education for there is a 
requirement by the Department of Education and Science that all Local Education 
Authorities provide aggregate and anonymous data on the ethnic compositions of 
their school teacher forces. In addition to this formal requirement, many institutions 
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conduct internal monitoring of applications for posts and for courses to research into 
the efficacy of their own equality of opportunity policies. 
Monitoring tends to be seen as the means by which an organisation can begin 
to translate into reality its equal opportunity policies. The figures provided by the 
monitoring process will reveal who gets the jobs, who gets the places on courses; 
who passes exams and where people progress. In short, monitoring provides the 
empirical evidence against which equal opportunity policy can be formulated and 
implemented. In its brief history, monitoring has armed policy makers with important 
statistics about uneven patterns of access and achievement (Gordon, 1992) thus 
justifying the case for its operation. For this reason, it is not my purpose to question 
the usefulness of monitoring as such though this remains a disputed area (Nanton, 
1989, Lloyd, 1991). Rather, I aim to discuss some of the difficulties of ethnic 
monitoring, including secondary and unintended effects that may come from it, 
particularly, if monitoring is unaccompanied by complementary strategies to combat 
its inherent, classificatory restrictiveness. 
Ethnic monitoring has always been dogged with disputes both in terms of the 
categories it adopts and the wisdom of its execution (Booth, 1988, Ohri, 1988, Nanton, 
1989, Gordon, 1992). The case for ethnic monitoring had to be made against 
reservations about the political uses and abuses of racialised data, notably by the 
police and by immigration officials (Carr-Hill and Drew, 1988) and about the difficulties 
of acceptable classifications. As Anwar (1990) has shown the history of ethnic 
classificatory decisions within monitoring systems illustrates the conflict surrounding 
terminology and definitions of categories. For instance, the first classifications 
recommended by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in 1977 were: 
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African UK/European and Irish 
Asian Other European 
Caribbean Other - please specify 
Shortly after their usage, objections centred on the fact that these categories 
do not recognise that racial discrimination tends to be based on skin colour. Revisions 
were accordingly made in 1983/4 as follows: 
Black White 
Afro-Caribbean European (including UK) 
African Other - please specify 
Asian 
Other - please specify 
These categories created a new set of protests, this time around the 
subsumption of Asian under black. At this point, the Commission for Racial Equality 
initiated field trials and consultations about acceptable categories in an attempt to 
create definitional consensus among ethnic minority groups. As a result of this 
consultative process, the Commission, reports Anwar, recommended the following 
format in 1988: 
White 
Black - Caribbean 
Black - African 
Black - Other (please specify) 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Chinese 
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Other (please describe) 
This new formulation responded to the objections made by a number of Asian 
commentators. It was felt that the sub-categories below 'black' could vary according 
to local need and that white sub-categories such as Irish and Cypriot could be added 
where appropriate. Despite this attempt to produce a flexible set of categories that 
were sensitive to community definitions, Anwar notes the compromise character of 
the CRE's final list: 
Whatever classifications are recommended will not, of course, be 
acceptable to all individuals or community groups. The CRE or any 
other organisations cannot satisfy all views expressed on the most 
appropriate ethnic classifications(Anwar, 1990 p. 611). 
The CRE's attempts at definitional agreement attest, then, to the contestable, 
negotiable and interpretative nature of ethnicity. It also attests to the emotive 
character of the debate. Indeed Anwar's careful study of ethnic monitoring categories 
reveals how there were always dissatisfied groups around the decisions made (see 
also Booth, 1988). This is hardly surprising since ethnic categorisation is a 
bureaucratic endeavour to classify humanity and as such is intrinsically arbitrary 
(Bentley, 1982). Indeed many involved in its formulations are aware of its inevitable 
contamination with a sinister history of selecting and counting who should be 
excluded, expelled, raped or killed. There is also the vulnerability of monitoring to the 
'numbers game'in which perceptions of 'too many' or 'too little' bring empiricist 
dangers to the anti-racist struggle (Ohri, 1988). 
However honourably formulated, ethnic monitoring conveys the problem of 
remaining conceptually parasitical upon the adversary. It is racists who have said 
that 'race' matters and, albeit for progressive ends, this is, in part, reasserted in 
monitoring. The risk here is of constructing what Foucault termed a reverse 
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discourse in which it appears "that racism can be countered only by accepting the 
categories of race" (Appiah, 1992, p. 7). Although 'ethnicity' superseded the more 
biologically connoted term 'race' to avoid this category problem, it is itself susceptible 
to racialisation. This is the view of Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) who question 
both the process by which official ethnic categories have developed and the 
helpfulness of the agreed categories. Firstly, they raise problems about the method 
and validity of the consultative process from which the Commission for Racial 
Equality purportedly produced 'reliable and publicly acceptable questions' on ethnicity 
and related topics (p. 149). They argue that there was no evidence of a search for 
'questions which would be methodologically valid' in the consultations about desirable 
ethnic categories. Secondly, Anthias and Yuval-Davis protest that the category 
'white' "completes the racialization of ethnicity in Britain by constructing "Whiteness" 
as an 'ethnic' category (p. 152). 
While Anthias and Yuval-Davis are right to raise the problem of methodology in 
the consultative-process for as Stanfield (1993) puts it more generally: there would 
seem to be "little systematic thought.. invested in epistemological questions 
concerning methodologies employed in race and ethnicity research" (p. 16), it is hard to 
know what questions would be 'methodologically valid' in terms of ethnic boxes. 
Ethnic identity is interpreted and constructed from a. range of determinations that 
cannot be located 'objectively', unless, of course, one uses a racist logic. The 
consultations were bound to produce a mixture from this range, however rigorously 
posed the questions. Crudely, boxes will never fit human experiences precisely 
because they are boxes. Ethnic monitoring, however sensitively formulated, can only 
produce bureaucratic identities and these are bound to do violence to real humans 
and groups behind them (Bentley, 1982 p. 259). This is why, perhaps, some people 
refuse to enter their ethnicity on the grounds that they do not wish to be boxed in. "I 
am me" is a familiar, individualist cry of revolt. This commonsense refusal of 
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classificatory violence understands, perhaps, that however elastically presented, 
ethnicity excludes as much as it includes and that it is a way of carving up humanity 
and differentiating it according to posited group characteristics. 
Inescapably, then, ethnic definitions are about categorising people and as 
such, will always be susceptible to racist meanings and hierarchical readings. 
These susceptibilities are transported into ethnic monitoring procedures where the 
vulnerability and instability of ethnic categories are reinforced. It is in this sense that 
those who monitor for progressive means, need to be mindful that the ethnic 
categories they create cannot reflect easy truths about any individual or groups of 
people. In the first instance, it is important to bear in mind that ethnicity does not 
constitute people rather people constitute ethnicities and they constitute them out of a 
"bewildering variety of combination" (Nash, 1989, p. 6). Elements of history, 
nationality, language, religion and geography "form the kaleidoscope of ethnicity" 
(Nash, 1989, p. 6). There are many struggles and movements that determine the 
meanings of ethnicity which means that its study: 
... needs to be rooted in a definite time period, with an eye to the malleability of the combination of elements that go into its construction 
at different times and places, all this with a sensitivity to the continuum 
of cultural- political- natural which also has a dynamic shaped by history, 
circumstance, politics and economics. (Nash, 1989, pp6,7) 
There is a gap between the meaning of ethnicity as it is articulated in the kind 
of shifting realities Nash describes here and a bureaucratic articulation of ethnicity. 
The former can keep definitional violence at arms length because it can remain fluid, 
the latter is necessarily reductive, fixed and exclusive. Naturally, any system of 
naming, indeed language itself, confines as well as describes its objects. As Bauman 
(1991) has put it: 
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Classifying consists in the acts of inclusion and exclusion. Each act of 
naming splits the world into two: entities that answer to the name; all the 
rest that do not. Certain entities may be included in a class - made a 
class - only in. as far as other entities are excluded, left outside. Invariably, such operation of inclusionlexclusion is an act of violence 
perpetrated upon the world, and requires the support of a certain 
. amount of coercion 
(Bauman, 1991, p. 2). 
Though I think that Bauman diminishes his case in stating that classification is 
always symbolically violent, this would appear to be so with respect to the colour- 
coding of humanity which ethnic monitoring is driven to repeat in order to address. 
One difficulty here centres on the interdependent but unequal meanings of white and 
black. 
2. The black/white binary 
Black and white are colonial inventions which have come to be cognitively and 
affectively organised as binary oppositions about inclusion and exclusion. By such 
an organisation, black is understood negatively against white and vice versa. 
Humanity is understood by a 'savage mind', which thinks through the primitive 
classification of perceived 'opposites' ( Hall and Gieben, 1992). Moreover, the 
savage character of such a classificatory procedure is increased by its representation 
through hierarchical binaries which order our awareness. For instance, the term non- 
white can only come out of this cognitive arrangement because it defines something 
by what it is not. And what it is not - in this case white - has the master status. Thus 
the asymmetry of black/white is evident in the absence of a currency for non-black to 
denote white. Though anti-racist literature tends to avoid . 
the use of 'non-white' for 
these reasons, the problem of unequal meaning remains because the binary lurks 
within new terminology. Language adjustments can begin to shift meanings but they 
cannot entirely disembed values which are wedged in unequal power relations. 
Black and white continue to be weighted with socio-historically formed interpretations 
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of opposition from which they are unlikely to, become freed for some time, if at all. 
Guillaumin (1995) shows how the meanings of 'black' (she also examines 'Arab', 
'yellow' and 'Jew' for similar associations) underwent a transition from qualifier to 
determinant so that by the nineteenth century an element of a person (his black skin) 
became his essence. For Guillaumin, the adjective black which had its own life - as 
colour, mood and negativity - was projected onto the 'black' person at a historical 
moment. Here it is perhaps obvious but no less important to remember that 'black' 
people did not inspire the symbolic uses of black, rather it was racists that married 
them together as a work of projection. This is something that Fanon powerfully 
takes up and which I discuss below (see also Tajfel, 1987, Preston, 1991,1992 and 
Anthias and Yuval Davies, 1992). 
3. Ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities 
Besides a range of Western, colour-coded cultural associations, the black and 
white binary delineates the norm from the deviant. In Britain this is quantitatively 
deduced. To be designated 'black' is to be designated a minority so that by this 
virtue alone, blackness demarcates separation from a majority which is not black. 
Alterity is 'innocently' derived from an empirical reading. There is, of course, an easy 
slippage from this apparently disinterested count of bodies to a commonsense view 
that being white is not 'the' or 'a' problem. We rarely think, for instance, of ethnic 
majorities because they are the status quo from which ethnic minorities deviate 
(Anthias and Yuval Davies 1992). As Guiliaumin put it: 
the membership of a majority is based on the latitude to deny that one 
belongs to a minority. It is conceived as a freedom in the definition of 
oneself, a freedom which is never granted to members of minorities and 
which they are not in a position to give to themselves (in Taifel, 1987, 
p. 242). 
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By definition, minority is relational to majority and it is the latter that frequently 
wields defining power over the former. "Minorities" writes Taifel " (1987)are often 
defined on the basis of criteria originating from and developed by, the majorities" 
(p. 242). Among such criteria will be presumptions about what members of a minority 
have in common with each other. Brah (1992) refers to this as 'ethnicism'; it denotes 
ways in which heteregeneity is denied to 'minority' groups: 
ethnicist discourses seek to impose stereotypic notions of 'common 
cultural need' upon heterogeneous groups with diverse social 
aspirations and interests (Brah, 1992 p. 129). 
Two difficulties emerge from the use of such discourses (which are by no 
means absent in equal opportunity practices). Firstly, ideas about representativeness 
within ethnic minority groups become extremely simplistic and subscribe to the 
'fallacy of homogeneity' (Stanfield, 1993, p. 19). Since such groups are presumed to be 
homogenous, it matters little who 'represents' them so long as is he a member 
thereof; and it matters little whether there has been a consultative process for 
selection within the groups. Consultation is believed to be a matter of a member of a 
'community' talking to 'wider society' since the ethnic minority group is presumed to 
have formed a community by virtue of its ethnic commonality (Nanton, 1987, 
Spivak, 1990, ch. 5). 
Few would talk of ethnic majority communities for there is a more modernist 
assumption about how majorities live out their lives. There is often an unstated 
assumption about the backwardness of ethnic minority communities, a refusal of 
coevality, as Rattansi (1994) puts it, and because the very term community invokes a 
sense of traditional cohesion and consensus, representation is viewed 
unproblematically for those who are taken to live in one. By this logic, community is 
a 'banal collective' where representation "takes a 'resemblance between things' and 
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ascribes 'complete congruence, denying difference" (Judovitz in Rosenau, 
1992, p. 97). Part of the ethnicist perspective then, involves fixing ethnic minorities 
into community membership where people are ascribed monolithic identities 
(Stanfield, 1993, p. 19). 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) have argued that it is in the development of 
equal opportunity policies and in the logic of 'equal opportunity stereotypes' that such 
simplistic views of community have flourished. At local government level, funding and 
positive discrimination initiatives required 'community' as their object, be it a posited 
ethnic minority community or a gay and lesbian one: 
Formally as well as practically, the 'equal opportunity' 
categories and the 'community' were often referred to 
interchangeably' (Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1992, p. 171). 
In relation to education, a similar usage of community has been tied to Section 
11 funding. Of course communities do exist and have often been founded for 
protective reasons; but usage of the term community can denote no more than a 
rough siting of people with something in common but not everything. The ethnicist 
perspective tends to flatten difference within the umbrella of community. Anthias and 
Yuval Davies (1982) have also pointed to the particular dangers this perspective has 
for women whose voice may be drowned by the din of male, community 
'representation'. 
Secondly, the term 'ethnic minority' is often prefixed with those of 'black', 
'Indian' or 'Asian'; these terms, argues Brah (1992) have assumed a "semiotic 
function" and cannot be read as simple referents. The enduring problem for ethnic 
monitoring categories lays in their inability to slough off this semiotic 
function, particularly in terms of the racialised meanings attaching to 'whiteness ' and 
'blackness' which effect a colour-coding of humanity. 
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4. Colour-coding humanity 
Whiteness, writes King (1991) "is informed by the blackness upon and out of 
which it has been erected" 
. 
(p. 490). Evidence of this lays in the arbitrary ways in 
which colour is assigned to some regardless of their phenotype. Whiteness and 
blackness are politically defined with definitions of each shifting according to political 
decisions but always with the first as the desirable pole to which the second is 
opposite. For instance, in the United States, debates were once waged about what 
quantity of 'traceable amounts' of African ancestry went into the legal category of 
"negro" (Allen, 1994, p. 28). And in Brazil where it is said that "money whitens", people 
could buy their way out of blackness (Allen, 1994). 
To say that 'whiteness and blackness' can never be pure descriptions of skin 
colour is to refer. to colonial beginnings rather than to support, as racists do, a 
concept of natural and primal perception of colour difference as a sign of real 
difference. Appiah (1992) argues that the use of colour as a. mode of differentiation 
among peoples is a distinctive part of modernity. While, for instance. he traces a 
good deal of Otherising in Greek and Roman antiquities, perceptions of difference 
were tribal rather than coloured (p. 14,15). Our modern savage mind is so habituated to 
colour consciousness that we code ourselves by colour as unquestioningly as we may 
sex ourselves in the formation of our identity. Brah (1992) writes that this is 
particularly true of White people. Inescapably, colour is a constitutive part of our 
identity whether we are conscious of this or not. In the case of many white people, 
white identity is not made conscious precisely because it is a taken for granted, 
normalised source of power: 
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Racialisation of white subjectivity is often not manifestly apparent to 
white groups because 'white' is a signifier of dominance ( Brah, 1992, 
p. 134). 
Generally, to be white is to be 'normal' and to be powerful within certain contexts. 
Some have argued that this implicit, colonial message is carried in the rank ordering 
of ethnic monitoring forms where 'white' is the first category. However, moving 
'white' to a more random place, does not solve the problem because it takes its 
hegemonic status wherever it goes. For a start, and with the qualifications I make 
below, there is an ease with which white people can fill in an ethnic monitoring form: 
a quick tick; no study of the other boxes to see which sub-category of black might 
apply; little self-inquiry about a 'prefer not to say' option. Ethnic monitoring systems 
ask white people to identify themselves-according to the colour of their skin. By such 
an identification, white people are positioned ambiguously between a sense that 
either their whiteness constitutes its own ethnicity or that they are relieved from the 
burden of ethnicity. Though there may be categories for Irish, Cypriot and non- 
European, the more vague the ethnicisation of white people, the more it leaves 
whites with a conviction that ethnicity is not problematic for them. In contrast, the 
ethnicisation of black people is always at centre stage, leaving some, perhaps, with a 
sense that they cannot escape ethnicity. There will be an accompanying feeling, 
perhaps, that the term ethnicity does no more than stand in for black, meant 
perjoratively. In imitation of Rousseau's pronouncements on men and women 
(Rousseau, 1979, p. 361), it could be said that the racialised meanings of black and its 
ethnicised subsumptions mean that a white person may be white for some of her life 
but a black person is black for all of hers. Commenting on census data for 1981 and 
the interdependence it establishes between colour and ethnicity, Anthias and Yuval- 
Davis note that: 
The first filter in the questionnaire was whether or not the person 
answering the questionnaire considered himself or herself to be White. 
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Therefore, there was an equation of the concepts of ethnic minorities 
and of being 'non-White'. (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992, p. 148) 
Ishmael Reed (1991) argues that this equation has entered the psyche of 
American society; he instances an arts television programme where three authors 
were discussing literature. One author was introduced as a black writer, the 
remaining two (who were respectively white Jewish and white Irish) were simply 
named by their names. This benign transmission of the message that black is a key 
signifier is set against a sense that white ethnicities can move from the particular to 
the universal in ways that 'black' experience cannot. Reed's ordinary example here 
expresses clearly a similar question in monitoring procedures. 
Though ethnic monitoring categories seek to engage with racism, the effect 
with respect to white people is potentially twofold. Firstly, some white people 
vulnerable to racism are unrecognised in this schema. Secondly, being white 
becomes susceptible to an inflated status. In terms of the first question, the issue of 
'semiotic function' is worrying around a textual silence in monitoring procedures 
concerning anti-semitism. This is not just about discrimination against individual 
Jewish people, though it includes this, it is also about recognising that anti-Semitism 
is a "problem for society.... not a Jewish problem (Learman, 1993). 
5. The Jewish question in monitoring 
The Jew provides many racists, particularly of fascist persuasion, with a racist 
ideal type. For instance, Kushner (1994) argues that Britain has developed a 
paradoxical relationship with Nazism. On the one hand, British fascism is 
successfully demonised and its representation as profoundly un-English ensures its 
political marginality. On the other hand, Britain admits fascism into its cultural 
mainstream where an enduring, tolerated and even eroticised fascination for nazism 
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smuggles anti-Semitism en route and widens the racist road generally. Football 
racism, bands that adopt nazi insignia, shops that specialise in nazi regalia and 
elements of gay pornography, argues Kushner (1994) are places that keep anti- 
Semitism alive, even if this is not the intention (see also Smith's (1989) critique of 
Sophie's Choice for an examination of the eroticisation of the holocaust). Kushner's 
point is that nazism cannot be dissociated from anti-Semitism and that any 
representation of nazism will be shadowed by it. In the case of football terraces, anti- 
Semitism is overt and taunts about gassing Jews are routinely chanted. This 
declared and largely uncontested anti-Semitism mingles with its undeclared forms to 
cross-fertilise with racism generally. By such a process, hate for the Jew who may 
not be empirically or visibly present can transmute easily into hate for the black 
person who is. Kushner does not suggest that all racism against black people is a 
transmutation of anti-Semitism, of course, merely that they connect opportunistically. 
Similarly, Philip Cohen (1988) argues that the connection between anti- 
Semitism and other racisms (including anti-Irish racism) lies in a shared fear of 
otherness that cannot be simply mapped onto "the empirical characteristics of the 
populations against which they are directed" (p. 23). Thus, for the racist, the Jew 
embodies and conveys more than herself. "What's a pachi" asks a Jewish woman 
from Rushdie's Satanic Verses. "A brown Jew" replies her friend (Rushdie,. 1988, 
p. 300). Similarly, as Fanon's philosophy professor advised him, "Whenever you hear 
anyone abuse the Jews, pay attention, because he is talking about you" (Fanon, 
1986, p. 228). 
In examining the 'terror of racism' for both Jews and blacks, Gilroy (1993) calls 
for the coupling of struggles against anti-Semitism and racism against blacks because 
holding the two together - since they are in 'some sort of mutual relation' increases 
the potency of decolonising discourses (p. 212). Gilroy wants a reversal of what has 
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happened intellectually and indeed on the streets of urban America in terms of a split 
between these two anti-racisms. This split derives from conflict, disassociations, 
academic specialism, competition and unacknowledged indebtedness between two 
'diasporised' experiences. Such experiences, argues Gilroy, have to be connected 
anew for an understanding of modernity's injustices and cruelties. The black/white 
and Jew/gentile binaries need cross-fertilised deconstruction. A closer look at the 
Holocaust and slavery as interrelated phenomena will reveal, argues Gilroy, that they 
are "precious resources from which we might learn something valuable about the way 
modernity operates "(Gilroy, 1993, p. 217). 
In terms of monitoring, putting these two racisms together would not impact 
greatly on the quantitative data yielded but it might have the qualitative outcome of 
giving recognition to their affinities and the scope of racism. It might also subvert the 
simplistic, empiricist readings some make of monitoring data around the question of 
representation (Jewson and Mason, 1987). 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis point out that the bifurcation of the two racisms under 
discussion is partly to do with the 'Black' specialism of the Race Relations Industry 
which is responsible for formulating definitions and priorities: 
... another major reason for the absence of 
Jews from anti-racist 
organisations is that anti-Semitism does not fit with the construction of 
racism within them; which is concerned with Black people of ex-colonial 
origins. This construction is understandable, given the specific history 
of both the Black movement and the history of Race Relations in Britain. 
But this specific construction of racism should not be perceived as 
summing up what racism is - not in general, and not even in 
contemporary Britain. (Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1992, p. 155) 
The Institute of Jewish Affairs, reporting on a World Report on Anti-Semitism in 1992 
also endorsed the view that black people are the most vulnerable to racism. As 
Learman (1993) put it in his reflection on this report: 
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We stated very clearly that the problems facing Jews are not remotely 
comparable with the problems facing other non-white minority groups. 
who, on a daily basis, face violent attacks, discrimination and 
harassment (Lerman, 1993 p. 27). 
With this important qualification, however, Lerman (1993) calls for closer analytical 
and political attention to the resurgent anti-Semitism in Europe so that it can be 
effectively contested alongside other racisms. In this respect, it needs to be stressed 
that in recognising the representational usage of anti-Semitism that makes it stand in 
for xenophobia generally, we should not lose sight of the fact that Jews really are 
vulnerable to racism and that this vulnerability includes the relative unpredictability of 
its emergence at political crisis points (Gilman and Katz, 1991). In this regard, the 
critique of orientalism (Said, 1991) which posits an imperialist Euro-gaze on the 'rest' 
of the world overlooks, perhaps, that Jews are the 'rest' in the West. 
The persistence of anti-Semitism, its political malleability and its thanatic 
messages about 'alien-ness' suggests that Gilroy's call for a more synthetic, de- 
colour-coded approach to racisms is a timely one, particularly if we add the context of 
ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia. Ahmed (1995) has sounded a similarly urgent call 
with the latter case in mind. 
Since ethnic monitoring procedures communicate the message that racism is 
consequential, there is something troubling, then, about omitting one of Europe's 
most recent, savage examples of it from its frame of reference. Albeit unwittingly, 
such an omission contributes to the "collective forgetting" of the terrors which 
continue to haunt many Jewish people as 'their' problem in the absence of a political 
and empathetic spread of responsibility and injury (Kushner, 1994 (a)). This is a 
knotty problem because, as I have noted, it concerns a question of symbolic as well 
as real representation. Ethnic monitoring procedures are not anti-racist tools as such, 
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they are aids to anti-racism. (Jewson and Mason, 1987). There is a danger in the 
drift of my argument that I call for monitoring to go beyond its structural limitations. 
Ethnic monitoring is a statistical gathering exercise which transmits and yields limited 
data. It asks very little of those who participate and such participation may be more 
perfunctory than thoughtful, given the routine inclusion of monitoring with other 
bureaucratic routines for selection, enrolment etc. On the other hand, there may be 
scope for increasing the meaningfulness of the small act of deciding upon and 
offering monitoring data by extending the questions, or the explanatory preamble at 
the top of monitoring forms, to admit qualitative data. I will return to this later. 
An important dimension to the Jewish question in monitoring is the terrifying 
memory it represents for many Jewish people. Hitler, after all, turned ethnic 
classification into a hideous practice (Dawidowicz, 1976). Indeed, the 'prefer not to 
say' box remains on many monitoring forms to accommodate sensibilities about this 
kind of history. Again as Anthias and Yuval Davis (1992) report: 
Jews have been absent from the 'Race Relations Industry' partly 
because of the Jewish fear of visibility which would render them 
vulnerable to racist attacks..... Even after the publicity about desecration 
of Jewish graves in Britain and in France, and against the background 
of virulent anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, there is bitter debate within 
the Jewish Board of Deputees as to what extent public 
acknowledgement of anti-Semitism contributes to resistance to it or 
rather to its reinforcement. (Anthias, Yuval Davis, 1992 p. 154) 
Within the logic of ethnic monitoring as it stands, it is hard to see how anti-Semitism 
can be recognised without designating a box. In addition to the difficulty above noted, 
however, such a box also contains all the problems under discussion with respect to 
'blackness'. Ironically, at the moment the only other place a person wanting to self 
define as Jewish can go, is in the last box marked 'Other'! In Bauman's (1995) view, 
Jews are modernity's unclassifiable others. Too shifty to be assimilated within the 
comfort of national boundaries, Jews are eternal strangers upon whom the modern 
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world's chaos and ambivalence can be dumped. Moreover, anti-Semitism, argues 
Bauman (1995), was preceded by allosemitism and remains its constant companion. 
Allosemitism is the treatment of Jews as a distinctive group, be it chosen or cursed. 
By this logic, would the recognition of anti-Semitism on ethnic monitoring forms avoid 
allosemitism or produce it? This dilemma about public identity is surely central to the 
'bitter debate' within the Jewish Board of Deputees noted above. Here too, this 
Jewish question is real for itself and representative of other racisms as it serves to 
raise questions about the limits of quantitative and classified data generally. 
6. Anti-Irish racism 
I should recognise at this point that the other major white racism in Britain, anti- 
Irish racism has an ambiguous status on monitoring forms where there is sometimes 
a box for Irish. Although this may indicate a bureaucratic desire to define nationality, 
the existence of the category is suggestive at some level that the Irish are a 
vulnerable group. Indeed, prejudice against the Irish is a product of the same 
colonial forces that produced pejorative views of black people. (Cohen, 1988) Anti- 
Irish sentiment has a shared reliance on notions of partial evolution, in evidence for 
instance in Charles Kingsley's reference to the Irish as 'white monkeys' (Husband, 
1987, p. 12, see also Curtis, 1984). 
In my own experience as a schoolteacher in South East London, I can remember the 
head of English advising me to keep my ambitions for the pupils modest because 
most of them were of Irish ancestry. Like anti-Semitism, this 'permissible' racism is 
likely to ghost other and perhaps less announcable ones within a professional milieu. 
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7. Fractured whiteness 
White ethnic minorities and black ethnic minorities are, of course, positioned 
differently in Britain, not least for the easy visibility of black people and the relative 
concealability of vulnerable white people. If it is true, that racists hold contradictory 
and ambivalent views on their targets (Rattansi, 1992, pp. 25/6, Macdonald et. al. 
1989) so much more so perhaps if there is a shared skin colour and continent of 
origin, factors which have assisted doubtless in the class mobility of some immigrant 
white groups. Having said this it would be hard and distasteful to make any claims 
about equivalence of injury. Racism is always situational and as Gilroy (1993) writes 
the "wrangle over which communities have experienced the most ineffable forms of 
degradation" is both "pointless and utterly immoral" (p. 212). 
My general point is that there is a systemic difficulty in the colour-coded 
orientations of ethnic monitoring of acknowledging intra-white racism, particularly anti- 
Semitism. This may be wounding for those who do not feel that their skin colour has 
been an effective inoculation against racism. This difficulty which creates a failure to 
communicate messages about the vulnerability of some white people also elevates 
the status of being white. This returns us to the first concern noted by Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis. The less acknowledgement that whiteness is shattered by internal 
contradictions, the more powerful it seems. As Roediger (1994) writes "to ignore 
white ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony by naturalising it" (p. 183). It is in this way 
that being white may be reinforced as an unqualified asset with monitoring adding, 
unwittingly of course, to the "tenability of a composite whiteness, with all the benefits 
which this yielded and continues to yield to those who qualify" (King, p. 507,1991). 
The more homogenous whites are represented, the more they appear to be a 
powerful, cohesive bloc. In reality, whiteness is rather dented, not least by the 
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shifting position of blackness, its own fractured racisms, its class and gender 
differences and its political and moral alignments (e. g. Hall, 1992(a), 1992 (b), King, 
1992, Dyson, 1994, Bhavnani, et. al. 1994). Finally, as Roediger's (1994) study of 
whiteness in the United States shows, there are those who are 'not yet' white or 'not 
quite' white (p. 183) including those of so-called 'mixed-race' who embody the crisis 
inherent in the whole. business of classifying humanity. Recent research with young 
people of 'mixed parentage' illustrates this very crisis: 
A number of young people in our sample told us that they had been 
upset when filling out official forms at being forced to identify 
themselves as 'black' or 'white', when they felt themselves to be both or 
neither. (lizard and Phoenix, 1993,173). 
We have seen that 'white' means too much and too little. It follows, of course, that 
'black' is problematic too. 
8. The Fact of blackness 
There is a level at which ethnic monitoring methods need to catch up with 
contemporary inquiry into the term 'black' to avoid reductive interpretations of its 
results. The implied homogeneity within this term contains its own problems, of 
course. The converse danger to white supremacist messages in the division of 
white and black categories lays in that of derisive and essentialist readings in the 
latter. As I have already indicated, within the logic of 'race thinking', blackness, 
embodied or metaphorically conveyed, represents the negative against which white is 
valorised. In his well-known essay The Fact of Blackness, Fanon (1992) examines 
the existential predicament of being black within this value system: 
I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my 
spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I 
found that I was an object in the midst of other objects (Fanon, 1992 
p. 220). 
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Importantly Fanon reminds us that human vitality is sapped by objectification. He 
alerts u$ to the corrupt process whereby some humans aggrandise themselves by 
belittling others and to the fact that racism is a framework for such corruption. The 
ego stability of the racist depends on the degradation of others rather than on a 
positive construction of self. At least I am not him, her, them! Self-realisation needs 
an object of sadism. You are not black, Fanon argues, until the colonial, racist finger 
is pointed at you: 
As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion 
except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others 
(Fanon, 1992, p. 220). 
While this suggestion, resting as it does on Fanon's enlightenment frame, would 
seem to exaggerate the sovereignty of the subject, it points to the cruel intrusion of 
racism in the process of becoming. Fanon (1992) cannot "come lithe and young" 
(p. 222) into the world as long as classification precedes him. His self becomes his 
exterior;, his skin colour will structure how he can move, what he must consider, who 
he is, creating "a real dialectic between my body and the world". This is not a 
victimist discourse but one that recognises the difficulty of "ontological resistance in 
the eyes of the white man"(1992, p. 220) and the necessity of reconstruction of the self 
in the light of this difficulty. For Fanon, the self which is blacked in from the outside 
is reconstructed from the devastation of racism. Against the "glances of the others I 
demanded an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart. Now the fragments 
have been put together again by another self'( 1992, p. 220). This is an important 
point because it means that colonisers may be invasive but they are not 
incontestable. Growth can start from devastation. Nonetheless, Fanon insists that 
racism produces an extremely injurious route to self formation in which the self must 
fight free of the negative gaze and fantasies of the coloniser at huge, painful cost. 
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This fight forces the individual to be shaped by it, displacing a more elemental and 
innocent self for one born out of struggle and compulsion. A natural, human drive to 
flourish qua human is perverted by racist forces into the struggle and necessity to 
flourish as a black human. This latter struggle, it needs to be added, is not always or 
ultimately dire. Indeed, it may well create its own sublimities but these will be wrought 
from pain and the requirement to rise above it (hooks, 1991, Gilroy, 1993). 
In Bhabha's (1994) view, what gives Fanon's analysis its potency is that he 
writes 'from a state of emergency', that is from a colonial dislocation by which he is 
oppressed and by which 'enlightenment man' is unrealised. "And the state of 
emergency" adds 6habha, "is always a state of emergence". (p. 41) Such emergence 
is fraught for the black person because she exists before her arrival. As Fanon 
(1992) put it at the beginning of 'The Fact of Blackness': 
"Dirty nigger! " Or simply: "Look a Negro! " (1992, p. 220) 
For Bhabha (1994) these "unforgettable opening lines"(1994, p. 236) capture the heart 
of all prejudice because they evoke the problem of prejudgement poignantly, be it for 
a "Jew in that estaminet in Antwerp, or the Palestinian on the West Bank .... the body 
of woman or the man of colour" (236) 
In similar vein, King (1992) argues that prejudgement casts black people into a 
psychic prison. They are banished to an imagined community in which spatial 
restrictiveness (the ghetto) is more emotional than topographic because the soul is 
trapped in the parameters set by racists. Leaving the ghetto is a difficult, spiritual act. 
Sartre locates a connected problem in the anguished, split identity of the Jew bound 
by anti-Semitism: 
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It is not the man but the Jew that Jews try to know in themselves 
through introspection... . while he contemplates himself with the detachment of someone else, he feels in effect detached from himself, 
he becomes someone else, a pure witness. (Sartre in Taifel, 
1987, p. 250). 
9. The impoverished other of the other 
It should not be deduced from the above comments that the powerful Other is 
free to realise himself with painless ease. As Bhabha's (1994) puts it: "the very 
nature of humanity becomes estranged in the colonial condition" (p. 42). Just as it 
can be argued that men and women are estranged from themselves because they are 
estranged from each other (see chapters 4 and 5) so the relationship between 
colonised and coloniser is 'enigmatic' and mutually disturbing: 
The white man's eyes break up the black man's body and 
in that act of epistemic violence its own frame of reference 
is transgressed, its field of vision disturbed (Bhabbha, 
1994, p. 42). 
Looking down onto the 'black' as a 'white' lacks imagination, to say the 
least; it prevents self-interrogation and growth. "To brutalise the other is to reinvent 
oneself - as a brute" writes King (1991, p. 499). Reed (1989) suggests that the 
creation of a 'black only' ethnicity in the United States serves as a narcotic for white 
people "which permits 'white America' from dealing with its problems (P. 229). bell 
hooks (1992) has taken this question into the classroom where she asks black 
students to offer a colour-coded gaze of white students in an attempt to illuminate its 
incompetent encounter with experience: 
usually white students respond with naive amazement that black people 
critically assess white people from a standpoint where 'whiteness' is the 
privileged signifier (Hooks, 1989 p. 167). 
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To avoid such 'naive amazement', Spivak (1990) urges white people to do their 
"homework", to inquire, that is, into their historical accident of whiteness and their 
social positioning consequent on this. This homework, adds Spivak, must not be 
driven by guilt but "a certain degree of rage against the history that has written such 
an abject script for you" (p. 62). In similar vein, Guillaumin (1995) writes that an 
obsession with the Other (particularly characteristic of nazism) produces a 
concomitant blindness of self. These observations are reminders that anti-racist 
positioning requires a comfortable self-relation. For all its flaws, this was an important 
implication in Adorno et. al's (1982) ambitious research to locate the racist personality. 
Needless to say, this raises questions about styles of race-awareness training, 
suggesting, for instance, that guilt-inducing strategies are destined to create more 
difficulties than solutions (Sivanandan, 1985). 
Modernity's hierarchies and associated identities, then, have created a world of 
distorted mirrors (Cohen, 1988). We fail to assimilate the other into ourselves and are 
thus prone to construct negative alterities that keep self-awareness at bay, unless of 
course, we make an effort not to do so. No-one can escape the problem of racism. 
The important distinction to be made here, of course, is that those vulnerable to 
racism necessarily feel its effect while those. who are not so vulnerable must be 
prompted and convinced to examine the ways in which 'black' provides a false 
antithesis to a 'white' identity (King, 1991). 
10. Identity and Ethnicism 
If, then, ethnic positioning inhibits an imaginative, intelligent sense of identity, 
does ethnic monitoring ask some people to submit, however fleetingly, to 
classificatory violence against which some souls must do battle? Or is ethnic identity 
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a malleable and progressive force for individuals and groups exposed to racism? Is it 
'strategic essentialism'? (Spivak, 1990). 
There are levels at which ethnicity can be negotiated; levels at which it cannot; 
this connects to the fact that ethnicity is deployed both for progressive and for racist 
purposes. Since ethnic membership is a cultural phenomenon, it ought to be 
possible to exit from it, to reject it or at least to modify its meaning and indeed to 
change ethnicity in one's lifetime. While all of these things do happen, they do not 
take place simply or peacefully because ethnic determination is so often racialised. 
For instance, exit from Jewishness during nazi rule was not an open option for most. 
Indeed, Jews who believed themselves to have already exited from Jewishness be it 
for religious, political, intellectual or personal reasons perished in the same measure 
as those who kept kosher kitchens and attended synagogue regularly (Cohen, 1988). 
From this example alone - and there are more contemporary ones sited in ex 
Yugoslavia - it is clear that the majority ethnic group not only demarcates what are 
ethnic minorities but it can control their membership and movement. Indeed, those 
who want to disappear into a larger and perhaps less vulnerable crowd or those who 
want to live their lives in different ways are often regarded as spatial or cultural 
trespassers. For instance, anti-Semitism lays in waiting for the 'so-called' 
cosmopolitan 'Jew', who is considered to be a demonic peddler of dangerous, supra- 
national, ideas (Bauman, 1995). And the 'assimilated black', that is the black person 
who moves in so-called 'white circles' is perceived to be a mimic of the 'real' thing and 
inevitably in a state of denial of his roots and blackness (Morrison, pp. vii-xxx, 1993). 
The dilemma for those enduring this kind of ethnicist moralism is that they can be 
both damned for leaving and damned for staying within ethnicised confines. As 
Cohen (1988) put it, "in anti-Semitic eyes, it is bad enough to be a Jew, it is an even 
greater crime to pretend not to be one " (p. 10). 
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There are controlling forces within ethnic minority groups too, particularly 
through the control of marital and reproductive options for women. As Anthias and 
Yuval Davies (1982) have argued, the restriction of movement out of ethnic groups 
maybe enforced with respect to its female members because they literally reproduce 
its members. Exogenous marriages are often sanctioned with social isolation and. 
disapproval. As a consequence, women's marital options, including whether they 
marry at all are controlled by their ethnicity. 
There may be defensive, siege mentalities too that encourage people to stay 
within the purportedly safe boundary of ethnic group. There are those who feel 
affirmed through ethnic minority group membership and who orient much of their lives 
in this direction. This group may include 'converts' and returnees; it may also include 
some who have rejected assimilationist strategies as too precarious and inauthentic 
because assimilation is conditional on 'good' behavioural norms set by privileged 
others. To be 'like them' or as 'they' desire, may involve suppressing bits of oneself 
that hollows into a yearning for something more culturally bold and confrontational 
(hooks, 1991). Ethnicity has the double edged capacity to resource a sense of 
security and its opposite. Some people feel safe in a community because they are 
unsafe outside of it. However phantom or real the ethnic community, its attraction as 
a psychic anchor can be compelling. As Nash (1989) writes: 
There is an immediate appeal in the utility of the idea of primordial ties. 
In the modern world of rootlessness, deracination, alienation, and the 
twin search for meaning and a usable past, the idea of a discoverable, 
fixed, comfortable, and historically continuous identity is highly charged 
with psychic rewards and appeal. Finally, the self has a home, with a 
past, a present, and a future transcending the fragile biological vessel 
that is its container (Nash, 1989, p. 4). 
Ethnic positioning, like any socialised positioning, can substitute for living life 
creatively and critically (Gilroy, 1990). It can give a coat of glamour to oppression. 
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The victim may become invested in her oppressive circumstances because it gives 
her the high moral ground from which to view others. She becomes, in Rushdie's 
words, the 'anti-anti-anti-racist' (1988, p. 281). From such a stance, the victim is 
dependent on binary hierarchies like black/white though she will, of course, reverse 
the usual readings of the binary. Much contemporary thinking on ethnic definition and 
identification rejects this dependence for a more late modern view of ethnic 
experiences. I refer here tö recent debates on hybridity, 'new ethnicities' and ' new 
racisms'. (e. g. Donald and Rattansi, 1992, Rattansi and Westwood 1994, Ashcroft, 
et. al, 1995, Goldberg, 1994, Giroux and McLaren, 1994). These debates constitute 
the final part of my discussion on classificatory restrictiveness. 
11. Our mongrel selves 
The challenge for those involved in ethnic monitoring procedures is to find 
ways of keeping apace with important shifts in the expanded possibilities, ambitions 
and power networks involved in the formations of ethnic identification. Stuart Hall 
(1992a) identifies these shifts in the cultural and political arrival of a more centre- 
stage presence of black people in Britain. Fanon (1986) wrote his analysis of the 
black condition in the colonial, early nineteen fifties, a period in which "blacks were 
positioned as the unspoken and invisible 'other' of predominantly white aesthetic and 
cultural discourses' (Hall, 1992a, p. 252). What was formulated from such times, 
argues Hall, was a necessary concept of The Black experience' that could oppose the 
objectification of all black people; this meant downplaying the heterogeneity of black 
populations and stressing the common vulnerability to such objectification. It was, 
continues Hall, a struggle to 'come into representation'. While he does not suggest 
that the struggle is complete, Hall (1992a) considers that the counterpositioning of a 
'positive' black imagery has transformed 'relations of representation'. There are 
degrees of black visibility where there were none so that the struggle to be 
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represented is now also a struggle about what is represented. This shift means that 
the 'old binary oppositions and substitutions will no longer suffice', it means 'the end 
of the essential black subject' and the innocence that attaches to him or the idea of 
him (p. 254). 
Hall suggests that the category 'black' is becoming more and more adrift from 
the subjects it is meant to capture. Black people are differentiated, not least, argues 
Hall in terms of class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity. Within this differentiation there 
will be diverse emotional and political investments and diverse power relations which 
will fetch diverse outcomes. What is clear for Hall - and there are resonances in this 
debate with those concerning gender essentialism - is that "you can no longer 
conduct black politics through the strategy of a simple set of reversals, putting in the 
place of the bad old essential white subject, the new essentially good black subject" 
(1992a, p. 254). Besides the social differentiations like that of class, Hall points to the 
splitting processes 'on both sides of the division' in which the structures of otherness 
are not always stark or simply contemptuous; Hall reminds us of the implications of 
desire, ambivalence and fear in identity construction: 
Just as masculinity always constructs femininity as double - 
simultaneously Madonna and Whore - so racism constructs the black 
subject: noble savage and violent avenger. ' And in the doubling, fear 
and desire double for one another and play across the structures of 
otherness, complicating its politics (Hall, 1992a, p. 256). 
Similarly, King writes: 
Being white and black, grand and base, abusive and obsequious, it 
should occasion no surprise that black self-hatred is a love of whites, 
that black self-love is a hatred of whites, and that neither the hatred nor 
the love is ever unmixed since 'blackness' is a lived antinomy, a modern 
ambivalence thoroughly internalised (King, 1992, p. 240). 
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Hall's discourse on late modernity is concerned with seeking 'a new cultural 
politics which engages rather than suppresses difference' (Hall, 1992a, p. 257). 
Aware of the appropriation of ethnicity for purposes of domination, Hall (1992a) calls 
for the decoupling of ethnicity "as it functions in the dominant discourse, from its 
equivalence with nationalism, imperialism, racism and the state"(Hall, 1992a p. 257) 
so that a 'non-coercive and a more diverse conception of ethnicity' can be invented. 
Such an invention, he suggests is underway in works of art which work with the past 
not as sentimental roots but in "complex mediation" with memory, fantasy and desire 
as they are "re-experienced through the categories of the present" (p. 258). 
Hall has set a tricky task because on the one hand he argues that we are all 
'ethnically located' and so long as we can subvert the hegemony of Englishness, we 
can produce a carnival of ethnicities (a bit like the postmodernist gender carnival - 
see chapter 4) that recognises a host of particularities: 
we all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, out of 
a particular experience, a particular culture (Hall, 1992(a) p. 258). 
On the other hand, Hall 91992a) states that these particularities, ethnically 
speaking, 'do not contain us' (p. 258). I am unclear about the place Hall has 
negotiated between ethnic identity and freedom from it. Is this a grey zone, an 
interface of blackness and whiteness, metaphorically and really as ethnicities, 
majority and minority interact? This at least seems to be the theme of another article 
by Hall (1992) revealingly called Our Mongrel Selves. Here, Hall produces a more 
disintegrative view of ethnicity in which he appears to suggest an inversion of the 
liberal melting pot for a late-modern celebration of difference in which ethnicity is 
more productive than reductive, particularly for those who have lived its difficulties. 
The concept of diaspora has become quite pivotal to this new discourse (see also 
Hall, 1990). 
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Those who have been 'diasporised', writes Hall (1992) are at the "leading edge 
of what is destined to become the truly "late-modern" experience ( p. 8). Robin 
Cohen, 1995)argues a similar point in his attempt to subvert the pure meanings of 
loss in the notion of diaspöra for one of gains that derive from the cultural fluidity 
demanded of its victims men-1-995)r 1-995)r Gilroy too makes much of the diaspora as a 
rich and special resource available to those who have been colonially scattered 
-{GiIrey; *993) The playwright and novelist, Hanif Kureishi (1986), writes movingly of 
his own diasporised experience: 
... 'my country' isnt a notion that comes easily It is still difficult to answer the question, where do you come from? (Kureishi, 1986 p. 35). 
This question is rendered difficult, writes Kureishi, not because his own sense 
of self is split between Pakistan (his father's birthplace) and Britain (his mother's 
birthplace) but because of a racist refusal to grant him full citizenship. Responding to 
a Conservative minister's proposal that "half-caste children would merely produce a 
generation of misfits", Kureishi remarks: 
I wasn't a misfit; I could join the elements of myself together. It was the 
others, they wanted misfits; they wanted you to embody within yourself 
their ambivalence (Kureishi, 1986, p. 11). 
Clearly, as Hall argues, Kureishi's art at some level comes from and indeed 
explores new ethnic configurations but in this dynamic, 'home' is problematic, above 
all, because it is the racist that makes it hard for Kureishi to settle. For this reason, 
care needs to be taken to avoid romanticisating geographic or cultural yearnings. 
While the concept of diaspora points to the crisis of belonging and the effects of 
enforced mobility endured by groups of people, its contemporary usage could cross 
its wires with racist suspicions. There is a risk that 'home' is ethnicised and/or 
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racialised, reproducing, for instance, an unintended echo with the racist insistence 
that they should return whence they came. 
There is also the risk of creating a false opposition between a diasporised and 
an undiasporised experience if the diaspora is made to resource too much (e. g. 
aesthetics, desire, myth, search - Hall, 1990). Without wanting to deny the specificity 
of events like the Irish famine, the pogroms, the holocaust, enforced migration the 
slave trade, all of which displaced the survivors, landing them in places that were 
inhospitable to their arrival, it is important to remember too that home (meant as 
nation and community as well as family) is a highly charged, emotional site for all. 
Home can be a place of abuse, a nasty nest, a healthy point of departure and much in 
between. Not-belonging - and the suffering that it produces - is multifariously rooted 
and indeed there is potential for people to find a common ground if we broaden what 
we mean by 'home'. "Home" announces Ben Okri (1995), "is wherever you are 
happy" (p. 69). Racism intrudes on such a construction of home but if the discourse of 
diaspora over-ethnicises home as belonging, it can let into its backdoor the 
restrictiveness of nationalism for it will contain its own, competing 'imagined 
community' (Anderson, 1992). 
Perhaps few are closer to the 'leading edge' of late modernity on the 
precariousness of belonging and of ethnicity than the writer Sälman Rushdie. It was 
Rushdie, of course, who named the phenomenon of ethnic hybridity and its potential 
pleasures before an unhappy audience fighting for purities in a fragmented world 
(Appignanesi, 1985). Rushdie's work and his predicament, it could be said, 
embodies a crisis of transition from the illusory safety of modernity's classificatory 
order (particularly in its divisions of the sacred and profane) to late modernity's 
uncertainties. It is no surprise that Hall takes the title of Our Mongrel Selves from 
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Rushdie's defence of his novel, the Satanic Verses and quotes an important passage 
from this defence: 
This book celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the 
transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of 
human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in 
mongrelisation and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Melange, hotch- 
potch, a bit of this and that, is how newness enters the world. It is the 
great possibility that mass migration gives the world and I have tried to 
embrace it. This book is for change-by-fusion, change-by=conjoining. It 
is a love-song to our mongrel selves. (Rushdie in Hall, 1992, p. 10). 
Hall, then, sees ethnicity on the move. Fluid not fixed. Such a perspective 
finds support among the many, particularly those engaging with post-modernism, who 
question a perceived modern neurosis to classify in order to control. King's critique of 
what he calls 'antinomy mongering' offers succinct illustration : 
Modern identities are immensely complex for being jumped up. The 
counterpoised abstractions of black and white, conservative and radical, 
slave names and 'free' names, Christianity/Islam, male/female, always 
have some basis in fact, but rather more in fancy. Their falsity is 
startling in its implications. What is useful in them is not the reality, but 
the esprit simplificateur which they unleash. These simplistic 
antinomies become the essential means by which humans, in an 
alienated, overcrowded and hierarchical world, presumptively invent, 
order and subjugate themselves and others (King, 1991, p. 499). 
In combating such 'simplistic antinomies', it follows, of course, that something 
should be said of whiteness around the question of mongrelisation and hybridity. If 
the binary divisions of black and white need dismantling and if we are witnessing the 
death of the 'innocent' black, should this be accompanied by a death of the 'guilty' 
white? If 'fear and desire' are present in the racist psyche how are they constituted in 
the anti-racist? Is fear of difference displaced by love of difference? What can be 
negotiated with whiteness? Can the white person reflexively mongrelise and thus 
reduce her privileged positioning both within and without? Or is she too "responsible 
for a system that is white and racist" as one school of race-awareness would have it 
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(Katz, 1950, p. 135). The logic of recent theorising on ethnicity such as Hall provides 
suggests that whiteness is indeed politically and culturally malleable and that this 
admits a more open orientation on the meanings of black and white. If this is one end 
of the new ethnicities stick, however, we must keep hold of the other which will 
concern power. 
To what extent can it be said that there is a parity of dislocation among whites 
and blacks? Does late/post modernity produce non-racism out of an 'unhomeliness' 
(Bhabha, 1990 p. 9) that is more scattered than ethnic configurations? Has 
globalisation (Giddens, 1991) reduced our colour-coded consciousness? Can the old 
black and white as opposites now be neighbouring, muted, blurred or meshed others 
in a globalised consciousness in which each are as grey as they are any other 
colour? Can we all jump on Gilroy's metaphoric ship, floating between places, "a 
living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion" (Gilroy, 1993, p. 4)? Caws 
(1994) argues something like this in his invitation to educationalists to adopt a post- 
modern multiculturalism that globalises and uproots us all. "Nobody is going to be at 
home everywhere", writes Caws (1994). "But it is one of the rewards of post- 
modernism to have many homes, not just one" (p. 386). By such a perspective 
(despite its insensitive negligence of the materially homeless! ), the deconstruction of 
whiteness, and its sub-categories like Englishness, also requires eviction from 
colonially defined lands and an interrogation of the much debated question of nation 
and nationality (Parekh, 1989, Anderson, 1992, Modood, 1992, Cohen, R. 1994). 
Such a deconstruction can take place, perhaps, within Giroux's notion of 'border 
pedagogy' (Giroux, 1991). This pedagogy takes students to the edge of their worlds 
to improve their vision of what lays beyond, before and within to encourage a more 
adventurous self-relation with difference. As King put it "the other is not your brother 
but yourself (King, 1991). The message in this post-modern frame (Rattansi, 1994) is 
to look difference in the eye, refract it back to oneself and replace fear with 
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celebration. By such a logic, all the equality 'isms' could lose their discrete treatment 
in a kaleidoscopic project to combat heterophobia. Such a project would have to be 
sensitive 
_to 
illusions of difference as much as real difference. Related to this, as 
Sarup (1991) has cautioned, there is a risk that hierarchies of difference will hold 
sway over the celebration of them. While we maybe able to jettison the 'guilty white' 
from anti-racism, power remains disproportionately white. Another risk in a multi- 
ethnic progressivism lays in its male imagery. Does thinking ethnically screen out the 
complexities of gender location in the world? 
12. Ethnicity and gender 
Beneath the ethnic category is the image of a man, black or white, Jewish or 
not 1, Rattansi. (1994), for instance, suggests that Bauman's Jew is always male). Just 
as male workers occupy the imagery and category of class, they also populate much 
of the discourse on ethnicity. Where women do emerge, they are often as shadows, 
even stranger, often exclusively sexualised (e. g. the 'oriental woman') and invariably 
property: the notions of our women or their women have no reverse equivalence for 
men. The racist perception of women from ethnic minorities tends to be even more 
undifferentiated than that of men and in a racist sleight of hand, this adds to the scorn 
for 'barbaric others' (Sardar, et. al. 1993). In an act of double-classification, the 
responsibility for the presumed abject condition of women is placed on the menfolk. 
This is a particularly oppressive and stubborn form of classification with respect to 
Asian and Arab women and men. Although, of course, vitality and independence are 
no less evident in such women, often encounters with non-stereotypical displays are 
explained as exceptional. It would seem that the idea of female passivity is much 
stronger than the vision of female activity (Spivak, 1990,1993, Minh-h, 1989, 
Bhavanani and Phoenix, 1994). When we look at an ethnic category, then, we must 
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make an effort to see the woman and an even greater effort to see her beyond the 
stereotype. This effort presents certain challenges for multicultural education. 
There is. much controversy around how cultural practices that influence 
women's lives should be presented and valued. Difficult issues like clitoridectomy 
(euphemistically called female circumcision at times) and purdah, for instance, can be 
easily reduced to sexist victimologies or anguished debates about universal values 
(Leicester, 1989, Carens, 1995). In part, these perspectives may arise out of a 'West 
and the Rest' (Said, 1991, Hall, 1992c) perception which either resists denigrating that 
which is not West for a runaway cultural relativism or buys into the west/rest binary 
for the creation of a sexist and colonial victimology. The question of gender also 
raises the need to dent the view of a western other to admit more commonalities 
alongside difference to avoid both these paths and get somewhere in the middle of 
them. Clitoridectomy serves as a good example here if we take Lerner's (1993) 
argument that this is symbolically practised in the west through the denial of the 
centrality of the clitoris in female sexuality. While there is a crucial difference 
between symbolic and real mutilation, (because the first is reparable and the second 
is not) Lerner points to gender commonalities that can neither be subsumed culturally 
nor geographically. One could make similar linkages with the example of purdah and 
sex segregative practices in the 'west' (see chapter 5). 
If multiculturalism looks squarely at the question of women, it will stimulate 
doubtless many uncomfortable questions, including some which racists use 
opportunistically (talking about the sexism of the other is a good way of avoiding one's 
own sexism! ). Left undiscussed, women of many places, are likely to be brushed 
aside as victims and their men often will be demonised in the same stereotypical 
sweep. To avoid such a sweep, multiculuralism must give texture and visibility to 
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female experiences and resist basing cultural differences on what happens to their 
women, as if they are an undiffentiated rest set apart from or in the west. 
13. Ethnicism and multi-culturalism 
What an educational institution says in its ethnic monitoring procedures may 
not connect up with what is said within the context of multicultural strategies. While it 
is not my purpose to journey far into debates about multiculturalism, I think conscious 
connections do need to be made between monitoring and the parameters set for 
multicultural strategies in educational organisations. If we are bound to submit to the 
rigidities of classification in one place, such rigidities can be softened and 'explained' 
in another. Put simply, the meanings, scope and limitations of ethnicity need to be 
taught. 
A number of contemporary commentators on multi-culturalism in education 
want to go beyond the much derided three 's' (samosas, saris and steel bands) to a 
grasp of the allusiveness of ethnic identity and the bountiful prospects of playing with 
this. Peter Mclaren (1994) talks of 'transcultural routes' beyond 'white terror' (p. 34). 
Similarly, Yuval-Davies (1994) speaks of a 'transversal politics' comprised of multi- 
cultural encounters, dialogues and messages. In this context, multi-culturalism will 
be more about 'us' than 'them' because it will confront alterity as a self-relation 
according to the kind of questions already discussed above. The other is not your 
sister but yourself! ( Bhavnani and Phoenix, 1994). It is in this sense too that 
Gidden's position that there are no others in late modernity is meaningful 
(Giddens, 1991,1994). Though this is a little optimistic if it is meant as a statement of 
present reality, perhaps it points to some cracks in the white hermeneutic circle and 
the usurpation of colonial arrogance for a more cosmopolitan reading of the world. 
To suppose that there really are black and white worlds 'out there' is to subscribe to a 
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racist fantasy. This circle, of course, is more conceptual than real. Humanity is riven 
in many ways and in this respect, we need to be sensitive to cross ethnic alliances 
which can be intimate or political or cultural. Since our whiteness or blackness is 
lived with many other elements and allegiances, a more radical multi-culturalism must 
ensure that the 'multi' is neither. racialised nor read exclusively in ethnic terms and 
that the cultural is not monolithic and masculine. 
Furthermore, within multiculturalist strategies, there needs to be an avoidance 
of 'epistemological narcissm' (Gilroy, 1993), that is the assumption that privileged 
vistas derive from specifiable experiences as I elaborate in chapter 6. Oppression 
does not prescribe the same set of spectacles to all of its victims. Nor does it deliver 
predestined outcomes or an automatic counter-cultural life that is creative. A radical 
multiculturalism cannot afford 'chromatism' (Spivak, 1990), i. e. the practice of colouring 
voice or experience. Such a point needs to be tempered by a recognition that 
experiences and ethnicity correlate at important levels. 
To return to Hall (1992a) he argues that those who are "obliged to inhabit at 
least two identities, to speak at least two cultural languages, to negotiate and 
"translate" between them" (p. 8) do not have the luxury of a lazy self-construction and 
thus bring a certain intelligence to their predicament. It is also true, it should be 
added, that there are those who get into the belly of Babylon and those who remain 
on its periphery or in psychic exile. Exile, wrote Rushdie, "is an endless paradox: 
looking forward by always looking back" (1988, p. 205). Unsurprisingly and humanly, 
the diasporised or ethnic experiences are themselves differentiated through different 
ways of meeting the obligation to 'inhabit at least two identities'. Similarly, just as 
some whites are becoming available to a different kind of food, others maintain 
stubborn, xenophobic distances from any kind of difference, illusory or real. With 
these qualifications in mind we should not assume, however, that privileging 
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experience commits us to- a standpoint theory of knowledge. Engaged with 
sensitively, such privileging is a recognition that grasping the complexities of racism 
requires a journey into the affective domain. Some have had this journey forced upon 
them and there is insult to the injury of racism in denying the learning that frequently 
comes of it. 
These, then, are some of the issues that can enter educational strategies to 
infuse a multiculturalist perspective that largely contests heterophobia in the 
elements of self rather than those of the other. Within such a perspective, however, 
we should not delude ourselves into believing that an ethnic carnival is out there and 
available to us all. On such matters, choice encounters power more for some than 
others. Although, the black/white binary has been unbalanced - and this needs to be 
better reflected in education - it has not been toppled. Such a reality sustains the 
raison d'etre of ethnic monitoring. 
14. Classification: enabling, restrictive or both? 
If social theorists are rejecting a cognitive order based on dualities for one 
that is sensitive to the relational and to differences, their challenge is to keep in mind 
that the playing field remains uneven. The aggressive oppositions facilitated by 
binary classifications do need to be contested. Whoever does it, as Foucault (1991) 
has argued, the drive to classify humanity is inherently authoritarian. Or, as Bauman 
(1991) offers, it is an anxious urge to avoid chaos, a modern, neurotic endeavour to 
have a place for everything and everything for a place. In classificatory systems 
much is either overdefined or underdefined, nothing can be left murky, ambivalent, in 
the middle, shifting, chaotic or becoming: 
The ideal that the naming/classifying function strives to achieve is a sort 
of commodious filing cabinet that contains all the files that contain all the 
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items that the world contains - but confines each file and each item 
within a separate place of its own (with remaining doubts solved by a 
cross-reference index). It is the non-viability of such a filing cabinet that 
makes ambivalence unavoidable (Bauman, 1991, p. 2). 
The appeal of mongrelisation is that it resists taxonomy (or it becomes so 
infinite, it degenerates into madness, turning out "unstoppably more divisions, 
diversity and ambivalence than it has managed to get rid of') (Bauman, 1993, p. 5). 
However, if, like Bauman, we believe that classification enforces meaning against 
ambivalence or if we subscribe to the similar Derridean notion of a crisis of meaning 
in everything we name, we must abandon ethnic monitoring because it centres on 
category decisions and is thus relentlessly inaccurate and tyrannical. Such 
abandonment would exemplify the problems that critics of postmodernist theory 
make. In the name of the protection of endless difference (however spelt) inequality 
would be left to promote itself (Sarup, 1991). In the new social scientific project to 
locate the mucous, the 'greyness within', the processes of becoming, the cathecting 
operations of otherising and so forth, we must not drive out empirical reality. 
Classification is not always wrong though it is invariably limited. As Adorno (1922) 
put it: 
Classification is a condition for cognition and not cognition itself; 
cognition in turn dispels classification. (Adorno, 1972, p. 220) 
We get to warmth through the categories of hot and cold. This appears to be 
forgotten in those strands of postmodern thought in which power dissolves into 
differences and a refusal of dichotomy. The risk is that this refusal may replace a 
sense of social justice and responsibility for a celebration of uncertainty. To the 
dichotomous possibilities of 'innocent' or 'guilty', the postmodernist, decentred 
'subject' may reply 'ambivalent' and thus acquit himself of murder. Meanwhile the 
black child killed by his white classmate is unambiguously dead (Macdonald, 1985). If 
modernity has overdetermined the moral self, postmodernity may have bent the stick 
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the other way to breaking point. The tension from these two poles leaves ethnic 
monitoring decisions with a predicament. 
Hall usefully challenges overdetermined ethnic definitions, whether for the self 
or the group, and urges greater individuation within the meaning of ethnic identity. 
But the idea of 'new ethnicities' standing in their own multi-dimensional glory, 
decoupled from racism underestimates perhaps a codependence between racism and 
ethnicity. What is at stake in the discussion on ethnicity is the need to retain its 
meaning within the reality of racism while avoiding purely reactive definitions. Can 
one then, as Hall (1992a) suggests, extend its meaning to leave the racist behind? I 
wonder if racists will be on the tail of ethnicity however it is fashioned. It is rumoured, 
for instance, that in some police quarters, ethnic categories are referred to as 'stills'. 
Whatever you call 'them', it is said, they are still black! 
In Our Mongrel Selves, the ethnicised subject seems to me to be struggling 
more to shatter ethnicity than to affirm it. Not so much getting black into the union 
jack as ridding us of the union jack altogether. Such a shattering constitutes its own 
fight against racism for it rejects the latter's classificatory violence. I realise that this 
leaves a hole where people's particular culture, place, history and experience is 
customarily defined ethnically. If ethnicity is shattered how do we reduce these 
particularities terminologically? Perhaps the answer is that we cannot because 
ethnically informed articulations do too much violence to the complexity and shifting 
nature of people's lives. Perhaps we are in the presence of a language, rendered so 
poor by the insistences of racisms that we have to transcend ethnic definitions to 
develop the trends Hall describes. 
We are culturally attuned to ask people where they come from and we expect 
to place them by their answer. Perhaps a more relevant question would be: 'how did 
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you get here? ', 'how have you managed to arrive? ' Or 'what is preventing you from 
doing so? '. From Kureishi's (1986) testimony, these are more intelligible questions. I 
will ground this point in a final discussion on ethnic monitoring procedures which I 
hope deals too with problems of anti-Semitism to which I refer above. 
. 15. Ethnic monitoring and the 
limits of quantitative research 
It seems to me that in auditing and ultimately overcoming discrimination, we 
could reduce some of the classificatory difficulties such as 'racial' and 'ethnic origin' 
by asking a different order of questions, as supplements or substitutes to filling in 
boxes. In this respect, we. could learn from the orientation used on questions of 
disability where the monitoree is invited to disclose whether she needs particular 
technological or human assistance to function at work or as a student. In similar vein, 
we could ask people if they feel vulnerable to racism; and invite them to disclose what 
they would like the institution to do about it. 
There can be cultural and religious questions too which avoid ethnicist 
stereotyping. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) argue that religious difference has 
become a crude signifier of cultural difference. They further argue that events like the 
campaign against Salman Rushdie are fuelling the racialisation of religions assisting 
fundamentalism on one side and racism on the other. These are added reasons for 
trawling information about religious needs directly rather than deductively from 
defined ethnicity. In any case, questions such 'as 'what sort of food do you like/dQ you 
have dietary restrictions' will give caterers more to go on than a list of the ethnic 
groups present in an institution. Similarly, questions about single-sex groups/facilities 
and space for worship can be posed for every student. 
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In short, we could move away from difficult quantitative material to difficult 
qualitative material to monitor, inter alia, whether the sort of self-identity shifts of 
which Hall speaks are taking place. It would mean moving away from the risks of a 
positivism upon which racism itself relies; moving away, that is from a count of bodies 
according to skin colour and or the cultures and geographic affinities they are 
presumed to have to a different kind of assessment. In her review of research 
methods with respect to 'demography and race' Carole Marks (1993) concludes that 
quantitative data must be accompanied by qualitative data to avoid basing an 
assessment of the first on assumptions: 
.... before judging exaggeratedly high or low fertility, fatherless homes, the overestimation of discrimination, or the advantageous position of 
Black women, it is essential that 'the validity of knowledge taken for 
granted' be always and continually exposed, examined, and brought into 
question (Marks, 1993, p. 171). 
Giving the monitoree a chance to engage with what is being counted may be a 
way of 'exposing and examining' quantitative data and of revealing a different set of 
differences beyond or with 'ethnic' ones. Otherwise there is the risk too that: 
The use of "empirical data" to explain the causes and consequences of 
racial difference in income, educational attainment, intelligence, mobility 
patterns, family structures, and residence perpetuates the myth that 
race is relevant in defining human differences and therefore confirms 
the stratified racial order (Stanfield, 1993, p. 161). 
In' one of my former college workplaces, for instance, each year a 'satisfaction' 
survey is conducted and broken down by gender and 'race'. The questions are 
uniform for all students and concern matters like course structure, curricula, tutorial 
support and so forth. A piechart is published from this survey: 'black satisfaction 
rates' are represented against 'the rest' as a meaningful division. This honourable 
attempt to discover whether the educational needs of black students are met makes 
the assumption, of course, that the respondents respond as students if they are white 
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or as black students if they are black. This is precisely the problem to which Stanfield 
refers. The connected issue of ethnic monitoring concerns the messages it conveys 
about human sub-divisions and what can be counted as meaningful (Nanton, 1987). 
An emphasis on the qualitative, it may be argued, would not be able to deal 
with representativeness, except at the level of those identifying themselves as 
vulnerable to racism. It would not be able to proceed according to notions of ethnic 
representation or under-representation. A debate has been waged about whether 
'fair procedure at work' can achieve fair representation in any case. Jewson and 
Mason. (1987) point out that the problems of under-representation tend to start a good 
deal before the process of job or course application because there is too much of a 
'qualification deficit' (p. 237) among those who are also disadvantaged by racism. 
Monitoring procedures and other guarantees of fairplay can only make a slight 
improvement with representativeness, they argue. In fact the scrupulous matching of 
formal qualification and set experiences with jobs can often disqualify the 
disadvantaged. Indeed their research shows that under-representation requires a 
strategy that goes beyond, or even behind, fairplay in order to admit more 
disadvantaged people into the game. Representation has to be achieved by specific 
interventions at the levels of training and positive discrimination. Even then we 
should be cautious about what we think is being represented because it is a 
qualitative question as well as a quantitative one. There should be no burden on 
black people who get jobs or pass exams to represent more than themselves. What 
needs to be lifted from their shoulders is the burden that they can offer unmediated 
representation of others presumed to be 'like them'. 
The debates on ethnic absolutism and ethnic hybridities do present a 
challenge to the practice of ethnic monitoring. As Young (1992) put it: " The 
118 
organisational practice of ethnic labelling will evoke continuing unease as to its 
meaningfulness" (p. 268). 
Although more people are filling out ethnic monitoring details (Anwar, 1990) and 
the statistical evidence they yield is of some use, is it a system that can keep apace 
with 'the dynamic and interactive processes by which human identity is managed over 
time'? (Young, 1992, p. 268). 
If Hall and others are right in seeing ethnicity as fluid and negotiable, then 
increasingly monitoring procedures will want to freeze the unfreezable and may limit 
our comprehension of the very problem it seeks to combat. What will be at issue in 
the 1990s, writes Young: 
... is the way 
in which we construe ethnicity itself. The more important 
manifestations of the politics of race in the 1990s are then likely to be 
less concerned with programmes than with language and concepts as 
we struggle to find a mode of discourse that can do justice to the 
subtlety and variety of the influx of social experience (Young, 1992, 
p. 268). 
Similarly, Jenkins (1994), writes that: 
Unless we can construct an understanding of ethnicity that can address 
all of ethnicity's facets and manifestations, from the celebratory 
communality of belonging to the final awful moment of genocide, we will 
have failed.. (Jenkins, 1994, p. 219). 
These- two observations summarise the purpose of this chapter. If ethnicity is 
an increasingly problematic category, we must continue to problematise the practice 
of ethnic monitoring. This is not simply about the quality of information ethnic 
monitoring can yield for it concerns too the messages it conveys about blackness and 
whiteness, identity and belonging. It is also about the culture of multiculturalism that 
the deployment of ethnic categories promotes in educational institutions. 
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In this chapter I have discussed the dangers of essentialising ethnicity, that is 
of regarding ethnic identity as fixed, natural and fundamental to an individual's 
'difference'. In contrast, the next chapter explores sex difference as something that 
is, at certain levels, fixed natural and fundamental. Difference in sex difference, I 
suggest, is different to difference from ethnic and class difference. 
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Chapter 4 
SEX EQUALITY: THE SAME AND DIFFERENT? 
1. Equality and difference 
Ideas about sex equality within equal opportunity policies tend to be 
influenced by two strands of feminism. The first draws on humanist feminism 
where sex differences are held to be a matter of differential social treatment 
rather than of biology. From this perspective, increasing women's access to work 
and education is a question of equal rights. The second draws on a notion of 
female particularity which claims that the presence of women will make a 
qualitative difference to wherever they are because women have special 
attributes. Both strands can be found together in equal opportunity policies as 
in, for instance, the following Further Education Unit handbook on gender 
equality: 
Commercial and industrial employers are now assiduously 
encouraging young women to enter and stay in their organisations. 
They are valuing the contribution that women can make to the 
organisation as colleagues of equal status with men and, indeed, 
welcome the fact that they may have particular skills to offer in 
terms of human resource management and personal and 
interpersonal skills (Warwick, 1988, p. 5). 
The reference to 'particular skills' here is likely to be framed within an 
understanding of the specificity of gender construction, either as a biological or a 
social process or perhaps both. The reference to 'equal status' is likely to be 
framed within a concept of human commonality. Although these strands of 
feminism come from different feminisms, this is unacknowledged often in equality 
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statements that combine them as with the example above. Crudely the differing 
feminisms rest on either an assertion of a dual species within humanity (male and 
female) or that of one species (humans). These assertions are presented in 
many different shades, particularly the first where decisions vary about how much 
difference is biologically, socially or psychically constructed (Cott, 1986, p. 4,5). 
In the present field of equal opportunities the position of one species - 
which is largely a humanist, enlightenment view - is more hegemonic than that 
which calls for a recognition of the distinctiveness of women. I mean by this that 
arguments. about social justice and equality with men tend to take priority over a 
liberationism which questions whether women want to measure 'up' to men or 
indeed whether this would result inequality( Thornton, 1986). The more women- 
as-special feminism that competes with that which declares women to be the 
same as men ( socially, politically and intellectually) derives - in this century at 
least - from what has come to be labelled broadly as radical feminism, much of 
which was developed in North America in the nineteen seventies and eighties 
( e. g. Dworkin, 1977,1986, Rich, 1977, Firestone, 1979, Daly, 1990). More recently, 
developments of a philosophy of sex difference from mainland Europe promise to 
extend the debates about sex equality and to offer new challenges to those 
working in the equality industry. For this reason, this feminism, particularly 
through the work of 'Luce Irigaray (1985 (a), (b), 1993 (a), (b), (c), 1994) and 
Italian feminists close to her, (Milan Women's Bookshop Collective, 1990, 
Cavarero, et. al. 1991, Cavarero, 1992, Finzi, 1992) provide the focus to this 
chapter. With such a focus I do not attempt to offer a faithful Irigaraian feminism 
for assimilation into equality' discourses, rather, I want to identify some of the 
insights from this body of thought which I think can inspire an ethics of gender 
relations in the service of sex equality. In addressing the tension between a 
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feminism of sex equality and one of sex difference, I suggest, as does Thornton 
(1986) that we abandon the unresolvable gender debate about nature and nurture 
for one that can be comfortably unclear about the knowable extent of sex 
differences between male and female. At the same time, what we can be clear 
about is that whatever differences exist between the sexes, they need not be 
hierarchised. On the contrary, they can be the very basis for a radical conception 
of humanity's gifts: men for women, women for men. 
In order to clear a path for my focus, I begin with some comments on 
enlightenment influenced feminism and the radical feminism that developed in 
partial opposition to it. I hook these comments on Segal's (1987) critique of 
radical feminism, centring much of this on the issue of male violence and 
pornography. Unlike Segal - and this is a case I make in the next chapter -I take 
the view - along with radical feminism - that pornography is emblematic of 
existing sex relations and deserves centrality in feminist debates. This is also a 
pertinent focus because I organise my discussion of ethical gender relations 
around the problem of sexual harassment. In this regard, this chapter and the 
subsequent one are closely connected. While it is important, of course, that 
equality work is attentive to empirical patterns of sex discrimination, there is 
increasing evidence (Ralson, 1992, Klein, 1992, Larkin, 1994, Lees, 1994) that the 
questions of sexual harassment and the wider connected one of male and female 
communication need to underpin our formulations of gender equality strategies. 
Larkin's (1994) research, for instance, - has shown that getting females into. 
hitherto male domains is crucially about dismantling the symbolic and petty 
violences wielded against female 'trespassers' into men's worlds. Most of this 
violence, reports Larkin, is sexualised and given free reign by the ignorant or 
unwitting complicities of educationalists. Essentially, Larkin's (1994) work 
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reveals that the dismantling of sex discrimination structures has to be 
accompanied by serious efforts to transform the cultures of sex relations that 
circulate in any institution; this is because the ways in which male and female 
-regard each other licences informal exclusions and abuses which escape 
legislation (Halson 1992, Bagilhote, et. al. 1995). This chapter, then, is more about 
the dynamics of sex relations than it is about material structures of discrimination. 
While I try to capture some of the 'plurality of feminisms' (Delmar, 1986, p. 9) 
in pursuit of conclusions on sex equality and difference, I ultimately stray from 
feminism for an exploration of sex relations that is inspired by Irigaray's theory of 
the hetero-sexual, meant as the terrain on which male and female meet or could. 
meet in an economy of mutual exchange. According to an enlightenment dictum, 
the soul has no sex (Fromm, 1993 p. 20). My aim in this chapter is to expose 
the opposite possibility. 
2. Enlightenment feminism 
Modern feminism is a child of the enlightenment (Rende11,1985, 
Tong, 1994). Early arguments for equality of the sexes rested on a concept of 
natural rights taken from this movement. Even though enlightenment thinkers 
like Locke and Rousseau excluded women from their theories of an essential 
equality among men, feminists extended the logic of these men's work to argue 
the case for sex equality. If Löcke could claim that God had endowed all humans 
with reason, it was but a small conceptual leap to suggest that women, being 
members of humanity, must be endowed with this faculty too. And if Rousseau 
could argue that man in his original state of nature had no cause to subordinate 
others, it followed logically, at least for enlightenment feminists like Wollstonecraft 
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(1985) that women's subordination to man is artificial and mutable. 
Enlightenment humanist feminism insisted on commonalities between male and 
female. The social dualities produced out of sex inequality were theoretically 
resolved by feminists through a concept of essential sex sameness (Brody, 
1985, Wollstonecraft, 1985). 
With this thrust on equal rights, humanist feminism carried with it an 
anxiety that differences would always add up to inequalities. Differences had to 
be denied or be minimised to avoid slippage into naturalising sex inequality. Vital 
for Wollstonecraft was a critique of femininity as a learned phenomenon. 
Femininity is largely a , social edifice which prevents women 
from breathing as 
humans. "The first object of laudable ambition" she wrote, "is to obtain a 
character as a human being, regardless of. the distinction of sex" 
(Wollstonecraft, 1985, p. 82). This insistence on the human in the female is 
understandable not simply in terms of the enlightenment paradigm which inspired 
it but also in view of modernity's formative views on women. Wollstonecraft 
wrote in a period when femininity and passivity were becoming increasingly 
intertwined, at least for middle class women. The less women did, the more 
female they were perceived to be as we shall see in Rousseau's conception of 
Sophie (chapter 5). Thus confronted with views that women were creatures of 
nature and incapable of modernity's cultural and political excitements, the 
retrieval of women as social, human beings occupied the centre of classical 
feminism (Mitchell and Oakley, 1986, Rendell, 1985). 
Arguably, Wollstonecraft's response to the male chauvinism of her time, A 
Vindication of the Rights of Women (1985), represents one of the first 
elaborations of socialisation theory, qualifying her, perhaps, as a founding mother 
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of sociology. Though the feminism of Wollstonecraft admits some consequential 
biological differences into its framework, the thrust of her analysis extends the 
enlightenment view that humans are born with a tabula rasa upon which society 
can write what it wills. This version of feminism survived within socialist and co- . 
operative movements in the nineteenth century and within twentieth century 
social theory and liberal or socialist feminist politics (Taylor, 1983), but it has had 
to compete with a feminism of sex difference as well, particularly from the 
nineteenth century and under the. impact of the suffrage movement. This 
movement marked a shift from a stress on natural rights to that of women's rights. 
As Delmar (1986) summarises: 
What replaced the notion of 'human' rights was one of 'women's' 
rights which depended not so much on a concept of woman as 
species member, but on woman as member of a specific social 
group composed of herself and other women. Suffragist and 
suffragette alike, whatever their differences over tactics, usually 
agreed in constructing 'woman' as a unified category, a specifiable 
constituency, sufficiently similar for an enfranchised section to 
represent the disenfranchised (Delmar, 1986, p. 8). 
These shifts within -the politics of sex equality point to the vintage of 
tensions in the debates on sex difference and to the respective legacies of 
enlightenment egalitarianism and its nineteenth century modifications. An 
exploration of the many feminisms deriving from these splits is a project of its own 
(see for instance, Mitchell and Oakley, 1986, Tong, 1994), I want to note only that 
contemporary feminism as Delmar (1986) writes, has a 'complicated inheritance' 
in which debate on sameness and difference continues to enliven its endeavour. 
(Delmar, 1986, p. 24). It is within this debate that Segal (1987) intervenes in the 
defence of a feminism that remains attached to its enlightenment root against a 
contemporary feminism that recalls the stresses on the specificities of 
womanhood expressed by some of the early supporters of female suffrage. 
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3. Radical Feminism 
(a) Good woman/bad man? 
Segal charges radical feminism with turning back the political clock: 
.. what 
is most troubling to some older feminists such as myself is 
the turnaround in feminist writing from an initial denial of 
fundamental difference between women and men in the early 
seventies to a celebration of difference by the close of the 
decade..... a parallel cycle seems to have occurred in the first 
organised feminist movement at the turn of the 
century'(Segal, 1987, p. x. ). 
Segal does not question whether this parallel cycle (and indeed the many 
defeats of the humanist principle within feminism occurring earlier than the turn of 
the century) may be a problem of its tenability. As a socialist feminist, Segal 
believes that the only authentic feminism is one that minimises sex difference; 
and where there are differences, they must be theorised as conditioned ones. 
Thus any departure from this approach satisfies male chauvinism more than it 
serves women because it inescapably polarises the sexes in a reversed moral 
hierarchy of good and evil. 
The real problem with popular 'new feminism' which sees women as 
essentially virtuous and men as essentially vicious is that it serves 
the forces of reaction as surely as it serves the forces of progress 
(Segal, 1 987, p. 246). 
Segal's polemic is directed towards the North American feminists, Rich, 
Dworkin and Daly and the influential Australian feminist, Dale Spender. Segal's 
objections are many but the principal ones are that these theorists demonise men 
and exalt women for the very qualities that materially confines them in modern 
society. 
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Segal is happy to see women as the more gentle, co-operative, nurturing 
sex so long as these attributes are recognised as socialised ones. Her objection 
to the radical feminists (Segal uses the American term cultural feminist as well) is 
their worship of the female qua female, particularly her maternity and her 
presumed affinity/proximity with nature. In opposing any discourse on the innate 
specificity of women, Segal offers Cockburn's defence of a socialist feminist, 
humanist perspective: 
All the true diversity that people are capable of experiencing and 
expressing, of needing in their sexual, domestic and working lives 
and of contributing to society is repressed by gender.... Gender 
difference is not true difference at all... The good qualities deemed 
masculine - courage, strength and skill for instance - and the good 
qualities seen as feminine - tenderness, the ability to feel and 
express feelings - should be the qualities available to all and 
" recognised and acclaimed wherever they occur, regardless of the 
sex of the person... . 
Any society we out to organise anew would 
surely be a celebration of multiplicity and individual difference 
(Cockburn in Segal, 1987, p. xiv and xv). 
Essentially, Segal and Cockburn's claim is that gender is both a matter of 
social construction and potentially, of choice. Gender is understood largely as a 
question of behaviour and of attitude. Contemporary gender positioning here 
makes a mountain out of the molehill of anatomical sex differences. Gender is 
superstructural and ideological and thus relatively easily reformable through 
political and personal will. The underlying humanist equation is that because we 
are all human, we can all be the same. Because we can all be the same, gender 
is a false organiser of human difference. Gender must dissolve for authentic 
human differences to flourish. As I touch upon later, there is a surprising meeting 
between this enlightener feminism and the post-modernist analysis of gender 
differences. 
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Segal is unhappy, understandably, with what she sees as the 
essentialising of men as inherently violent. She protests that violence belongs to 
no sex by nature. A j'accuse methodology in feminism denies women's 
complicity in violence or indeed in their effective contestation of it. Women have 
power too; and they can abuse it as much as men; or they can harness it to 
contest oppression; they can also join hands with men who reject violence and 
sexism. 
In the radical feminist literature Segal discusses, there does indeed appear 
to be a tendency to collapse all sexisms into misogyny which is inverted 
sometimes to produce a feminist polemics of counter-hate. Assessing material 
on male violence as do Dworkin (1970,1986,1992) and Daly (1990) may infect. 
the writer with understandable rage. The challenge is to resist generalisation and 
inversion and it would seem that this challenge is not always met in radical 
feminism. Spender (1986), for instance, announces that "there are few other 
(other than partner, brother and father) men with whom I feel comfortable or who 
contribute to the improved quality of my life" (Spender, 1986, p. 217). This is a 
rather dismal, ungiving, sexist stance and like many women, feminist or 
otherwise, Segal wants an engagement with men not unremitting warfare. 
While it may be true that some radical feminists are unyielding to men or 
to any concept of humanity, Segal is, I think, insufficiently yielding to radical 
feminism's strengths. In many ways, Segal has provided a critique of its 
rhetorical drive more than its substantive arguments. On the question of 
violence, for instance, I think that Segal is at her weakest in her responses to 
radical feminist objections to pornography. It is true that an over-credulous 
reading of, say, Dworkin (1976,1986,1992) would induce most women to bolt 
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their doors and never venture beyond them. It is not so much what Dworkin says 
about pornography but the dependent generalisations she conveys about men 
and women which cast the first as devils and the second as their victims. 
Although this unhelpful binary might mar Dworkin's work, it need not undermine 
its central message which is, ironically, much more concerned with egalitarianism 
than Segal's own analysis of pornography. 
b. Pornography 
For Dworkin, pornography is an abusive expression of sex inequality. 
While Dworkin has contributed to the research into causal factors between 
pornography and male violence, her case does not rest on questions of causality 
(Dworkin, 1992). Pornography is violent per se and she offers a great deal of 
evidence to show this (I return to this question in my discussion on sexual 
harassment). Segal(1987), on the other hand, writes that pornography is an 
outcome of men's diminishing power, "the last bark of the stag at bay" ( 1987, 
p. 108). For Segal, pornography is a crisis in the male superiority complex. It is 
the sexually unsure and. anxious who buy into pornography: 
It (pornography) depicts not men's actual sexual control over 
women but rather men's Qneurotic and debilitating obsession with 
'the netherworld of phallic failure" (Segal, 1987, p. 108). 
Thus for Segal, pornography is not a site of violence but one of the 
pathetic and humiliated man. Because the man cannot disclose and overcome 
his sexual anxieties in negotiation with a flesh and blood woman, he buys a 
debased representation of one. This conclusion, however, hardly counterposes 
Dworkin's critique for surely violence frequently emanates from a crisis of 
potency? By this analysis we could reduce fascism simply to pathos though this 
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is unlikely to be comforting for those who perished at its hands. In any case, 
according to one testimony, Segal has misordered the problem. In Baker's (1992) 
experience, it is pornography that renders the man insecure and anxious 
because it sets impossible 'standards' for men and women. Having consumed 
pornography as a young man under peer pressure to accomplish this particular 
rite de passage into manhood, Baker discloses that he presented a very 
alienated sexual self to his first lovers because pornography scripted his sexual 
performance, creating in the process "expectations that could not possibly be 
fulfilled" (p. 124). Clearly, as Foucault (1990) has elaborated, sexual activities do 
not derive from private choice. However, this should not preclude the possibility 
of degrees of individual ownership and integrity playing some role in intimate life. 
In the field of international relations violence is defined as what happens when 
communication breaks down (Ahmed, 1995). This strikes me as a good way of 
seeing pornography. In part, it expresses the absence of dialogue between men 
and women both of whom take their cues from sources outside of themselves 
and outside of each other as Baker's example illustrates. This is an 
underestimated problem in Segal's soft critique of pornography's blockages to 
human relations. 
It is likely that there is no . unifying motive for the consumption of 
pornography. Segal's emphasis on a single kind of consumer is a little trivialising 
of a larger question about the product available and its victims. Unlike the 
evidence on consumers, what we know with certainty, is that pornography is 
overwhelmingly by men and for males, including those in their formative stages of 
adulthood (Itzin, 1992). The problem with the magazines which are said to 
circulate around school cycle sheds lies not in their lewdity, as the moral right 
would have it, but in their sexist fictions about sexual freedom. Segal has 
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underproblematised this fact in her attempt to dissociate much pornography from 
violence. Indeed, this attempt forms part of Segal's general tendency to shrink 
the problem of male violence as a response to radical feminism's amplification of 
it. Segal's thrust is to defuse male power and to redistribute it more evenly 
among men and women. Thus Segal has usefully challenged the male/female 
-moral oppositions in radical feminism, but has done so by reducing the 
significance of power differences between men and women From a less 
dramatic view of pornography, Segal argues against censorship and for a 
struggle for cultural changes in the representations of male and female sexuality: 
More appropriate feminist action would seem to me to involve not 
the demand for state censorship of pornography but the attempt to 
understand, analyse and publicly discuss the appeal of 
pornography, commenting upon and at times taking direct action to 
remove pornographic and sexist images of the use and abuse of 
women's bodies primarily for men's titillation. (Segal, 1987, p. 113). 
This does not work as a response to writers like Dworkin (see also 
MacKinnon, 1992) firstly, because they do 'publicly discuss the appeal of 
pornography' (Dworkin, 1976,1992) and secondly, because, as I show later, they 
argue not for state censorship but for redefinitions and legal boundaries to be 
drawn with respect to abusive/sex discriminatory erotica and for the adventurous 
idea that sexual pleasure and sexism need not be bedfellows. 
If the terrain of pornography is not exactly benign in Segal's analysis, it is 
close to this in that she relates it to popular films and romantic fiction as one of 
the many sexist artefacts of capitalism. Rightly, Segal objects to the 
representation of pornography as symptomatic of an alleged endemic male 
violence in society but in the process, she refuses the centrality of violence in 
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pornography itself. In such a refusal, Segal underestimates the very stark and 
specific issues of inequality and violence relevant to pornography. 
In contrast, in her treatment of pornography as a particular symptom of 
sexist domination, Dworkin (1992) points to the strategic necessity to combat it 
within an understanding not of sexism as ubiquitous but of sex discrimination in 
definable terms. I develop this theme in the next chapter and for the moment 
merely want to suggest that in her resistance to the essentialising of men as 
violent, Segal has lost sight of specific cultural outlets for male violence and what 
Irigaray (1993(c)) would term female sacrifice. There may of course be a dispute 
about what constitutes violence here; for Segal, violence may be that which 
draws blood, kills, maims, mutilates or marks the body - in which case this 
represents about one-fifth of pornographic depictions; (Itzin, 1992) or she may 
share a broader definition of violence which includes female postures of 
degradation, humiliation and subordination which accounts for a great deal more 
of pornography. 
The debate about pornography is also a debate about what is intrinsically 
violent in the representation of women as sexual subordinates (Cameron and 
Frazer, 1992). In this debate Segal draws attention to the fact that erotic 
identifications are not sex-bound (Segal, - 1994). For instance, Segal cites 
research that claims that a significant minority of male viewers of horror/slash 
movies identify with the female victim and are thus masochistically invested in 
pornography. This may well be true but it needs to be added that there is an 
important difference between such fantasies of identification and real life 
prospects. Erotic respite from the hard edge of masculinity is not withdrawal from 
its material privileges. However the consumer of pornography consumes it, the 
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scripts are oppressively gendered and restrictive. Pornographic games of power 
are indeed games which - as the above testimony shows - function to impoverish 
the realm of erotic responsibility by reducing it to positions and postures rather 
than relations. Some men may well enjoy a subordinate position in the bedroom 
but there is less evidence that the same men want to extend this relinquishment 
of power in the boardroom. Bringing the violences of pornography into a legal 
framework of rights means, among other things, connecting the fantasies of 
violence against women with women's real subordination. While Segal is right to 
point out that there are no simple mappings from the erotic to the material, this 
should not deter us from a focus on the sexist and gendered ideas informing 
pornography as a whole. Libidinal forces may well resist political correctness (as 
well they might) but if we judge them to be mysteriously out of our hands, we 
conform to the tired view that men in particular are hormonally and unstoppably 
driven. We may not be able to dislodge subconscious desires of subordination or 
domination but this should not deter us from stimulating the cultural terrain with a 
more radical sexual discourse. Such a discourse necessitates critique of what is 
as well as a new discursive space for what can be. Segal's tempered critique of 
pornography makes this a difficult ambition. 
Radical feminism takes pornography as a key case example of a diffuse 
and permissible (largely permissible) abuse of women and whatever this 
feminism's excesses, it understands the problematic of women's alienation from 
her body through such abuse. Tied to this issue, is the importance radical 
feminists place on the need for women to reclaim their bodies. Again, the 
enlightenment rooted feminism Segal represents and radical feminism diverge. 
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Segal is less willing to share radical feminisms' indecisions about the 
biological and the social in the determination of the female. Such indecisions 
irritate Segal because she holds a more humanist conviction of the human body 
as an abstraction. Humanism wants to forget the body or at least to androgynise 
it (Bethke-Elsthain, 1992, Scott, 1992), whereas radical feminism (and the related 
ecofeminism) wants to remind us of it. Segal is dismayed by this renewed 
attention to the biological because in her view, it is antithetical to the feminist 
project: 
Feminists have fought fiercely. to demolish the significance given to 
the biological in determining the social inequalities between women 
and men and the contrasts we draw between feminine and 
masculine. But today some feminists with equal passion appear to 
have gone over the opposite camp (Segal, 1987, p. 7). 
c. Our bodies, ourselves 
Interest in the body need not be read as a biologist retreat for it can be 
about women's reappropriation of their bodies in the context of its social theft. 
Such a direction is also central to the continental feminism I discuss below and 
which is openly indebted to radical feminists, particularly Rich (1.977). The 
following passage from her Of Women Born is, for instance, quite compatible with 
an Irigararian analysis: 
The repossession by women of our bodies will bring far more 
essential change to human society than the seizing of the means of 
production by workers. The female body has been both territory 
and machine, virgin wilderness to be exploited and assembly line 
turning out life. We need to imagine a world in which every woman 
is the presiding genius of her own body. In such a world women will 
truly create new life, bringing forth not only children (if and as we 
choose). but the visions, and the thinking, necessary to sustain, 
console and alter human existence -a new relationship to the 
universe (Rich, 1977, p. 285). 
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Rich is calling for women to have sovereignty over their bodies, to do with 
them as they please. Though she may be suspicious of its informing ideas, it is 
unlikely that Segal would want to contest this call. Indeed, her most recent book, 
Straight Sex (Segal, 1994): makes a valuable contribution to this endeavour. 
However, the last sentence in this cited passage moves Rich closer to what 
Segal has called a 'psychic essentialism'. This label refers particularly to Irigaray. 
It is a feminism which engages with psychoanalysis and the morphologies of 
male and female bodies in its quest to understand sex difference. Although Segal 
points to some of the weaknesses in Irigaray such as her privileging of the 
symbolic over the material, Segal extends her critique of radical feminism to this 
new wave of 'feminism', by offering the. same foundational objection. This 'new' 
feminism is, Segal decides: 
... most readily interpreted as strengthening and celebrating traditional gender ideologies of fundamental biological difference 
between women and men (Segal, 1987, p. 133). 
Against Segal's dismissal, Irigaray (1993(c)) would reply doubtless that a 
feminism which refuses to explore biology is unconfident about what it will find. 
'There is', writes Iraragary a 'physiological and morphological complementarity 
between the sexes. Why deny it? (Irigaray, 1993(c) p. 107). While radical 
feminism may carry some indecision about the origins of sex difference, the 
Italian and. French feminism I now turn to has no such tension. It believes in sex 
difference and the importance of this difference for the political as much as the 
personal. 
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4. Homologising sex difference 
One of the recurring criticisms Segal offers to the many women she 
examines centres on the inadequacy or absence of a political logic or 
commitment from their positions: 
Radical feminists fear that focusing on political action for equality 
and joining political structures dominated by men inevitably negates 
or distorts the expression of women's own special experiences and 
values, perhaps even making women more aggressive and 
competitive like men (Segal, 1987, p. 243). 
This is an issue that touches the heart of equality politics. In response to 
Segal's feminism, there are those who would argue that sex egalitarianism does 
more to submerge women's rights than to promote them. In the European 
political arena, this debate has been in Italian feminist and socialist movements 
(Lauretis, 1990). Luce Irigaray's (1993(a) critique of egalitarianism has provided 
a spine to this debate: 
egalitarianism, sometimes expends a fair amount of energy denying 
certain positive values and getting nowhere. Which leads to the 
crises, disappointments, and periodic setbacks in women's 
liberation movements, and their failure to make a permanent mark 
in History. Equality between men and women cannot be achieved 
without a theory of gender as sexed, and a rewriting of the rights 
and obligations of each sex, qua different, in social rights and 
obligations (1993(a), p. 13). 
If there is truth to Segal's charge that a feminism of sex difference is 
politically helpless - or even harmless - this cannot be said of Italian feminism and 
Irigaray's long relation with it (Milan Bookstore 1990, Cavarero et. al. 1991, 
Irigaray, 1994). The Italian women's movement and its feminist intelligentsia is 
closely engaged with political debates. Perhaps more than anywhere else, public 
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discussions of sex equality admit a feminism of sex difference within their 
framework (Irigaray, 1994). 
Adriana Cavarero (1991,1992) Is prominent among Italian theorists of sex 
difference. I shall describe her critique of emancipationist feminism (humanist or 
socialist feminism) below before turning to Irigaray herself. "Modern political 
thought", Cavarero writes, "is characterized by a fundamental repression of 
sexual difference" (1992, p. 32). Caverero, who is much influenced by Irigaray, 
urges a recognition of sex difference as a key to understanding humanity. All 
attempts to subordinate one sex to another actually remove the possibility of sex 
difference rather than assert it. In subordinating herself to a man, a woman does 
not merely assist him in material terms (washing his shirts, etc. ), she assists him 
in being male, she functions for him and cannot therefore complement him or he 
her. Thus the distinctiveness of the sexes is lost in relations of subordination; 
neither male nor female can strike out on their own. This problem of sex 
entanglement and of subordination cannot be resolved through the humanist 
paradigm of equality. "Equality between two different beings cannot be the 
dissolution of one of. them in the other", writes Cavarero (1992, p. 32). Beneath 
the apparently sexless term humanist, man is already present as representing the 
universal. And by such an overstretch of himself, man does not represent man 
except in grotesque form. Female sexual difference - which is denied in. 
humanism - is absorbed into an 'abstract paradigm of the individual, which is 
understood as male and universal" (Cavarero, 1992, p. 32). Sex differences, she 
continues, cannot be grouped in with epiphenominal differences within a 
discourse on equality. "Women are not a race, nor a culture, nor an ethnic 
group. They are a primary difference inscribed in human existence, they are and 
have always been one of the two sexes" (1992, p. 45. ). Modern political theory 
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and practice, even at its egalitarian best, claims Cavarero, suffers amnesia about 
sex difference because it forgets the female subject: 
The minds of political thinkers are marked by a powerful repression 
of female sexual difference. We are dealing here with an innate 
repression which I would define as a syndrome of 'universalisation 
of masculinity' (Cavarero, 1992, p. 36). 
This syndrome is accomplished in two ways, claims Cavarero; firstly, 
theoreticians "simply fail to see women.. . women are a sort of 
'background'... vaguely perceived in the distance and not further explored 
(1992, p. 36). Secondly, as already noted, instead of understanding his own 
particularity, man "transforms him(self)into a paradigm of humankind as such" 
(p. 36). Thus where women are included within the political order or in public life 
generally, they are inevitably treated as the 'female-sexed part of men'. 
Unwittingly, emancipationist feminism. conceals a homologizing logic within its 
own discourse: 
The male subject though male in essence and in name, counts 
potentially for women too. In this perspective, women are not 
another subject (with an equally genuine origin and therefore equal 
dignity and empowerment) but are a sort of empirical specification 
of the sole male subject (1992, p. 37). 
Our political culture, then, including the politics of equality, is male 
perverted as much as it is male dominated. There is not even an androgynous 
merger of the sexes here because the male has to stand in for the female too. 
The concepts of male domination or of patriarchy carried within radical feminism 
are unable to explain this problem fully because they are more concerned with 
oppression than with complementarity or alterity. As Segal(1987) identified in her 
critique, the moralist idea that women must develop separately because men are 
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allegedly horrible inhibits a wider investigation into gender realisation for both 
sexes. The oppositions proposed between men and women resist an exploration 
of the relational between them beyond, that is, hierarchically arranged relations of 
oppression. Otherness for the radical feminists tends to be understood within a 
master-slave dialectic. In contrast, strands of Italian and French feminism are 
concerned to affirm the basic alterity of male and female and to affirm it as 
constitutive of humanity. The refusal to consider sex difference is not just about 
exclusion to the advantage of others because the "exclusion is of the very alterity 
that constitutes human subjects by virtue of their sex" (Fischer et. al. p. 10). Both 
male and female are unrealised in the power configurations that sexism 
produces. Put simply, the argument rests on the view that humans are sexed 
subjects and that this is consequential. As Cavarero puts it: 
If we are concerned for truth, truth must give an account of, and 
meaning to, the fact that there exist men and women rather than 
bisexed or unsexed individuals (Cavarero, 1992, p. 38). 
Humanism then strains at a gendered bit which it tries to neutralise: "the 
neutral, universal, sexless subject has never existed" ( Cavarero, 1992, p. 38) If 
sex difference is forgotten, phallocentrism is inevitable. This is evident around 
questions of suffrage: 
The male subject, working out representations of the world oriented 
to himself, is so shamelessly capable of regarding himself as 
universal that it has been possible to describe a situation in which 
men alone can vote as one of 'universal suffrage' 
(Cavarero, 1992, p. 38). 
This is an important observation globally if we contrast the enormous 
international mobilisation that took place (quite rightly) against racialised 
disenfranchisement in South Africa with the absence of such a mobilisation 
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against the many regimes that exclude women from suffrage. As Irigaray (1994) 
argues, the absence. of an attention to women's rights and civic status makes it 
possible to forget their existence in the public realm or, indeed, to exclude them 
from it. 
Equality with men, then, amounts to the inclusion of women into public life 
as honorary men. Modern history, argues Caverero, oscillates between 
exclusion or homologization. Either women cannot come in or they may come in 
like men. The second is not necessarily an advance on the first, writes Caverero,. 
because: "homologization does not mean generosity but an extremely potent form 
of power. " (1992, p. 39). This is also the kind of rat that radical feminism smells in 
struggles of equality but which result in a political abstentionism that 
understandably dissatisfies those who want to get into the fray. On the other 
hand, emancipationist feminism is always destined to fight itself into a corner 
because it urges the case that anything men can do women can do too as if that 
were the issue. Within this case, any female distinctiveness is read as a 
disability because it interferes with the project of homologization: 
This homologizing paradigm forces women to become uniform with 
the male subject by erasing female sexual difference to such an 
extent that, even at its biological level, femaleness comes to be 
regarded as an obstacle to homologization. Pregnancy is a 
stumbling block to be avoided, a career obstacle, a vertical drop in 
productivity (Cavarero, 1992, p. 41). 
If this critique were to be embraced within equal opportunity discourses on 
gender, it would require a radical rethinking about strategies. It would require a 
reassessment of the question of access for instance. Simply getting women 
where men already preside would not suffice. It would mean an exploration of 
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the ways in which male and female can be represented, not just quantitatively but 
qualitatively. The question would be not so much to de-gender an institution but 
to re-gender it. The radical message of this kind of feminism is that the 
subordination of the female by the male perverts and weakens masculinity as 
much as it perverts and weakens femininity. In this analysis, violence does not 
'belong' to men (an inference from radical feminism), rather it belongs to perverse 
masculinity; conversely, passivity does not 'belong' to women but a perverse 
femininity. Thus men do not have to learn to be more like women to reduce their 
violent nature (another inference from radical feminism perhaps), rather they have 
to learn what men are; and this requires that they release themselves from their 
covert dependence on women (Benjamin, 1990, Giddens, 1992). For the 
moment, argues Cavarero, men are 'monstrosities'. Irigaray (1993(c)). uses the 
same term within the same logic to describe women. Both sexes are abnormally 
formed. Women do not have to learn to be more like men to get beyond the 
confines of maternity; they have to know who they are as women. 
5. Female Difference 
For Irigaray, women can only be free of inequality with men if they discover 
their own singularity: 
It is not enough to free oneself from the master in order to be free. 
Freedom should be founded on the capacity of the female subject to 
speak herself, think herself and protect herself. She must give 
herself an autonomous meaning which takes account of the fact 
that women are women and not men ( Irigaray, 1993(c) p. 40). 
Moreover, as we shall see, what is at stake in this philosophy is not just 
the reinvention of men and women but the relations between them. The 
pronouncement vivre la difference makes many women wince because they know 
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that what is generally meant here is vivre I'inegalite. But - as we have seen with 
Caverero - it is the ambition of a number of contemporary writers to appropriate 
this old chauvinist refrain for modern social theory. Sex. difference, writes 
Irigaray, represents one of the questions, if not the question of our age 
(1993(c), p. 15). 
. 
Irigaray's reverses the influential declaration of. de Beauvoir (1992) that 
"one is not born a woman, one becomes one" (de Beauvoir, 1992). For Irigaray, 
we have yet to become women, at most, we are shadows of our own sex. 
Women are never mirrored to themselves for themselves; they are only 
meaningful for-men (wives, etc. ) or as not-men (without a penis). Women are 
absent in a monosexual symbolic order that is male. Our authenticity, that is our 
being beyond the functions of maternity and helpmate for men, has been 
destroyed by a symbolic matricide in the 'male imaginary'. Irigaray revises this 
psychoanalytic concept to explain how we experience the world and the sexed 
self in a complex of psycho-sexual developments. For psychoanalysis, ego 
formation and cognition of the world and the self proceeds simultaneously 
through the mind and body. Knowledge is always affect. Crudely, what we know 
is what we feel, urge, lose, discharge, touch, desire, see from a complexity of the 
sexual, the bodily, fantasy, imagination, mirroring and filial experiences of 
attachment and loss, most of which are unconscious. In particular, infants are 
cast into a gender drama - which psychoanalysis roots in the Oedipal complex - 
with parental figures in which the mother bond is severed for the law of the 
father. Through a process of bodily and psychic comprehension which moves 
into language (the basis of culture and society for Lacan) a monosexually male 
symbolic order comes into being and holds sway. The word enables males to 
differentiate from the mother and thus from femaleness and to find their sex 
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specificity in a phallocentric order that owns language. Males leave the female 
realm of nature for culture while females are stuck in a primitive netherworld 
because their sameness with the mother puts them under no pressure to 
differentiate or, crucially, to individuate. There is an economy of male sameness 
in the symbolic order, argues Irigaray. Women are viewed from behind, their 
physiological specificity and thus their female specificity is lost in 'anal ontology' 
(Irigaray, 1985(a)). The frontal, psychoanalytic gaze can see no further than the 
penis and takes its obvious evidence as obvious evidence of women's lack. The 
visual has primacy over touch in such a conclusion which means that women are 
doubly denied because their physicality is ignored both in terms of its contours 
and substance (vagina, vulva, clitoris) and its inherently tactile sensuality. 
(Irigaray, 1985(a) ). 
Irigaray challenges the conventional psychoanalytic interpretation of the 
centrality of the Oedipus complex and thus of an essentialised male triumph; 
In fact, when Oedipus makes love to his mother one might say that 
he does so at first with impunity. On the other hand, he will become 
blind or mad as soon as he knows that it was his mother; whom he 
has already killed, according to his mythology, in obedience to the 
verdict of the Father of the gods (1993(c), p. 13). 
Thus it is not the Oedipal drama that launches male superiority (as with 
Freud, Lacan . and Kristeva) but the confusing, social encounter with male 
superiority that traumatically replies an original and innocent love of the mother as 
sin. It is Western psychology that has turned love of the mother and the 'horror' 
of its sexualised aspect into a complex which conveys with it a repulsion of the 
maternal (see also Finzi, 1992). In modern idiom, a 'mummy's boy' is derisively 
considered to be an overfeminised male. We have no language to articulate a 
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positive mother-son bond, indeed the well adjusted male leaves his mother 
behind. Moreover, the reading of female social birth as a necessary turn against 
the mother is symbolic violence of an essentialised symbolic violence: 
Neither the little girl nor the woman needs to give up the love for her 
mother. To do so is to sever women from the roots of their identity 
and their subjectivity (Irigaray, 1993(c), p. 20). 
Irigaray reminds us that the first relation of mother to child is written out of 
psychoanalysis, namely the foetal relation: 
This primary experience is very unpopular with psychoanalysts. In 
fact they refuse to see it.. A vague sort of taboo is in force. There 
would be a danger of fusion, death, lethal sleep, if the father did not 
intervene to sever this uncomfortably close link to the original 
matrix. Does the father replace the womb with the matrix of his 
language? But the exclusivity of his' law refuses all representation 
to that first body, that first home, that first love (Irigaray, 1993(c) 
p. 14). 
This is something Rich thematises too. The fact . that all humans are of 
woman born, she argues, must be consequential to gender construction in 
important but silenced ways (Rich, 1977). Psychoanalysis has always 
problematised women for not being men (without a penis in Freudian terms). For 
Irigaray, such problematising is driven by a heterophobic denial of women's real 
specialness and their centrality in the very survival of the human species. This is 
a denial of men's social debt to women. (Irigaray, 1993(c). Instead, maternity is 
sentimentalised and framed as a determinant of women's restrictiveness and this 
crushes the possibility for a law of the mother, which includes her own realm of 
desire and her own natality, to take its side with that of the father. In 
psychoanalysis, there is only one law and the male imaginary is expressive of 
this. 
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Whatever our conscious or unconscious primal and formative experiences, 
it seems to me that we do not have to settle the psychoanalytic debates about 
the drama of exclusion, differentiation and symbolic murder to accept that our 
ways of seeing are emotionally invested. And however we want to trace its 
formation, it is clear that the female is not represented (or ill represented) 
symbolically and we can take the example of religion to illustrate. Within 
Christianity, for example, God is not only male but he functions as God because 
he is not married and he only incarnates as male, as Jesus who remains single 
too. And the virgin Mary', "alone of her sex" is "Without a daughter or love 
between them, without a way of becoming divine except through her son: God- 
man, without a divine bridegroom" (Irigaray 1993 (c), p. 62). If women are outside 
of the divine, continues Irigaray, they cannot transcend their corporal selves, they 
are trapped in their flesh, their interiority denied: 
Female beauty is always considered a garment ultimately designed 
to attract the other into the self. It is almost never perceived as a 
manifestation of, an appearance by a phenomenon expressive of 
interiority - whether of love, of thought, of flesh. We look at 
ourselves in the mirror to please someone, rarely to interrogate the 
state of our body or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of 
our own becoming (1 993(c) p. 65). 
On the other hand, the presence of the divine as male enables men to 
transcend their corporality, to see themselves as something more than their 
exteriority. In reading Irigaray's assessment of the divine, I am reminded of 
Durkheim's (1961) attention to the totemic in societies as a source of ontological 
security and of a collective identity. For Durkheim, it is not simply god that 
matters, it is the act of worship that binds people, that gives them an inner, 
spiritual existence. Through religion, men have an opportunity to worship 
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themselves as men from which they can derive pride and security. In some 
religious practices, this monosexual spirituality is structurally organised. Women 
are excluded not only from the symbolic but are kept at the margins of worship 
through segregation or exclusion in order-to minimise female contamination of this 
male affair with manhood. By the same token, there are religions, like 
Catholicism and Buddhism, that require its priests to achieve purity and virtuous 
contact with God through a vow of lifelong separation from women. These 
established religions have repressed the representation of women through 
Goddesses for the privileging of man (see also Miles, 1989). 
Because women are not represented in the divine order, suggests Irigaray, 
they are derelict, they cannot individuate as women or develop pride in 
themselves as autonomous beings. Women can only enter this order as the 
mother of a son or the wife of a man; she cannot enter it for herself: 
Female identity always comes down to empirical parameters that 
prevent a woman, and the world of women, from getting themselves 
together as a unit. The sexual-familial dimension remains one of 
these parameters. "Are you a virgin? " Are you married? " Who is 
your husband? " Do you have any children? " These are the 
questions always asked, which allow us to place a woman. She is 
constituted from outside in relation to a social function, instead of to 
a female identity and autonomy" (Irigaray, 1993(c) p. 72). 
In exploring women's capacity to love themselves, Steinem(1992) gives 
the example of a woman whose deep desire to be a deacon was rejected by her 
church. "It hurts me in my soul" this woman reported. Brought up in a Christian- 
Jewish family, Steinhem writes that: 
Both religions left me out of their words and imagery, and made me 
feel a little suspect and unclean, as if I had to behave in a very 
special way to be accepted (Steinhem, 1992, p 360). 
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The revelation for Steinhem came on a trip to Egypt where she saw 
paihtings on the ceilings of a temple of the goddess Nut: 
For those of us who have been raised in religions that treat 
sexuality as suspect and women's bodies as symbols of temptation 
and downfall, the feeling of standing in places that treat both as 
sacred is like sunlight flooding into a dark room (Steinhem, 1992, 
p. 362). 
Obviously the influence of religion is not limited to that of active believers, 
or even established beliefs, because God is a metaphor for that which stands 
above the single, mortal, human being, so that it can embrace science and 
philosophy too. This is not, of course, a question of the empirical representation 
of women in science and philosophy but of their symbolic presence. For Irigaray 
"the whole of our culture in the West depends upon the murder of the mother' (in 
Whitford, 1991 p. 75). 
Matricide is accomplished by the repression of the maternal 
genealogy, by a refusal, for instance, to represent as divine the 
mother-daughter relationship or to represent the mother and 
daughter as generationally distinct because "the man takes the 
woman as a substitute for his mother while the woman simply takes 
her mother's place (Irigaray, 1993(c), p. 87). 
As a result: 
Women have no generic identity as women, they are always for- 
men and thus monstrous creatures "weak, formless, insecure, 
aggressive, devoted to the other because unaware of ourselves" 
(Irigaray, 1993(c),. p. 68). 
Some have objected that Irigaray's analysis leaves women as the abject 
victims of an omnipotent male order (Moi, 1985). Though there is a case to be 
made here, her writings can be made to bend in many directions. Irigaray is self- 
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consciously contradictory and playful with language and theoretical proposals, 
not least because she rejects binaries such as truth/fiction and sciencelpoetry 
(Tong, 1994). What I think can be usefully read into Irigaray are her attempts to 
understand a deracinated female experience. Reminding the reader of 
Heidegger's identification of being with dwelling, Irigaray calls for the restoration 
of a female genealogy and a sacred dwelling for women (1993(a), p. 18,19). 
Women need their own gravitas as women and for this to happen they must gaze 
at themselves without the intrusion of the male. 
6. Mirroring the female 
Women, claims Irigaray, need a god to refract themselves as subjects. In 
Irigaray's view, a creative self-image without divine image is hard to realise. In its 
absence, women tend to survey themselves through the male gaze: "The mirror 
should support, not undermine my incarnation"(1993(c) p. 65 ) contests Irigaray. 
We are accustomed to the view that religious requirements on women to cover 
themselves are connected to conceptions of modesty and the protection of 
women from an alleged male animality. Irigaray encourages us to reverse this 
conception and to modify, perhaps, her own view of women as abject. It may be 
that women are directed to cover themselves to censor the narcissistic 
identifications available to them in the secular world. An engulfing, shapeless, 
uncolourful dress, like that of a nun's habit or the Muslim chador, inhibits self- 
admiration. A shaven head (as with married, Hasidic Jewesses) or an entirely 
veiled one crowns the mortification of the sensual self perhaps. 
Between the existential analysis of Fanon's Fact of Blackness (1986) and 
Irigaray's psychoanalytical rooted sense of the female, there lies a similarity. 
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Both search for psychic damage and the problems of positive mirroring for 
individuation in its face. Though I think this a worthy search, I would want to add 
that to propose that women are always object, never subject is 'to refuse any 
human life force in women that can interact and affect the male or themselves. 
This seems to me to be a very salvageable message from humanism. Fanon 
(1986) is able to account for his own survival as a species member of humanity. 
In the case of Irigaray, one is tempted to inquire through what cracks in the male 
imaginary does she emerge? 
7. Matricide 
What actually happens between men and women is both negotiated and 
struggled for. Sex relations are dialectical which is why, for instance, women 
have managed to effect changes in their conditions of existence. If we take the 
harrowing example of female infanticide and feotocide (where survival of the 
female line is a real struggle) we can see an interplay of defeat, contestation and 
negotiation in stark relief. From the evidence of an important survey of this 
question in India (Sunanda, 1995), it seems clear that the men and women 
studied are positioned within caste and socio-economic structures as male and 
female humans. What happens to them - and their female offspring - is 
determined by all of these factors: their sociality, their humanity and their sex. 
The most telling part of this survey centres on 'the parents who prefer not to 
commit female infanticide'. This section gives recognition to human choice, 
agency and female resistance. 'Parents' in the main turn out to be mothers, at 
least in the first round of resistance to female infanticide. As one woman 
reported: 
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I do not differentiate between girl child and boy child. While I gave 
birth to my second daughter, several people advised me to resort to 
killing. But I refused their logic...... I find nurturing both my 
daughters as a very satisfying experience. I so far never and will in 
future also never regret the. decision of not resorting to infanticide. 
In fact, I shiver and shudder at the thought (Sunanda, 1995, pp 
46,47). 
And another mother: 
There are several instances, when my husband brought the milk of 
colatropis but I refused to feed my daughters with the poisonous 
milk. I used to carry my children and go to my parents house. I 
used to return back after assessing that my husband's anger had 
reduced. For this act of mine, the villagers themselves are witness 
as to how many times my husband thrashed me for disobeying him. 
In spite of all these physical torturing,. I nurtured my children 
(Sunanda, 1995, p. 49). 
Real violence is more pressing than symbolic violence for these women 
who refused to rupture the female line in their families. Ultimately, the woman in 
the last example recruited her husband to her side. His remorse is evident: 
Now I feel ashamed for my behaviour and dread at the thought, 
where these same children whom I volunteered to kill. These evil 
thoughts are no more existing in my mind (Sunanda, 1995, p. 49). 
And: 
I could no longer picturise the situation of my own children looking 
at me. like a murderer. To avert such situation, I started slowly 
buying them small gifts and communicating with them and spending 
more time in their welfare. Only this way, after long years I could 
win them over (Sunanda, 1995, p. 50). 
In Sunanda's gruesome accounts of the literal obliteration of the female, 
we can see the precariousness of this endeavour in the face of forces such as 
humankindness, female solidarity and mother-love. Such forces can inspire the 
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male to identify with the female as an equal gift to humanity, even if he is 
ambivalent about how this needs to be expressed concretely. In Irigaray, 
women's voice functions only as the subconscious of 'male' language and what 
surfaces as 'feminine' is merely residue or debris. I suspect that women have 
more vitality than this, not least because many, indeed most I would imagine, 
have been launched into the world with a maternal and paternal love that is life- 
giving, even if this is sexist in expression. Women's real, earthly presence 
mocks as much as it might reflect their absence in the divine order. While it is 
true that many women experience dreadful violences in this world, 
(Daly, 1990, Radford, et. al, 1992), the shaping of the female condition includes 
degrees of self-love and male love too. As the above repentant father declares, 
"the only flowers in my garden are my darling daughters"(Sunanda, 1995, p. 49). 
In Sunanda's moving accounts, we can see that a mother's courage turns 
also into the rescue. of her husband from institutional misogyny. She has shifted 
his gender positioning from traditional entrenchment to a more reflexive one. Her 
own strength clearly derives from her sense of a necessary guardianship of the 
female line: 
At times of my need, my mother always stood with me. In the 
similar manner, if at all my daughters would face a situation like me, 
I would always back them with my support (Sunanda, 1995,50). 
"While narrating the sentiments at the end", writes Sunanda, the 
respondent became "very emotional" (1995, p. 50). This is hardly surprising given 
the size of the question but it may also clue us into this woman's gut (feminine? ) 
opposition to misogynist violations. Her visceral, maternal, human, female 
resistance was against, perhaps, a double death: the reap death of the infant girls 
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and the soul murder of herself as woman/mother/human. In this example, there 
has been a process of what Italian feminists have called 'entrustment' (Milan, 1990) 
that is the passing down of women's authority (a law of the mother? ) which has 
safeguarded the lives of females. In this respect, feminists need to beware of a 
paradoxical possibility in. the positing of an original matricide because it may be 
feminism itself that kills off the mother in a fantasy about male omnipotence. Put 
differently, it may be phallocentric to believe in pervasive phallocentrism. 
8. The dialectics of sex 
Irigaray argues that polarities between male and female, patriarchy and 
matriarchy were not meant to be because there is an essential complementarity 
between the sexes. I would suggest that these polarities are no more than ideal 
types and that the real interdependence of men and women make it impossible 
for the former to triumph over the latter as my example suggests. Clearly, 
construction of the sexed and gendered subject is in disequalibrium so that sex 
complementarity finds little fertile soil but this does not preclude growth entirely. 
Moreover, there is more to male experience than domination. 
Men, we should note, frequently die before women. Hafner (1993) has 
connected this to the impossible strains of distorted manhood and relations 
between men and women. Hafner talks of men's ambivalence about their own 
power and their conscious understanding of women's strengths. It is no accident, 
he suggests, that the more 'macho' a society, the higher the rate of men referring 
themselves to doctors for radical transsexual surgery; or indeed the very 
existence of transvestism, where the feminine is literally sneaked into the. 
masculine (Hafner, 1993). These men have been unable to banish the feminine; 
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their 'perversions' are the dysfunctions of . an exclusion that can never be 
complete (see also Silverman, 1992 and Dollimore, 1991). 
Irigaray also argues that men fear reprisals from women because they 
have excluded us. This rings true for some men, and could explain particular 
forms of male. neurosis such as misogyny but it is humanly possible that other 
men confront their fear honestly and place their stolen goodies on the table for 
us to share. There is a bit of a feminist censure on the recognition that some 
men, quite a few, like, love and respect women or learn to like, love and respect 
women. Some of these may gatekeep as effectively as men who denigrate and 
resent women. Others know that their future is with and for women, not above or 
against. Some find a homosocial world barren. Lastly, when some women resist 
the theft of their species being, it changes the relations of the sexes, as the 
above examples have shown. 
I do not want to resurrect the simple point about heterogeneity within the 
male population (although that is consequential), but to stress that differentiation 
within the sexed groups is an outcome of the real relations between them. The 
relational can never be simply dualistic, it can never just be oppressor/oppressed, 
included/excluded, it is always dialectical (King, 1991). It is out of that dialectic 
that struggle, information and sentiments can emerge about the inequalities and 
dissatisfactions of hierarchised sex differences or gender restrictiveness. In 
contrast, the feminist epistemological idea of a conceptual, cultural and emotional 
territory which is feminine depends on faith in a sexuated underworld rather than 
on the ability of women and men to grasp contradictions in their relations in the 
daylight. 
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9. Women and the thinkable 
In supporting her conception of feminine knowledge, Irigaray often 
invokes the image of the entombed Antigone, deprived of space and air; or 
Aphrodite whose energy of eros and female desire is currently crushed by that of 
thanatos; or Persephone, banished to the underworld, severed from the mother 
and thus from fertility (Irigaray, 1994). It seems to me that these mythical women 
do say something about the suppression of the female as does the concept of the 
male imaginary. But I think that they can just as easily return us to the question 
of the symbolic and divine representation of women as they can to an archeology 
of female knowledge. Although feminist epistemology - 'thinking in the feminine' 
as Irigaray and like theorists would call it (Sellers, 1991), reveals the 
overrepresentation of the male in discourse and language, I am not drawn to its, 
claim that knowledge is sex embodied. Can we defeat the restrictiveness of a 
universalism that secretes this overrepresentation with a dualism that claims that 
different bodies 
. 
(male and female) speak with different tongues? Is not 
conversation interdependent and relational, even in its most oppressive forms. I 
wonder whether it might not be more fruitful to explore the valorisation of the 
sexes through a different dualism. In making sense of some of Irigaray's 
problematising of female genealogy and hetero-sexuality, it might be helpful to 
look at the cognitive ordering of sex difference through the primitive classificatory 
binary of the sacred and the profane. Again, Irigaray's work returns me to 
Durkheim and his understanding of this binary in the regulation of society 
(Durkheim, 1961). Essentially, the profane is the ordinary, usable and abusable 
realm of life while the sacred is separated by rites (and perhaps rights), ritual and 
rules as a treasured and worshipped domain. The sacred is inviolate. Is it the 
absence of a sacred status for women (which includes their absence in the divine 
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order) that makes abuse of them thinkable? As Irigaray has written (1993(c) the 
anthropological observation that women are the objects of exchange for men 
reveals women's sacrificial usage. For instance, this economy of exchange 
permits the female infanticide and feotocide as reported by Sunanda (1995). 
Females are bought and sold through a dowry system that defeats the economic 
capabilities of households and which stimulates the solution of murder 
(Sunanda, 1995). My own twist of Irigaray's work here suggests (and this may 
well do violence to her own intentions! ) that 'thinking in the feminine' can be about 
redefining the thinkable and the unthinkable with respect to female life and to turn 
this effort into a very modern use of an ancient, regulative classification. - 
10. The sacred and the profane 
As in most places, murder is illegal in India but the impotence of law as a 
regulative principle with respect to the protection of female babies is revealed in 
the research I have cited above. We could find plenty of examples in Europe too, 
particularly around the question of 'domestic violence', sex murders and 
pornography (Radford, et. al. 1992, Itzin, 1992, Daly, 1990). Arguably, what makes 
femicide thinkable is the absence of a sacred protection of the female and of sex 
difference. The Milan Bookstore feminist collective ( 1990) suggest that this 
absence results in a dreadful female fatalism. They cite the tragic case of 
Palmina, brutally murdered by her fiance because she refused to become a 
prostitute: 
The monstrousness of male behaviour must not prevent us from 
seeing the other, less spectacular but more tragic side of this 
drama: Palmina, who was fourteen years old, did not get from the 
older women around her the help she needed to make her desire 
for freedom to triumph over male imposition, In her environment, 
prostituting oneself for men was an accepted practice, and one may 
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easily imagine that the other women would have helped her to bear 
this common condition if she had accepted it (Milan Collective, 1990, 
pp. 146,147). 
Similarly, Sunanda reports that the order of infanticide is made by the 
father but the deed is carried out by the mother-in-law or female elders of the 
village and sometimes by the mothers themselves. Of course, the dowry system 
needs to be challenged as the structural cause of this distressing state of affairs. 
But perhaps too there need to be shrines, images, poems, pictures, etc. that 
demarcate the mother/daughter bond and indeed the female as sacred so that 
abuse, including self-abuse, becomes less thinkable. 'Don't even think about itl' 
is a modern, parental injunction that women could do well to appropriate for the 
protection of womankind. As Irigaray (1985(b) urges, women should refuse to 
go to the market as its objects of commerce. They should deny fathers the right 
to 'give them away' and grant mothers the right to command. 
As I show in the next chapter with respect to the Marquis de Sade, 
modernity has severed the mother/daughter bond to release women into an 
anomic and profane world. I do not here suggest that pre-modernity kept the 
bond intact merely that modern 'freedoms' for women remain undermined by the 
absence of explicit, safeguards for the protection of their integrity and the sanctity 
of their life (Irigaray, 1994). It is in this sense that formal equality for women 
without a reorganisation of their symbolic and civic representation leaves them 
vulnerable to abuse. Irigaray's philosophy points to a crisis of representation for 
women that cannot be solved by legal adjustments to a normative order that 
subsumes them to male rites/rights. 
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11. The secularisation of sex 
Weeks (1993) writes of the secularisation of sex as an 'unfinished 
revolution' that needs finishing so that 'free and individual' choice can reign. But 
can women be 'freed up' in a world of sex disequilibrium in which, symbolically 
speaking, they are 'bits on the side'? Does not the crisis of female representation 
render choice problematic, as those caught in the whirl of the 'permissive sixties' 
discovered? (Ehrenreich, et. a). 1986). Clearly recourse to pre-modern or religious 
fundamentalist certainities and rigidities would be unhelpful to women 
(Weeks, 1993). Many religions systems damn women as temptresses, witches 
and impure and they are only exalted if they are in an obedient relation with man 
(mothers, wives, etc. ). Women are often perceived to be at risk of sinning or 
encouraging sin. As I have noted, men with sacred duties must stay away from 
them entirely. In short, the primitive classification of most religious divisions 
between the sacred and the profane coincides with male and female and 
continues to hold sway. With such an order, women can only buy into the sacred 
by submitting to the law of the father through marriage and by taking the male 
name or by conceiving without sex. 'Unused' women are the most valued; the 
Virgin Mary is an idol because she managed virginity and maternity 
simultaneously (Warner, 1985). 
Weeks (1993) argues that religions, including the new religions of 
medicine and sexology, are losing their grip on the regulation of sexual behaviour. 
There is truth to this but the profanation of women in evidence, for instance, in 
pornography leaves men with an enduring, privileged status that is closer to the 
sacred. As Irigaray would put it, women have no civic status qua women and this 
is why, for instance, bits and pieces of them (breasts, etc. ) can be used to sell 
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commodities or as commodities. In this relation, Irigaray (1994) appropriates the 
conception of virginity for women. For Irigaray, a woman's virginity has nothing to 
do with actual sexual initiation. It is about a woman's right to disclose herself and 
her desire as a discrete, unique and owned event without the backdrop of a 
landscape of unbounded availability according to men's desire, not hers. Women 
have a right to mystery and distance. It is in this sense that virginity is about 
women's intactness. 
The problem with the secularisation of sex thesis (which is shared implicitly 
by Giddens (1992)) is its underestimation of male-biased religious meanings and 
value that continues to make it possible for men to worship themselves, not 
women. The sacred/profane binary operates beneath the surface of modern 
society as a sexed one. I am returning here to Irigaray's protest that female 
genealogy is underrepresented in the symbolic order. This problem can be 
exemplified in the realm of human rights where the sanctity of human life is 
protected as male life in the absence of a sexuate substance to the concept 
(Irigaray, 1994). This does not mean that male life is protected always. or that 
women's lives are not. Rather, the resistance' to look across to women in the 
formulation of protective declarations on the sanctity of life impoverishes its 
meaning for both male and female, permitting for instance, the violence of war 
(Lloyd, 1986). For Irigaray, excluding women qua women in formal rights is a 
subconscious way of excluding love of the other (Irigaray, 1994). Among other 
things, Irigaray's call for women to have civic status includes an opposition to'the 
atomisation of women or parts of women, as if they were in the economy' rather 
than agents of it. It follows that without this status, the free choice in the realm of 
sexuality will continue to prejudice women as objects of choice rather than its 
subjects. While both Weeks (1985,1993) and Giddens (1992) are sensitive to 
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gender issues and invested inequality of the sexes as an important basis for the 
transformation of intimate life, they may be placing too much reliance on the 
ability of women and men to negotiate this transformation in the absence of 
symbolic and ritual assistance. Giddens, in particular, posits a new contractual 
basis for what he calls 'pure love', that is relations which are purely a result of 
each partners desire for its . maintenance. 
At one level, this ' is progress for 
women, at another, it could be another tyranny because a restrictive, religious 
vow of unequal exchange is replaced by no vow at all. In consequence, an 
equal partnership of the sort Giddens describes may become trapped in the 
homologising logic of which Cavarero speaks (1992) because the distinctiveness 
of the female is lost in a contractual law she has not co-written. What I think will 
enhance Giddens' sketch of late-modern possibilities among men and women is a 
grafting of Irigaray's ethics of the couple in which, among other things, sacred 
status is restored to women and men, the hetero-sexual and the homo-sexual. If 
women and men could 'worship' each other, not as exalted idols but as members 
of a sacred sex and gifts to each other, they will have no need for the religiosity of 
phallic power. The secularisation. of sex may be a desired revolution but if it is 
adrift from the realities of sex difference, women may find it of dubious benefit to 
them because their own desire and female integrity will remain unspecified. This 
is a central question for Irigaray (1993(b)) for whom the 'phallomorphism' of our 
present understanding of sexuality overwhelms the female, preventing a relation 
to her morphology, her "in-self and for-self' (p. 149). With such a prevention, 
women are bound to be the circulating commodities for men, vulnerable to use 
and abuse, because they have yet to find symbolic and material space for a 
general transition from object to subject of desire. Individual women may well 
triumph over their objectification but they do so by swimming against the very 
strong current of phallomorphic sexuality. 
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12. The same difference 
Womankind and mankind, then, need to be honoured and treasured as 
distinctive and complementary as the context in which sex alterity and sexual 
freedom can thrive. This is a homo-sexual logic as much as a hetero-sexual one 
for, as Irigaray commented in an interview about how work: 
What I regret is that our society operates too much in alternatives. 
Either you love a man or a woman .... On the basis of some texts people say that I only love women. And sometimes I'm accused of 
loving men. Why does society pose that alternative? I believe that 
you can love the difference, but only if you're also able to love those 
who are the same as yourself (in Grosz, 1994 pp. 347,8). 
Importantly, too there will be some assimilation of the other in the other as 
well as distinctiveness. Cavarero writes that "a theory of sex difference 
premised on an original, fixed duality, excludes the logic of the assimilation of the 
Other"(Cavarero, 1991, p. 78). This is a vital qualification if theories of sex 
difference are to avoid submission to an Aristotlian logic that A can never be not- 
A. Such a logic, of course, characterises theories of sex hierarchy. (Fromm, 
1985, pp 63-65). Sex differences, then, must be understood paradoxically. 
The interplay between sex difference and assimilation is also founded on 
species commonality. A is not-A as well as not-A. In this relation, we could marry 
the humanist view that men and women can get to each other through their 
commonality with a theory of sex difference, which argues that this mutual 
reaching requires complementarity_ We are the same and we are different. In 
terms of the related debate here on the essentialising of-women, can we not 
similarly have our cake and eat it? The premise of an essential sex difference 
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between men and women - evident in physiological differences - is as 
irredeemably tautologous as the competing premise of an essential human 
commonality deriving from our shared species being. We can no more prove that 
we are the same because we are the same as we can prove that we are different 
because we are different. Reason is a dwarf in whatever decision we make here 
and instinct ( which is paraded as female knowledge but may be better described 
as felt knowledge) and the logic of paradox need to be its helpmate, or indeed its 
senior partner. 
Similarly - and in response to the objections to women as a unitary 
category - can we not take women to be both the same as each other and 
different from each other? Though the female experience may be fractured by 
class, ethnic and other differences, is there not something that keeps women 
intact as women? Particularly their alterity to men and their responsibility towards 
each other which requires the construction of a law of the mother, wherever they 
live, whatever they do. In this regard, Irigaray's exaggerations of female 
dereliction and male power do not need to be tested against socio-economic and 
cultural locations for they are theatrical devices. What I think we have in the 
concept of the male imaginary is a gender melodrama (as with Oedipus Rex) that 
stretches the imagination beyond equal rights politics so that we can see that 
law is lifeless without symbolic representation. The rights of man are given force 
by the rites of man. In this connection, I have suggested that we replace 
Irigaray's emphasis on a feminist epistemology with a fresh look at the spiritual 
organisation of knowledge, and to problematise the absence of a deeper and 
respectful protection of female life. The enlightenment pronouncement that the 
soul has no sex claims a false neutrality to animus and suffocates anima. The 
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Indian example I have given and that of the Italian feminist collective suggest that 
the protagonists for a female sexing of the soul must be women themselves. 
13. Establishing a law of the mother 
It is a commonplace of psychology that you perceive who you are in 
relation to the other (Purkey, 1970). In his concept of penis envy, Freud 
understood that I only know that I am female by looking at the male and vice 
versa. Whereas theologians turned this original gaze into one of shame and 
Freud constructed it as envy, the refreshing force of Irigaray's assessment of this 
encounter is her claim that it could be infused with admiration by both sexes. The 
ideas of shame and envy function to position women below men. Mutual 
admiration introduces a positive gaze and positions the sexes opposite each 
other in complementary form. Such admiration does not refer exclusively - 
although it certainly includes them - to heterosexual meetings. Irigaray inverts 
the politically conventional public/private order and delves beyond the civic 
handshake in suggesting that the 'amorous embrace' is where we start. Sex 
difference can be a paradigm for human relations because the one is for the 
other, not against nor with. This counterposes political conceptions like that of 
the social contract or of democratic assemblies which are organised around the 
rights of man and elisions of the private, of women and of the couple. Clearly, 
this model of human organisation cannot take place simply by moving men and 
women opposite each other in the hope that admiration will flow from it. 
Irigaray argues, of course, that women cannot position themselves 
opposite and equal with men without a sense of their sex specificity and their 
connection with each other for each other. In a 'theory of social-symbolic 
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practice' inspired by Irigaray's philosophy, the Milan bookstore collective (1990) 
call forth biblical and mythical tales to show that a mother-daughter bond (which 
does not. have to be a blood relation) which promotes female authority is a lost 
inheritance that needs reclaiming. Women's flourishment depends on women 
taking their lead from each other, as exemplified in these mythical tales. 
Reversing the destructive fracturing of female solidarity, argues the collective, 
requires that women pass authority down to each other. The ambition is for 
women to become 'autonomous mothers', not meant biologically, of course, but 
socially. There is a negative relation with this collective's view of what is to be 
done for the formation of women-citizens and Rousseau's elaborations for men in 
Emile. What is notable in Emile, writes Finzi (Finzi 1992) is not merely the 
lamentable education prescribed for Sophie (which I discuss in the next chapter) 
but Rousseau's removal of the child Emile from the company of women as a 
necessary condition for his formation as citizen. In Rousseau: 
The educational process requires a sole relationship between an 
adult and a child, both of the male sex, who have cut themselves off 
from their origins and rejected any female genealogy (Finzi, 1992, p. 
130). 
Such a cutting off, is of course, the foundation of much British public 
schooling which is designed, amony other things, for the formation of the nation's 
'leaders'. As I discuss in the next chapter, Miles (1992) critiques this severance 
from maternity as a severance from the emotional. In Rousseau, the maternal is 
not abandoned, rather it is appropriated. Emile's triumphant tutor, writes Finzi will: 
delude himself into believing that he himself has created Emile, 
without the intervention of a woman: 'Then .... I will clasp 
him to my 
breast and cover him with tears of sympathy; I will say to him, you 
are my wealth, my child, my handiwork' (Finzi, 1992, p. 130). 
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Such a pedagogic direction, of course, denies that women have any public 
authority or play any role in launching human life. For the Milanese collective 
this direction needs to be stood on its head so that women can flourish: 
It is more important to have authoritative female interlocutors than 
to have recognised rights. An authoritative interlocutor is necessary 
if one wants to articulate one's own life according to a project of 
freedom and thus make sense of one's being a woman (Milan 
Collective, 1990 p. 31). 
Practically, speaking the shift this Italian group speak for is a shift from 
mothering as a subordinating, needs meeting hyperactivity to one that is more 
measured and 'lawgiving. It challenges, for instance, the Jungian wisdom that is 
also a common sense one, that women provide unconditional nurturance and 
men provide a bridge to the world. Instead, it suggests that women most draw an 
ethical circle around production and reproduction so that they are no longer in 
tension or sex divisive. They must be there for themselves as much as for their 
children. Anyone who has worked with women returners in education knows 
how hard it is for women to discover a will to power to accomplish this separation. 
As Antonia reported to the collective: 
To meet with other women without the pretext of school or work, is 
not at all easy. It is not so much a question of material obstacles 
..... The 
"worst" is that "once you steal a few hours from housework 
or at any rate from your usual routine, you find yourself somehow 
impeded, blocked by what I call, very simplistically, the habit of not 
doing anything for ourselves, which increases our anxiety 
This anxiety can pass to both daughter and son with different lessons. 
The female may 'inherit' the habit of doing nothing for herself and the male may 
be anxious if she ever breaks through this. The field of adult returner education 
is full of stories of marital disruption deriving from the threat of a woman- 
becoming for herself (Thompson, 1983). Antonia's anxiety, it could be said, is the 
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anxiety of a masochist who "is yet to be born" (Fromm, 1993). She has yet to flee 
the nest of her male ordered life. An important feature of sex difference theory as 
against the radical feminism I have discussed earlier lies in the emphasis placed 
on women taking some responsibility for their predicament. Women must launch 
themselves and each other if there is to be the construction of "an originary 
human difference" (Milan Collective, 1990, p. 125) in which it is the responsibility of 
each sex to respect and develop this difference as an "inexhaustible source of 
ever-new meanings" (Milan Collective, 1990, p. 125). For Irigaray (1994)_ this 
launching requires an affirmation of female genealogy, of the mother-daughter 
bond, not in sentimental celebration of common commonality but so that women 
can see themselves as other than themselves. A knowledge of the difference of 
each woman produces knowledge of the worth of womankind and its individuating 
capacity. Otherwise, we are a blur of baby producers, generationally distinctive 
by costume and husband, not our own substance (there will be a few saintly, 
heroic exceptions to prove a norm here). Only with a grasp of the worth of the 
female as the half of the other half - not the assistant to the whole - can male and 
female really meet each other. 
14. Ethics of the couple 
Irigaray posits an ethics of the couple as a primary, complementary 
relationship from which society can flow. We need, she argues, a divine wedding 
of both sexes: 
In our tradition hasn't God always been sick because he never 
married? Except in the forms of annunciation our God never 
speaks to us. of the joy, the splendour, the fulfilment that lies in the 
alliance of the sexes (Irigaray, 1993(c), p. 70). 
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There must be an encounter of equivalence and difference for the very 
flourishing of humanity: 
Sexual difference is necessary for the continuation of our species, 
not only because it constitutes the locus of procreation, but also 
because its here that life is regenerated. The sexes regenerate one 
another aside from any question of reproduction. The latter might 
even weaken the life of the species by reducing sexual difference 
as such to genealogy (Irigaray, 1993(a), p. 15). 
In contrast to a political theory and practice which bases society on the 
exchange of commodities (including the commodity of women and/or her parts), 
Irigaray appeals for recognition of a more primary exchange from which human 
life force flows, namely the 'amorous exchange' of male and female (which need 
. not be sexual or 
heterosexual). Love of the other needs to take its place if 
society itself is to become fecund. 
Love of the same, on the man's side, or on the woman's side, does 
not have the same quality as love of the other. It does not produce 
a child. The woman exists in her own right here, not through her 
children, since the children produced by this exchange are 'of the 
spirit'. Each is a 'subject' in love; each is transcendent to the other 
(each is -divine for the other); each can confront the other with 
admiration (in Whitford, p. 167). 
For this mutual admiration to take place, men must cease to be guardians 
of the spiritual and women of the body. Thus women have to be spiritualised as 
other, not God. At present, claims Irigaray, the Other is seen by men as God. 
The 'You" "is always addressed to the transcendental, never to women" writes 
Irigaray, (1993(c) p. 147). There are affinities here with a Jungian feminism. 
Schierse-Leonard, (1986) for instance, suggests that women cannot encounter 
men as soulmates until they have made their own journey of self-actualisation. 
The wedding between male and female can only be divine, if the woman, as well 
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as the man, has arrived at some fruitful point for herself. "A vow' writes 
Schierse-Leonard, "can only be given out of one's centre, and it strengthens, 
protects, and reinforces that centre" (1986, p. 199). And in terms of the man as 
well as the woman, the vow has to be for the Other for the other to be whole: 
"The vow to the Other is a necessary part of individuation, essential for 
wholeness. (p. 196) Schierse-Leanard offers the following quotation from Jung: 
The unrelated human being lacks wholeness, for he can achieve 
wholeness only through the soul, and the soul cannot exist without 
its other side, which is always found in a "You". Wholeness is a 
combination of I and You, and these show themselves to be parts of 
a transcendent unity whose nature 'can only be grasped 
symbolically, as in the symbols of the'rotundum, the rose, the wheel 
or the conjunctio Solis et Lunae (the mystic marriage of sun and 
moon) (Jung. in Schierse-Leanard, 1986 p. 196). 
For Irigaray, of course, the I and the You must be the man and the woman, 
the woman and the man whereas for Jungians it can be God, child or work. 
(Schierese-Leonard, 1986 p. 196). However, in much contemporary Jung inspired 
therapy, the integration of the masculine and feminine, of anima and animus, of 
yin and yang are to the fore. There is a whole market of self-development 
books that exhorts men to get in touch with their femininity and women with their 
masculinity as a prequisite to fruitful encounters with creativity and love. The 
emphasis here is on the interior world and the recovery of archetypes. It is not 
entirely coherent with Irigaray's perspective in that it lacks an understanding of 
the relation between the exterior and the interior. This sort of therapy sees 
masculinity and femininity as inherent qualities that the self can bring to light 
autonomously by beating drums, screaming primevally and searching for 
goddesses within. It is an apolitical, private journey. Though Irigaray shares a 
concept of a gender journey to completeness, she also gives centrality to the 
public meeting of masculinity and femininity in the bodies of male and female 
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respectively. In her image of an ethical world, the sexual order and thus the 
meeting of the sexes must be made explicit and public. Lamenting that this is not 
so, Irigaray comments that: 
we have no or few specific sexual rules, rites or ceremonies 
appropriate to our time ...... It's a sad 
irony that cultures as 
sophisticated as ours in many respects is should be so lacking or 
impoverished in others and should now seek sexual rules or secrets 
from animals, plants and distant civilisations. What we need for our 
future civilisation, for human maturity, is a sexed culture (1993(a)., 
p. 16). 
From the point of view of sex difference, then, we are anomic. We have 
much that delineates the sexes at exploitative and oppressive levels but little that 
does so as a matter of mutual celebration and complementarity. The absence of 
rituals that mark out the mutuality of the sexes is symptomatic of the absence of 
any awareness that sex difference needs to be celebrated and respected. The 
profanation of women is also the profanation of hetero-sexuality. Furthermore, 
because there is little dialectic between love of the same and love of the other, 
the world of homo-sexuality is undersocialised and homosexuality is damned as 
too much of the other (i. e. feminised men and masculinised women). 
The insistence that men are relational to women and women to' men and 
that the distinctiveness of the two is fired. by real complementarity, means that 
gender growth needs socialised alterity. Reflecting on what can be said to exist 
in this direction, there would seem to be little of it. Even dancing, which has for 
many traditions ritualised heterosexual courtship, has become gender alienated in 
the modern world. In particular, disco dancing requires no Other or his/her 
minimal presence in an uncoordinated, unintimate space nearby. It is a gender 
depressed activity that atomises the sexes more than it unites them. Even more 
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so, is the case of much sport spectatorship where it is often the case of many 
men investing in the triumph of a few men over a few other men after which 
some men will be violent towards some other men for supporting the wrong men. 
This homosocial world, among many others, cuts out women and pursues 
pleasure as warfare. As White shows (White, 1989) sex difference is the basis 
for sex segregation in most spheres of public and private life. I take up this 
problem in the next chapter around the question of sexual harassment. 
An ethical order based on the model of the amorous embrace, challenges 
the idea of separate developmental sites as well as that of Nietzschian triumph 
(Nietzsche, 1956). It also challenges the post-modernist view of gender plasticity 
which has similarities with that expressed by Cockburn and endorsed by Segal 
(1987) above. I am speaking here of a perspective which sees gender identity as 
highly negotiable and gender itself as having no natural anatomical home in the 
male or the female. 
15. Muliple genders 
The ethnomethodologist, Garfinkel, in a case study of a transsexual 
'Agnes' asks the questions 'is a woman a person with a vagina? ' (Garfinkel, 1967). 
For Irigaray, the answer is definitively yes but for some theorists of gender, 
biology is not at all destiny in terms of the gendered self. Not only are masculine 
and feminine socially constructed but woman and man are fictitious categories 
too. Within classical psychoanalysis, the denigrated feminisation of the 
homosexual man is part of his problem, his weakness, his emasculation. For 
radical gay studies, the feminine in the ale brings to consciousness what the 
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heterosexual male has repressed as undesirable. In his very being the gay man 
is a contestation of misogyny because he hosts femininity self-consciously and 
gladly. By contrast, the heterosexual man is troubled, scared and repulsed by his 
femininity. The French film Cage aux folles elaborated this theme in advancing 
the argument "that it is the heterosexual rather than. the homosexual man who 
keeps femininity under psychic lock and key. To be a gay man, on the other 
hand, would seem to mean letting one's female 'soul' out of the closet. " 
(Silverman, 1992, p. 349). There is much that can be said about this perspective, 
particularly in terms of. the relationship between femininity within and flesh and 
blood women without and in terms of cults of masculinity among some gay men 
(Weeks, 1981,1985, Fenbach, 1981, Foucault, 1992). Whatever the specific 
readings of gay expressivity, however, the key issue that emerges is that of 
gender playfulness. Gay men and lesbians, it is argued, challenge the 
heterosexual binaries of male/female, masculine/feminine and 
heterosexual/homosexual (Butler, 1990, Dollimore, 1991). While closet gays and 
lesbians may remain imprisoned by a mimicry of heterosexual relations, once out 
they bring to human sexual and sexualised expression what Guattari calls 
'molecularisation' (Dollimore, 1991). Gender is shattered by the presence of the 
feminine in the masculine argues Guattari. Controversially, Guattari suggests 
that this feminine presence, which is still 'held' by phallic power because it is its 
Other, is only a "temporary stop on the path toward 'becoming animal, cosmos, 
words, colour, music'(Guattari in Dollimore, 1991, p. 348). As Whitford 
reveals(1991) this view of the gender carnival to come is shared by Derrida who 
posits the possibility of a world : 
... beyond the binary 
difference that governs the decorum of all 
codes, beyond the opposition feminine/masculine, beyond 
bisexuality as well, beyond homosexuality and heterosexuality 
which come to the same thing. As I dream of saving the chance 
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that this question offers I would like to believe in the multiplicity of 
sexually marked voices. I would like to believe in the masses, this 
indeterminable number of blended voices, this mobile and non- 
identified sexual marks, whose choreography can carry, divide, 
multiply the body of each 'individual' whether he be classified as 
'man' or 'woman' (Derrida in Whitford, 1991, p. 83). 
In this perspective, gender takes its inspiration from sex as anatomy 
(perhaps) but it leaves sex behind with an infinite mobility Sellers (1991) has 
called this approach 'gender tourism'. Effectively male theorists are travelling into 
the feminine in order to bring it back home as their trophy in an academic take- 
over bid for feminism. But it is not only male theorists who want to loosen the 
gender ties that bind us. Butler, (1990) for. instance, challenges the ontological 
integrity of women not simply within the debate about other determinations. For 
Butler'woman' is primarily a gendered identity, not a sexed one. In pointing to the 
many performances gay and lesbian people enact (camp, drag, butch, etc. ) Butler 
sees a subversion of unitary categories of man or woman, masculine or feminine: 
Ithe place of the law of heterosexual coherence, we see sex and 
gender'denaturalized by means of a performance which avows their 
distinctness and dramatizes the cultural mechanism of their 
fabricated unity (Butier, 1990, p. 338). 
Problematically, Butler argues that gender has no origin because it is a 
self-supporting, endless parody of the fictions of masculinity and femininity. 
Problematic, because this posits a middle with no beginning. What launched 
gender? If, for instance, Segal can claim in similar vein that being male entails no 
'masculine' essence, "just a penis and scrotum" (Segal, 1986, p. 281), our biology 
(or even our animality) is severed from our sociality. There is no sense of a 
dialectic between the two as there is with Irigaray's woman. The theoretical 
flourish that denatures gender also dehistoricises it. Gender is eternally 
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homeless an effect of power '- to use Foucault's term but with no genealogy. 
The anxiety among many theorists to dissociate themselves from essentialism is 
partly at issue here. What gets lost in this anxiety, perhaps, is an understanding 
that essentialism is not wrong if an essence is at issue. It seems. that the charge 
of essentialism is levied in much contemporary theory (and it is frequently made 
against Irigaray) as if it were a self-explanatory error to search for an essence. 
In rejecting a 'masculine essence' there is no space for male becoming, except as 
a perverted, oversocialised one. Masculinity - and of course femininity - by this 
logic is always superstructure and never effect of malehood or womanhood 
( indeed there is no hood in this analysis). That the manner of our becoming male 
and female is uninspiring in the present state of gender affairs, should not 
logically lead us to abandon the conception of gender as sex-related. As De 
Stefano (1990) points out, the removal of gender from sex in post-modern 
theorising returns us "to the falsely innocent indifference of the very humanism to 
which it stands opposed"( p. 77). 
Quite rightly, gay and lesbian studies point out that heterosexual 
organised gender relations oppressively depend on opposite sex eroticism. But 
combating the marginalising of same sex sexuality need not entail a shattering of 
the possible links with sex and gender. The problem with heterosexualism is its 
dependence on an embodied duality of male/female. Butler shows how 
homosexuality and lesbianism has a more creative, less reductive relation with 
alterity in which gender is part of an erotic repertoire that reinscribes bodies 
according to proclivity rather than biology. It seems to me that the logic here is 
more anti-sexist than anti-sex difference because men and women are able to be 
each other. 
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Irigaray objects to the idea of femininity as rootless not simply because she 
is committed to a concept of sex difference as embodied but because it leaves 
women stranded and unspecifiable. The haste with which postmodernists de- 
centre the subject refuses the need for women to ascend as subjects. As 
Whitford (1991) explains: 
In Irigaray's terms the difference between the sexes has not been 
rearticulated. Leaving aside the question of the social forms this 
fantasy might take, one is still left with the fact that the move from 
the masculine subject to the disseminated or multiple subject 
bypasses the possibility of the position of women-as-subject" 
(Irigaray, 1991 p. 83). 
Though Irigaray may be right to detect an indecency in the postmodernist 
haste to abandon the sexed body, if we reject gender malleability entirely, we 
may lose a dimension of sex dialectics, human bisexuality and the paradoxical 
reading of sex difference I discussed earlier. Bordo (1990) suggests that in the 
light of our considerable ignorances about sex and gender, the best we can do is 
maintain a posture of 'gender scepticism'. At the same time, we must be wary of 
a zealous agnosticism for if gender becomes too adrift, it threatens the feminist 
endeavour to find out more about women (Bordo, 1990). The refusal to moor 
femininity with women, reduces them to an inconsequential or, even worse, 
disabling, anatomy. It is a commitment to a fuller concept of women that Irigaray 
steadfastly maintains in her work. Clearly her work is not strictly speaking, 
'woman-centred' (indeed she is ambivalent about the term feminist) for she 
explores the relations and prospects between men and women, especially if they 
can meet on a level playing field. Ultimately, Irigaray gives centrality to a 
heterosexuality (Grosz, 1994) which she both resexualises (a place where men 
and women express both their general and chosen love) and desexualises (a 
hetero-sexual society that deploys opposite sexness beyond sex and 
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heterosexuality) If human labour can be reorganised hetero-sexually speaking, 
claims Irigaray, its fruits will also be different. 
16. The fecundity of sex difference 
In Irigaray's projection of an authentic heterosexual terrain, men and 
women encounter each other as equal subjects and in their intercourse, be it 
sexual, social or intellectual, they produce, metaphorically, a baby, a third force 
which she calls 'detumescence'. The dialectic between the sexes is forever 
productive, forever creating this third force which I understand to mean concretely 
as books, buildings, humans, ideas, politics and so forth. This is a utopia of 
triadic forces although it does not produce benign stasis or avoid tension. It is 
not simply the triumph of eros over thanatos, rather it is more of an even tussle 
between the two. The fruits of a dialectic between the sexes becomes external to 
the two and its embodiment as the third. 
I think Irigaray's fusion of the forces of production and reproduction here is 
as tenable as Marx's proposition that a mode of production developed for humans 
rather than vice versa will yield more interesting, intelligent and unexploitative 
results for society. (I discuss this in chapter 2). Just as the division between 
mental and manual labour by class breaks human potential more than it develops 
it (and this is true for both. sides of the divide, see for instance Sohn- Rethel, 1978) 
so sex segregated society in which women represent manual, domesticated, 
emotional, dependent, labour and men represent mental, public, rational, spiritual 
works - always symbolically and often empirically - impairs the productive 
possibilities of society. In a politics of sex difference, desegregation does not 
melt down men and women into androgynous forces or footloose genders. 
Rather it aims for an infinite and radical experiment in complementarity where 
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distance, space and mystery are granted to each sex without the expense of 
one-sided privilege, stereotype and objectification. It is in this space too that a 
gay expressivity can celebrate the same without annihilating or assimilating the 
opposite sexed other (Grosz, 1994). For Irigaray, a realignment of sex relations 
will bring with it a reorganisation of productive and psychic drives. 
16. The other for the other 
Suggested in Irigaray, is a plea to remove the sado-masochistic tension 
from gender relations to make space for other more productive, more interesting 
tensions. Men and women have yet to meet each other fully and this is the real 
basis of our discontents, our repressions and of our perversions (like warfare). 
Such suggestions, from a different angle, can be worked up from Giddens' latest 
work (Giddens, 1991,1992,1994) and in Bauman's. conception of being for as a 
mode of being that transcends merely being with (Bauman, 1995,52). Albeit from 
different departure points, both these men are concerned to redefine the relations 
with the other. There is also a suggestion that xenophobia has some of its roots, 
perhaps even its origins, in alienated sex relations. Arguably, if men and women 
were more at home with each other, they would find it easier to be hospitable with 
other others (Bauman, 1995p. 180). 
If men and women are to 'admire' each other (in the fullest sense of the 
word), for a sexed culture to flourish, attention must be paid to the kind of 
problems of violence and desire I have discussed earlier. Like radical feminists, 
Irigaray tends to the view that sexist society is also thanatic. She urges men to 
confront their original debt to women (as their bearers) so that they can confront. 
themselves as 'other' and face their castration anxieties which are to do with the 
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fear of a loss of identity. I am because she is not, must be transformed into I am, 
she is. Male narcissism achieves mastery only by killing off the female other. 
Instead of confronting their fear, which is a fear of self-annihilation, males have 
split it and projected it on to women. And women can only internalise this fear as 
masochism: I'm not because he is. For Freud female masochism and male 
sadism of this nature are universal states of affairs. lrigiaray is more hopeful. If 
men can contain some of women's original anxieties as women have always 
contained men's, the sexes could equilibrate. Eros could hold sway over 
thanatos or at least a middle energy between them could be released. 
(Irigaray, 1 993(b) ). 
It is to these themes that I turn in the next chapter in an exploration of the 
sexed and gendered terrain on which sexual harassment is enacted. In 
assessing the dysfunctions of abusive or alienating encounters of the sexes, I 
want to point to the usefulness of Irigaray's claim that an ethics of sex difference 
will contribute to the discovery of a more creative terrain for human flourishment. 
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Chapter 5 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND AN ETHIC OF SEX RELATIONS 
1. Heterosexuality and sexual harassment 
If richer relations between men and women demand that they meet in an 
exchange of equivalent gifts, this suggests that we place a different emphasis on the 
relational experiences of being male and female. This presents its own challenges 
for educational institutions, suggesting, among other things, a new dimension to the 
single sex or co-educational debate. It suggests too that sex education needs to be 
broadened into an education in the ethics of sex relations. All this implies that we 
initiate appreciative encounters between male and female, theoretically or concretely, 
to invigorate an exploration into sex alterity. 
What is noteworthy about further and higher education institutions (and indeed 
many other public and private institutions) is that frequently the only official discourse 
on sex centres on sexual harassment. If all (or most) an institution has to say about 
sex relations is contained within its policy of sexual harassment, part of the effect is 
to present the heterosexual terrain as a potential war zone. and to settle for the 
creation of a sex neutral, public territory to keep the peace. In this regard, the idea of 
'professional conduct' which is invoked to counter inappropriate boundary crossing at 
work, calls for a suppression of the sexual self rather than its rearticulation. 
Professional activity is activity without the body and emotion. It is Reason at work. 
Generally speaking, preventative strategies against sexual harassment centre 
on questions of control of the body. Men are asked to desist from sexist postures and 
gestures (Curtis, 1993, ) and women are advised to be vigilant about what they 
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communicate to men bodily and gesturally (Hadjifotiou, 1983). In this sense, the 
problem is kept at bay superficially rather than confronted elementally, as if it were 
one of manners, not desire. The attempt to neutralise (desexualise) relations 
between male and female by asking the man to sit on what is construed to be his 
desire leaves no space for her desire to surface. Thus an institution that aspires to 
rid itself of what it perceives to be largely, male, predatory behaviour is in danger of 
doing so by suppressing the female. That is to say, in exclusively contesting woman 
as sex object, woman as sexed subject is left unattended. Moreover, implicitly, men 
who do not harass will be simply men with a reduced script: men, that is, who 'behave 
themselves'. They have to be non-sexual to be non-sexist. What purports to be the 
promotion of a unisextsexless ethos can deny female sensuality/sexuality in its 
entirety and inhibits the possibility for men to be identifiably different from the 
predator. 
Subtextually, sexual harassment policies are organised around a predator/prey 
binary and a posited resolution of sexual abuse . 
in abstinence from sexual 
expressivity. The ideal workplace is constructed as a libidinal free zone. For 
instance, Rubenstein (1994), an influential consultant to the European Commission 
on its Code of Practice with respect to sexual harassment, endorses the view that "a 
sexualised workplace environment leads to sexual harassment" (p. 25). While it 
maybe true, as Rubenstein argues, that the sexualised workplace is the male 
sexualised workplace, the remedy of removal depends upon the banishment of 
desire. The libidinal may become displaced, suppressed, repressed or sublimated 
but it cannot leave the body so obligingly. In the end, because the sexual refuses to 
stay 'at home' during work or study, it will continue to be an unspoken force that is 
neither celebrated nor problematised, except as intrusion (hooks, 1994). 
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Clearly, while sexual harassment remains a problem, measures to stem it are 
important. But when institutions issue policies- and training around this question, the 
opportunity is there also to accompany it with a discussion about the fields of desire 
available to women and men respectively. Such a discussion can include the 
formulation of ethical possibilities that can reach beyond the predator/prey binary that 
'explains' harassment. This chapter focuses on this binary and dependent binaries 
within discourses on sex in order to draw out some of the terrain on which males and 
females are positioned (consciously or not) against, rather than opposite, each other 
as desiring objects/subjects. My objective is to sketch out some of the ways in which 
men and women are encouraged to construct a gaze of each other not across, but 
down or up or from behind. 
According to recent research, most harassers are "men, typically over thirty, 
and 'normally in positions of authority over the person who was harassed"' (Curtis, 
1994, p. 40). Bagilhole et. al. 's (1995) research into higher education reveals a similar 
trend. This evidence means, of course, that sexual harassment opportunistically 
feeds off structural inequalities. Curtis (1994) argues that a reduction of sexual 
harassment can take place only if these structural inequalities are likewise reduced. 
Get more women into positions of power and less women will be harassed. There is 
a seductive simplicity to this view but its materialist premise neglects that desire is 
perhaps thoroughly implicated in these structures of inequality both for men and for 
women. There is no ordered exit from sex inequality and I am not here suggesting 
that we can reorganise an economy of desire merely by wanting it in the service of 
justice. Nonetheless, I think more attention does need to be paid to the emotional 
and sensual substance of the regard one sex has for the other. It seems to me that 
we do need a paradigm shift both from a recriminatory feminist lament (they have all 
the jobs, money, power, etc. ) and a male wail that wants the other to be mother or girl 
and dresses this want in a theorisation of female inferiority. Each position otherises 
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the other negatively. Can there be a retreat from these sex war zones to a space that 
is no man's land? Can the sexes meet each other on such territory through an 
appreciation of sex difference that is not hierarchised? 
2. An ethic of sex relations 
For Irigäray (1993(b) a respectful recognition of sex difference "would allow us 
to check the many forms that destruction takes in our world" (p. 5). Current events in 
ex-Yugoslavia where the taking of territory has been accompanied - on all sides - by 
rape provides evidence for Irigaray's case. The forcible entry of territory and that of 
women appear to be bound up with each other (Ahmed, 1995). Similarly, the 
example from India in the previous chapter indicates that an economy of female 
infanticide affects the morale and demography of entire regions. This case shows 
how a hierarchised gulf between the sexes unleashes a death drive that really does 
surface as murder of the female. 
In contrast, the relative absence of danger or drama in educational institutions 
may depress our capacity to mobilise commitment to transforming male and female 
relations. The sex war is a muted one. Perhaps too, it is easier to treat sex relations 
as a problem when they are in obvious crisis. Could this account partly for the fact 
that sexual harassment cases are prone to sensationalist limelight? It may be that 
such events at least relieve the dull ache of unsatisfactory sex relations, domestic or 
otherwise, with a more discernible pain that can be experienced vicariously. Perhaps 
the absence of an ethics of sex relations helps to displace deeper questions onto the. 
spectacle of the prosecution of an alleged sexual harasser. 
Research on sexual harassment (Hadjifotiou, 1986, Curtis, 1994, Bagilhole 
et. al. 1995) focuses on what men do to women in the way of abuse, not on what 
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women want in the way of desire, except negatively (I want him to stop). Moreover, 
sexual harassment charges tend to be organised around the simplicities of guilt and 
innocence. Such simplicities - necessary though they may be in specific cases - 
could conceal what underlies sexual harassment in the way of alienated sex relations. 
In this connection, we must be receptive to issues of responsibility and mutuality in 
the gender equality debate which means, among other things, confronting the 
masochistic investments some women have in inequality. Likewise, there will be the 
question of some men's investment in sadism. Clearly, sado-masochism is not 
neatly male/female but, as I discuss later, it is typically constructed as such at an 
ideal level that is worthy of recognition as a filter of desire. I am not offering support 
here for the 'she asked for it' defence of the sexual harasser. I simply want to note 
that sexual harassment policies by their nature, reduce the complexities of desire to a 
set of behaviourist imperatives for the regulation of a trouble-free workplace. This 
symptomatic treatment of sexualised sex inequality may well need to take place but 
this disturbing terrain of inequality has a subliminal underworld that needs probing 
too. 
Implicitly, sexual harassment policies counsel the sexes to keep their distance 
from each other, lest private space is invaded or communication misunderstood 
(Hadjifotiou, 1986, pp 60,61). In the light of abuses, the setting of boundaries is 
justified but can this be a provisional solution that is accompanied by strategies that 
empty this prescribed distance of its latent hostilities and distrust? Unless distance 
between the sexes is filled with respect, it is fated to-be experienced with some 
measure of negativity. In particular, the gap will yawn with the resignation that boys 
will be boys and that females are unfathomable creatures, incapable of 
communicating what they want. Whatever one's standpoint about sex difference, the 
elaboration of an ethics of relations between male and female can be grounded on 
the need for each sex to flourish without exploitation. Sexual harassment policies are 
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oriented on what the sexes should not do to each other; an ethics of sex relations 
could orient on how the sexes can provide for each other. Clearly, in the context of 
sex inequality, this cannot lead to an even dialogue but should this rule out the 
ambition to construct a round table of some sorts? 
Sex segregation 
"An emotional abyss has opened up between the sexes", writes Giddens 
(1992) "and one cannot say with any certainty how far it will be bridged" (p. 3).. If this 
is so, then educational* institutions, precisely because they are educational and 
particularly if they have declared themselves committed to equality, perhaps have a 
responsibility to challenge sex divisive processes -as well as to sanction sexual 
abuses (Halson, 1992, Bagilhole, et. al. 1955). This requires creative attention to issues 
of segregation and desegregation with respect to the sexes. The very idea of 
co-education, for instance, is liberal in its conception and carries all the weaknesses 
of the equal rights feminism discussed earlier. It is focused on access to existing 
provision and seeks to equalise the sexes by a homologising logic. If boys and girls 
are treated 'the same', it will mean frequently that girls must aspire to a male norm 
and may well underachieve in the process (Spender, 1982, Stanworth, 1983). There 
is a kind of 'contact hypothesis' in co-educational thinking that assumes that boys and 
girls will get on if they are thrust together. It would seem, that they do indeed get on 
but only when gender identity remains in formation and more fluid. 
Children tend to stop mixing spontaneously with the opposite sex at early 
primary school age and begin to regard each other with hostility, embarrassment or 
distance until they begin (if they ever do) to desire each other openly. This means 
that the point at which female and male re-establish contact has been preceded by a 
huge unintimate period. There are, of course, cultures which formalise this period of 
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sex separation, based, sometimes on the confinement of girls until they are 'ready' for 
marriage and childbearing. In such cases, females are formally debased by 
banishment before they meet men so that the meeting is destined to be an anxious 
and miserable one. 
There is reason to suppose that prolonged sex segregation damages the 
eventual meetings of men and women. Rosalind Miles' study of boys banished to all- 
male boarding schools gives us many clues to this (Miles, 1992). Such boys are not 
only kept away from girls but are severed from their mothers (and fathers but not 
men) and indeed maternal experience. The experience, writes Miles, is often 
frightening: 
With or without 'the benefits of boarding', as the prep school brochures 
have it, from seven upwards the boy is forced to accept his severance 
from the female world. From this point on he is destined to live in a 
new, strange and often terrifying universe, which many adult men still 
recall with all the force of childhood's tremors (Miles, 1992, p. 70). 
What these boys learn in this 'terrifying universe' is emotionally estrangement 
from women, from intimacy and indeed from themselves. One small boy Miles cites, 
for instance, quickly learnt to address his dutiful letters home to 'Mr. and Mrs. Tranter' 
and- to end his formal, filial messages with 'yours sincerely' (Miles, 1992, p. 69). 
Preparatory schools, it would seem, prepare boys for emotional distance. Similarly, 
Willis'(1977) Learning to Labour shows how some working class boys construct a 
masculine identity in a homosocial world that relies on negative concepts of femininity 
and a relentless performance of bravado to mask their real feelings. 
There is a growing awareness that male and female have come to inhabit 
separate cultures in which there are "different protocols and silent languages of 
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nuance and gesture" (Kipnis and Heron, 1994, p. 13). It would seem that these 
differences grow out of structures of separation and the failures of male and female to 
interrelate (see also White, 1989). Kipnis and Heron (1994) argue that these 
differences " of distrust and misunderstanding" account for much of the difficulty with 
respect to sexual harassment. The field of opposite sex communication, they claim, 
is a chaotic place of misunderstanding, dissatisfaction and cross-wires. 
In pointing to opposite sex conflict, I do not want to project a picture of 
relentlessly embattled sexist sex relations. There are many men and women involved 
in enriching partnerships of one kind or another, who relate productively. Indeed a 
theory of sexism depends on this possibility. If women really were inferior to men, 
there would be . no place 
for alternative evidence to surface. There would be no 
cognitive dissonance prompted by the encounter of an idea of woman with a flesh 
and blood one. The evidence of the transcendence of sexism, is the evidence that 
we are dealing with prejudice, not nature. The kind of feminism that views men as 
irredeemably sexist simply leaves women to bang their heads forever against the 
brick wall of patriarchy. We must be careful also with the very label 'sexist' for it is 
frequently affixed to those who use the 'wrong' language and make the 'wrong' 
gestures as if this can sum up the positioning of one sex against the other. It is 
possible for a man to adopt all kinds of sexist postures and language according to his 
cultural formation but have, at the same time, a competing heart-felt positioning with 
respect to women that is respectful. Some mothers must have got something right! 
Similarly,, it is possible for women to be split between parodied femininity and a self- 
protective ability to reject degradation. I merely want to make the point here that 
'sexism' is a very rough and ready term to describe a complexity of psychic and social 
positioning vis a vis the sexed other. The politically correct dualism of sexist/anti- 
sexist leaves no space for the variety of contradictory, ambivalent, threatened, and 
desiring, sentiments that many of us carry in relation to the opposite sex or indeed our 
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own sex. These comments are an important preamble to the discussion I offer 
below because I am about to bend the stick towards binary models of sex relations. 
" Eventually, I descend from these models to appraise a more nuanced reality, but I 
see them as useful for an ideal typical representation of sex relations with which to 
understand sexual orientation, 'particularly within heterosexuality. 
5. Madonna or whore? 
My first exploration of opposite sexness is in Rousseau's 'educational romance' 
Emile, because it provides a setting for the passive woman of modernity. ' I then 
move to another enlightenment writer, the infamous Marquis de Sade, who contests 
Rousseau's sentimental view of women with another kind of woman for modernity, i. e. 
the female libertine. Roughly, Rousseau sketched an enlightenment inspired 
Madonna; and Sade an enlightenment inspired whore. In addressing Rousseau and 
Sade, I simply want to offer two models of hetero-sexuality. In moving to a more 
contemporary debate of sexual encounter, I relate these enlightenment thinkers to the 
question of pornography on the one hand, and romantic fiction on the other, as places 
where the predator/prey binary carries with it the related ones of sadist/masochist and 
active/passive. 
6. Sophie 
In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau's (1973) method is to 
posit man in a state of nature against which to argue the artificialities of inequality. In 
responding to . Hobbes' essentially selfish man, Rousseau argued that humans began 
life uncompetitively with and indifferently towards each other. Though Rousseau 
does not propose that all men are born equal, he argues that inequalities are 
produced essentially from social processes: 
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Thus natural inequality unfolds itself insensibly with that of combination, 
and the differences between men, developed by their different 
circumstances, becomes more sensible and permanent in its effects 
(Rousseau, 1973, p. 95). 
Included in this unfolding of inequality is that of sex inequality which arrives for 
Rousseau with the advent of the family whereupon: 
The sexes, whose manner of life had been hitherto the same, began 
now to adopt different ways of living. The woman became more 
sedentary, and accustomed themselves to mind the hut and their 
children, while the men went abroad in search of their common 
subsistence (Rousseau, 1973, p. 88). 
Combination, then, produces inequality and the combination of women and 
men awakens a natural inequality of the sexes. While it has been suggested that 
Rousseau's proposals for the reduction of inequality through a social contract are 
inextricably linked with his advice for a citltzen's education (e. g. Cole, 1973) it has 
been rarely acknowledged that such advice combines with a discourse for inequality 
of the sexes. For instance, Wolistonecraft's critique of Rousseau's sexist educational 
project is not routinely offered as a counterweight to him in the way that Hobbes' work 
tends to be. Or indeed the conception of Rousseau as a founder of progressive 
education is tempered infrequently with a recognition of the thoroughly unprogressive 
education he prescribed for women (e. g. Cole, 1979). Book V of Rousseau's Emile, 
Sophie diametrically opposes his emphasis elsewhere on the social in the making of 
inequality. In contrast to the rest of Emile (some of which I discuss in Chapter 2) 
Rousseau argues in Book V that the subordination of women to men is a natural 
consequence of the order of things: 
The male is male only at certain moments. The female is female her 
whole life or at least during the whole youth. Everything constantly 
recalls her sex to her; and to fulfil its functions well, she needs a 
constitution which corresponds to it. She needs care during her 
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pregnancy; she needs rest at the time of childbirth; she needs a soft 
and sedentary life to suckle her children (Rousseau, 1979, p. 36I). 
At one level, Rousseau's pronouncements would not meet with objections from 
theorists of sex difference: 
The only thing we know with certainty is that everything man and 
woman have in. common belongs to the species, and that everything 
which distinguishes them belongs to the sex (Rousseau, 1979, p. p. 358). 
At another level, difference is clearly hierarchised: 
In the union of the sexes each contributes equally to the common aim 
but not in the same way. From this diversity arises the first assignable 
difference in the moral relations of the two sexes. One ought to be 
active and strong, the other passive and weak. One must necessarily 
will and be able; it suffices that the other put up little resistance 
(Rousseau, 1979, p. 358). 
Rousseau introduces familiar binary divisions of the sexes in this passage. 
Sophie is an elaboration of these binaries which are mediated through the 
advancement of separate moralities for men and women in courtship and marriage. 
Rousseau invents 'Sophie' as Emile's, perfect partner and an exemplary woman for 
modernity ( though she can never be of it). Alongside his plans for the social 
construction of the male cititzen, Rousseau devises a social construction of erotic 
relations which will enable her to function for him so that he may act in a modern, 
progressive society for mankind. 
Having educated Emile to be a 'truly democratic human being' Rousseau has 
arranged his marriage with a full-time gender assistant who will "become his other 
half to such an extent that he can no longer do without (her) and that as soon as he 
leaves (her) he feels he is far from himself'(1979, p. 479) For her part and for whom 
no citltzen's education is set aside, Sophie, has been waiting for Emile to enter her 
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life so that she can realise her female vocation "woman is made specially to please 
man"(1979, p. 358). The manner of that pleasing resides in the development of 
separate libidinal economies, hardly libidinal for women and reigned in for men. 
Sophie's feminine modesty will lead her to recognise her natural inferiority 
"which is the work not of prejudice but of reason"(1979, p. 361). And in the sphere of 
sexuality, she must use her inherent modesty to restrain her desire for its 
instrumental rather than expressive use. With such restraint, Sophie will triumph over 
Emile: 
It will cost you some painful privations, but you will reign over him if you 
know how to reign over yourself... You will reign by means of love for a 
long time if you make your favours rare and precious (Rousseau, 
1979, p. 479). 
Sophie will civilise Emile's unbridled passion by bridling her own, by an 
economy of desire, by 'the management of love' through judicious rationing.. "Do you 
want to see your husband at your feet? Then keep him always at some distance from 
your person" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 479). Women must productively frustrate men with 
a game of slow drip availability. This will ensure a man's ultimate subservience to 
marriage and will effect an eventual . 
transformation of passion into marital 
companionability and duty. 
"You must not refuse for refusing's sake but to give value to what is granted" 
(1979, p. 479) counsels Rousseau. Sophie must treat her sexuality as currency to 
exchange rather than something she owns for herself. Initially, she will market herself 
through coquettish leakage in order to tantalise her buyer. Her 'innocence' will be 
conveyed through girly, gestures, thus offering to the object of her delicate attentions 
a peadephillic option (the height of virginity) for a prospectively protected/protective 
marriage. Rousseau's ideal wife is childishly manipulative: 
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The little girl (Sophie) overwhelms me (Emile's tutor) with friendliness by 
which I am not deceived (Rousseau, 1979, p. 423). 
And intellectually weak: 
0 
Sophie has a mind that is agreeable without being brilliant, and solid 
without being profound (Rousseau, 1979, p. 395). 
Sophie gets a conception of everything and does not remember very 
much (1979, p. 426). 
The gender bargain Rousseau offers leaves women emotionally insubstantial 
for themselves. And men too. In this classic concept of sex difference, there is no 
real difference, only a homosocial logic. Women, must transfuse men. It is for women 
to make men happy. The giving of such assistance, it is presumed, will suffice for 
women's own realisation. "The happiness of a decent girl lies in causing the 
happiness of a decent man" (1979, p. 399). Two centuries later, Friedan (1971) was 
to call the demoralising effects of this subsumption of the female self into the male 
and his family as 'a problem with no name'. 
In Rousseau's formulation of the gender romance, women's lives are at once 
exhausting and vacuous. The teasing, tantalising and titillating behaviour prescribed 
for women will, of course, leave them both demeaned and out of touch with their 
desire. Moreover, to wear this mask of parodied femininity, requires sustained 
vigilance, less it slips, and a distancing from what lies beneath it, less it be true, as 
Rousseau writes, that the 'Supreme Being' endowed women with 'unlimited desire' 
(1979, p. 359). Ironically, it is Rousseau's presumption about a woman's original 
shame that leads him to devise a female life style that guarantees its sustained 
appearance (Wollstonecraft, 1985). 
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In Rousseau's sketch of modern heterosexuality, what will be reinforced will be 
the spectre of women as forbidden fruit whose virginal behaviour will both thrill and 
shame men. It will ensure excitement in wooing, the exhilaration of conquest and a 
disenchantment with acquisition. The chase will be naturalised and the eventual 
meeting between the sexes will be undersocialised because it will be a process of 
hunt and capture rather than an exchange; and oversocialised because it will be 
imbued with a socially constructed, sex hierarchised, morality which will inhibit mutual 
discoveries of each other. This morality is conceptualised as romance. Indeed 
Rousseau (1979) indicates that he is happy for Emile to be read as a 'romance of 
human nature' (p. 416). The predator's chase and the prey's capture will be tucked 
into the rituals of courtship as elaborate and titillating foreplay. This will substitute 
and, to some extent,, compensate for a deeper exchange. Indeed, much of Book V is 
dedicated to courtship instructions in which each make tentative, gendered steps 
towards the other, Sophie with 'refined coquetry' (p. 416) and Emile with the gauche 
vulnerability of a man in love who "observes her and contemplates her with a sort of 
fear and distrust" (p. 414). Why distrust? Why fear? Is this not a doomed 
construction of sex alterity? 
When Emile eventually communicates his desire explicitly it is not to Sophie 
but to her father. Once the father grants permission for betrothal and Sophie receives 
news of what she and her mother apparently know instinctively, Sophie "says nothing, 
makes no sign, appears to see nothing and hear nothing. But she blushes (p. 417). In 
this conventional romance, the man bids for a property transfer . of daughter from 
father to himself and the woman on her mother's advice, consents silently. 
Rousseau deploys education in the service of a heterosexuality which instructs 
women to disown their desire. With such instruction, women must fall prey to men for 
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their libidinal energy will be channelled into a commodity of unequal exchange. Since 
the woman is encouraged to economise with the parting of this commodity to raise its 
cost, the man is encouraged to obtain a woman by stealth. On both sides of the 
gender fence, there is no open expressivity and no negotiation of equivalence, merely 
a commercialised exchange on a market which takes women as its objects (Irigaray, 
1985(b)). This dishonest encounter of object (woman) and subject (man) of 
commerce, structures heterosexual disenchantment for both male and female. Men 
are encouraged to creep up on women and women to feign ignorance or objection to 
this according to sexist valorisations of herself, not sexual desire. Modern 
heterosexuality tends to be Janus-faced: the sexes attempt to converse with their 
heads turned away from each other. 
Rousseau's Sophie is a sentimental version of the predator/prey opposition 
which includes a life after conquest in marriage and a tempering of inequality with 
love. This is an important qualification because, whatever its restrictiveness, 
Rousseau's romantic formulation offers a model of humane, if unequal, sex relations. 
Rousseau may be a sexist but. not, in my view, a misogynist. From his Confessions 
(Rousseau, 1953) it is quite clear that Rousseau identified with women and femininity 
more than is revealed in Sophie. Indeed, there may be bits of Sophie which are 
Rousseau. Take, for instance, the following from his Confessions: 
To fall on my knees before a masterful mistress, to obey her 
commands, to have to beg for her forgiveness, have been to me the 
most delicate of pleasures (Rousseau, 1956, p. 25). 
This may make odd reading when juxtaposed to Sophie but not if one places 
this confession against the poignancy of Rousseau's own origins. Rousseau's mother 
died bearing him and his father never ceased to lament the loss of his wife to his son. 
Rousseau's lovers were mother figures to whom he deferred. Ultimately, Sophie is a 
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soppy and contradictory invention and as Wollstonecraft (1985) observed, reason 
seems to have taken a backseat in her making. Perhaps this is why Rousseau had 
Sophie leave her husband for a more adventurous and transgressive life in his less 
known sequel to Emile (Shaver, 1990). This is why too, perhaps, Wollstonecraft, 
despite her strong objections to his sexism, could indulgently declare herself to be 
'half in love' with Rousseau (Brody, 1985, p. 52). It is doubtful that the Marquis de Sade 
whom I discuss in a moment, could have induced such indulgence from this classical 
feminist. 
That Sophie lacks credibility, does not, however, diminish the need to unpack 
her. Sophie has close affinities with Fiona whom I discuss below. Both fictitious 
women, separated by two centuries, feed a masochistic fantasy which I will explore 
later and once I have discussed a more publicised sadistic one. 
6. Shame and sex inequality 
A much more ruthless presentation of the predator/prey binary in sex relations 
lies in the episodic and loveless art of pornography. What gives both the 
sentimental and the ruthless oppositions commonality is an agreement that sex and 
shame belong to each other. In the first, women redeem themselves from shame 
through modesty, chastity and the disowning of desire. In the second, naughtiness is 
paraded as a transgression of shame though it is more often its exhibitionist 
inversion. In converting prudery into lewdity, pornography flips the same coin. In 
exposing what shame conceals, pornography is trapped in the reverse discourse of 
shamelessness. That is to say, in its dependence on naughtiness, pornography does 
what it 'shouldn't' much more than it explores what it could. Pornography in other 
words, cannot be visionary. Perhaps this is what Barthe meant when he said that 
Sade has nothing to teach us (Gusset, 1994). 
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In contrast, defenders of Sade suggest that he interrogated human darkness, 
thought the hitherto unthinkable and thus confronted his readers with what they could 
do, for better or worse. While it is true that Sade's classificatory fervour produced 
countless, extraordinary erotic possibilities, it must be remembered too that they were 
all framed within the ordinary parameters of sex and class inequalities. What people 
could do was invariably about what they could do to others as prey. This is a primary, 
unequal opposition in Sade that subverts his revolutionary project. His sexual dramas 
are variations on sexist and classist themes. Sade's refusal of women's physical 
specificity is particularly noteworthy here. 
Inequality in the field of sexual activity structures rights, needs, reciprocal 
possibilities and the forbidden. Sexual inequality produces an economy of access, 
disclosure and exposure and in so doing, renders sexual expressivity vulnerable to 
shame, particularly for women who may experience their desire as illegitimate 
(Hite, 1976, Friday, 1976). It was Eve, not Adam, who held the fig leaf. This issue 
of shame is clear in the case of Sophie as much as it is in Sade's work. Ironically, 
Rousseau's egalitarianism of the heart does not apply to matters of the heart. A 
wordless blush of consent to betrothal is unlikely to produce a social compact of 
equals in open celebration of union. Shame of this kind, disequilibriates each sex and 
transmits a sense of low entitlement to sex itself for both parties. Sophie must keep 
Emile sexually 'anxious' and Emile must see sex as a concession. He has to keep 
chasing and she has to keep chaste. As we shall see, Sade explodes this delicate 
balance with the impatience of a child who wishes for all his toys at once, entangling 
himself, in the 'process, with the urgency of 'more' without regard to what or with 
whom. 
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7. The Marquis de Sade 
There is a connection between Sophie and Justine and Juliette, the latter 
women invented by Sade (1965). In one way or another, all are in the service of man. 
But there is also much that divides them. While Rousseau wrote with some optimism 
about human potential, Sade, suggests Carter, was the "last, bleak, disillusioned 
voice of the Enlightenment" (1979, p. 34). However restrictive his conceptions of 
equality, Rousseau (1973,1979) urged regard for the other as a basis for human 
relations. For Sade, by contrast, every man is for himself and every woman must 
bend to this. 
As a witness and victim to the cruelties of a new social order, Sade transferred 
his own brutalising experiences and the social sadism of the reign of terror to a 
libertine logic purportedly for women as much as for men (Hayman, 1978). In Paglia's 
(1990) view, Sade satirises Rousseau 'point by point' (p. 234). Many commentators 
report that it is hard to read Sade in pointed detail. His "logorrhoea" (Crosland, 1994, 
p. 111), his compulsion to repeat infinite dramas of anal rape upon women, his sexual 
genocides and his coprophagy do indeed present challenges to the weak stomached 
reader. It is true, however, that Sade harnesses reason to a macabre egalitarianism 
that would seem to contest Rousseau's sentimental versions of equality. What Sade 
took from other philosophes was the centrality. of atheism for modernity. Sade's 
angle on this was to sexualise its meaning. If god is dead, nothing is sacred. Thus 
the sovereignty of man means sovereignty over his body which he can use or abuse 
as he pleases. Desire is the call of nature and harkening to her "delicious 
promptings" (Sade, 1965, p. 185) should be the only guide to action. Against 
Rousseau's conceptions of the community and the social compact, Sade posits a 
world in which the other's needs are her problem, the sexualised expression of which 
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lay in the libertine's disregard for her pleasure ( see for instance, Justine, or Good 
Conduct Well Chastised, Sade, 1965). 
The question of the political irony in Sade's work is a matter of continuing 
debate (Sawhney, 1994) and it is unlikely that it can be reduced simply to a critique of 
Rousseau. In part, Sade critiqued the degeneration of the enlightenment ideal with 
the charge that its ethos dictated that "you must hate your neighbour as you hate 
yourself' (in Sollers, 1994, p. 70) and it would seem that he converted this misanthropy 
ideal into pornographic and philosophical narratives that both contested and affirmed 
it. But Sade was equally unhappy with the despotism of the Ancien Regime under 
which he wrote much of his work in conditions of imprisonment for his libertine 
activities. It would seem that Sade wrote from many experiences and with many 
targets in mind, not least within his own family (Hayman, 1978) and that. his resultant 
philosophy was both chaotic and contradictory. As Blanchot (1965) writes of Sade's 
work: 
everything which is said is clear, but seems to be at the mercy of 
something left unsaid, and a little later reintegrated by logic; but then 
this in its turn succumbs to the influence of some other, still hidden 
force, until finally everything is expressed, is revealed, but also 
everything is plunged back again into the obscurity of unformulated and 
inexpressible thoughts (Blanchot, 1965, p. 39). 
This anxiety to say everything is shared with theenlightenment encyclopaedists 
who wanted to put an end to the unknowable in order to control through the power 
that is knowledge. In this sense, Sade was as much a sexologist as a pornographer. 
But this attention to the quantitative was also, of course, another symptom of Sade's 
refusal to attend to the qualitative potential in human relations. As Irigaray 
comments, phallocentric sexuality such as pornography evidences, is doomed to 
endlessly chase its own tale. "The only ' way out' lies in the quantitative dimension" 
(Irigaray, 1993(b) p. 202). It is in this context, that the pressure on a young man is to 
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'score' as many women as he can and on a young woman to keep away from such 
contests by 'saving herself. "Pornography" writes Irigaray is the reign of the series. 
One more time, one more "victim", one more blow, one more death ... 
(1993 (b)p. 202). 
This certainly rings true of Sade where every perverse variation permits yet another 
sexual assault. But Sade himself would protest that he was only articulating Nature's 
scope and licence. Had she not wanted certain impulses, Nature would not have 
made them possible. Paglia (1992) would agree. 
8. The naturalisation of sadism 
In Paglia's analysis, Sade's killing of god enabled the recognition of nature's 
powers and elemental hierarchies, of which sex inequality is a key. Sadism, argues 
Paglia, inheres in every human society and Sade merely brought it to light. This 
common sense legitimation of rank and violence is important to contest for a 
discourse shift that can view sex inequality as historically specific rather than 
timeless. Foucault's inquiry into pre-modern and modern forms of punishment, 
torture and discipline (Foucault, 1991) comes to our aid here. For Foucault the 
sadistic imagination is part of the secular imagination. While there were always 
cruelties ( normally imbued with theological reasoning as with medieval torture ) the 
harnessing of cruelties to sexual expressivity was a thoroughly modern affair: 
Sadism is not a name finally given to a practice as old as Eros; it is a 
massive, cultural fact which appeared precisely at the end of the 
eighteenth century (in Carter, 1979, p. 3). 
There was, argues Foucault, a transition from 'sanguinity' of the old order to 
'sexuality' of the new. Control of the human stock in the old order permitted all kinds 
of bloodletting activities upon the common people, for instance in the widespread use 
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of execution. Sade, however, dispensed of people through sexualised eugenics for 
he: 
carried the exhaustive analysis of sex over into the mechanisms of the 
old power of sovereignty and endowed it with the ancient but fully 
maintained prestige of blood; the latter flowed through the whole 
dimension of pleasure - the blood of torture and absolute power, the blood of the caste which was respected in itself and which nonetheless 
was made to flow in the major rituals of parricide and incest, the blood 
of the people, which was shed unreservedly since the sort that flowed in 
its veins was not even deserving of a name (Foucault, 1976 p. 148,9). 
Foucault locates Sade in the Ancien Regime, a kingless (and thus godless) 
aristocrat who turns sex into a "unique and naked sovereignty: an unlimited right of 
all-powerful monstrosity"(Foucault, 1976, p. 149). In Sade's work sexual genocide (his 
characters can get through 400 bodies before breakfast) targets women and the 
common people. His protagonists are noble though his pornographic cosmos is also 
meritocratic in that specially able sexual terrorists can be promoted from the ranks. 
That Sade can be read as political satire does not diminish Foucault's point 
that sexualised bloodletting devoid of religious sanction (though Sade appoints priests 
as executioners) was expressive of a modern possibility. 
Foucault reveals that pornography has a eugenic thread in which murder may 
be real or symbolic and is invariably femicidal. Pornography is necessarily profane 
too. In overlooking this fact, Paglia can attribute sexual sadism to a crisis of 
egalitarianism rather than a collapse of the sacred. Again, she offers a familiar 
objection to egalitarian projects and one that is mirrored by the critics of socio- 
economic equality I have discussed in the first chapter. 
For Paglia, nature's deeper energies rise to the surface when humans meddle 
with her original, hierarchical arrangements. When attempts to level social structures 
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are made in the name of equality, people turn inwards to create hierarchies in the 
bedroom. Hierarchies are part of nature and will breathe come what may. Thus 
Paglia offers the populist view that sado-masochism is nature's immutability, its 
destructive/reconstructive, dark side so necessary for creativity. To this common 
notion, Paglia adds the mischievous one that: "There is no female Mozart because 
there is no female Jack the Ripper"(Paglia, 1992 p. 247). For Paglia, women must 
become subjects of a terrible imagination rather than its objects if they are to create. It 
is the death drive not Eros that wills art. This reduced view of humanity, parades as 
a daring one and is certainly compatible with Sade's own literary commitment to 
naughtiness. This questionable perspective on female creativity refuses many factors, 
not least the Madonna/whore binary that informs the murder of prostitutes and which 
has no male equivalent upon which the perverse, 'artistic', female may depend. More 
importantly for my discussion, it refuses that sadism is itself a 'cultural fact', to use 
Foucault's term, rather than a prerequisite for the making of culture or something that 
inheres in the male species. And this cultural fact discloses narratives about male 
and female desire as much as that of romantic fiction such as Rousseau has 
provided in Sophie. 
Whereas Rousseau sentimentalised sex inequality, Sade erotisised a 
misanthropy which - always collapsed into misogyny. For Carter (1979, the 
pornography of Sade initiated the representation of 'free' women as 'profane whores' 
as accomplices to male sexual violence and the denigration of women. If, as Irigaray 
argues (1993(c)), mother and daughter are unrepresented in the divine, in Sade she 
can find this brutally confirmed in a revolting fantasy of a rape by daughter to mother 
involving sodomy and finally the stitching up of the vagina (Sade, pp 363,364). In 
terms of her physiological specificity, the woman's passage to femininity and 
maternity is blocked literally. Sade also knows, like contemporary pornographers, 
that if women are to do men's sex work, the bond between mother and daughter or 
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sorority itself must be ruptured and profaned. For Sade the family must go too. The 
logic Sade brought to egalitarianism was in an ordered challenge of the sacred that 
started with God and ended with marriage and the family. If all is profane and if the 
individual reigns supreme - within the limits of nature - then incest and matricide are 
up for grabs. In this respect, Sade sounds the familiar cry of the disgruntled 
adolescent: "we do not ask to be born" (in Crossland, 1994, p. 108). This is also, 
Irigaray would say, a denial of man's debt to woman. 
For' Sade, women like the timid, comely Sophie need to be released from 
gendered convention and that means getting them away from. their mothers and 
joining the men for their fair share of fun: 
You young maidens, too long constrained by a fanciful Virtue's absurd 
and dangerous bonds and by those of a disgusting religion, imitate the 
fiery Eurgenie; be as quick as she to destroy, to spurn all those 
ridiculous precepts inculcated in you by imbecile parents (Sade, 
1965, p. 185). 
But this release, turns out to be the freedom to serve a sexual terrorism and 
frequently to die for it. There are only two ways of being female in Sade's 
pornography: either, like Justine, she is virtuous and will go unrewarded and indeed 
she will be denigrated for it (perhaps a critique of Sophie? ). Or like Juliette, she will 
develop a libertine's amorality and share in men's fun by emulating their phallic ways. 
"Full-fledged libertines" writes Irigaray (1985(b) "speak and act like phallorats: they 
seduce, suck, screw, strike, even slaughter those weaker than themselves, like the 
strong men they are"(p. 199). Revealingly,. one of Sade's women is endowed with a 
clitoris so elongated that it resembles a penis (Sade, 1965). Either choice, then, will 
lead to self-annihilation. Erotically, Justine will dread death and Juliette will savour its 
prospect. Neither win, they merely lose differently. In both cases, women will serve 
men but in a reversal of conventional morality, Sade's violent radicalism punishes the 
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rule-bound woman and rewards the transgressive one in whose service Sade has 
placed pornography (Carter, 1979, p. 37). 
9. Sexual freedom and justice 
What Rousseau conveys in sentimental disguise is thrown in sharp relief by 
Sade, namely, the severance of freedom from justice in the sexual terrain. The 
difference between the two is that whereas Rousseau replaces justice with domestic 
responsibility, duty and love, Sade converts/perverts justice into unbounded sex and 
rampant individualism. It is just to do as one pleases and justice is other-less and 
certainly other-sex-less, a fact made explicit by his insistences that women be 
sodomised, suggesting that their physical distinctiveness needs to be obliterated. 
Although Rousseau receives some feminist stick for his sexist philosophy (e. g. 
Patemen, 1989), he at least should be credited with giving women the shield of love 
and offering them a measure of sacred and distinctive status that has some, albeit 
precarious, protective value in an unequal world. For Sade there was no emotional 
or spiritual gluing of the sexes at all. Indeed, if any of Sade's libertines show pity or 
affection for their object choice, they are capitally punished. Moreover, women's 
pleasure, if it exists at all, must always be incidental to man's for . women are 
"nothing 
but machines designed for voluptuousness" (Sade, 1965, p. 605). What man wants 
(egoism itself) is what nature wants and if nature wants it, then it must be right: 
If egoism is Nature's fundamental commandment, it is very surely most 
of all during our lubricious delights that this celestial Mother desires us 
to be most absolutely under its rule; why, its a very small evil, is it not, 
that, in the interests of the augmentation of the man's lecherous delights 
he has got either to neglect or upset the woman's; for if this upsetting of 
her pleasure causes him to gain any, what is lost to the object which 
serves him affects him in no wise, save profitably: it must be a matter of 
indifference to him whether that object is happy or unhappy, provided it 
be delectable to him; in truth, there is no relation at all between that 
object and himself (Sade, 1965, p. 604). 
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This logic of no relation between "object and himself' is also based on the view 
that love and enjoyment are separable and indeed separated. If you give to the other, 
you take from yourself: 
Anything by way of consideration for the woman one stirs into the broth. 
has got to dilute its strength and impair its flavour for the man; so long 
as the latter spends his time giving enjoyment, he assuredly does not 
himself do any enjoying, or his enjoyment is merely intellectual, that is to 
say, chimerical and far inferior to sensual enjoyment (Sade, 1965, 
pp. 603,604). 
The female must learn of this poverty of exchange in order to learn of her 
sacrificial role: 
No., Therese, no, I will not cease repeating it, there is absolutely no 
necessity that, in order to be keen, an enjoyment must be shared; and 
in order that this kind of pleasure may be rendered piquant to the 
utmost, it is, on the contrary, very essential that the man never take his 
pleasure save at the expense of the woman, that he take from her 
(without regard for the sensation she may experience thereby) 
(Sade, 1965, p. 604). 
Though Sade's male egotism is extreme, his views are not severed from the 
sacrificial practice of those contemporary women who may still be oriented on his 
desire, not hers. "Frenchwomen, stop trying", urges Irigaray, (1985, p. 198) stop, 
that is, staging his pleasure at the expense of yours. 
Sade's concept of sexual freedom, then, is necessarily severed from love 
precisely because it is otherless. It is part of sadism's drive to refuse mutuality and 
the 'acknowledgement of equal rights' (Carter, 1979 p. 141 ). Such a refusal ensures the 
dissociation of eroticism from love for their fusion would require intercourse rather 
than assault. This dissociation, argues Irigaray, is characteristic of modern homo- 
sexuality (not to be confused with homosexuality) because keeping love out is 
mediated through the exclusion of women's desire. What is left is a: 
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technocratic sexuality, always hunting for new techniques or targets, 
ending up bored and expecting happiness only in the world beyond 
(Irigaray, 1993 (b), p. 67). 
With such a sexuality, the woman is denied human integrity, let alone female 
integrity. "Happiness" is always beyond her (where other women wait in line), not 
with her. She is only flesh, more leavable than loveable and more have-able than 
knowable. 
In Sade, carnal knowledge concerns knowledge of the victim's flesh as meat 
(Carter, 1979, p. 141). What Sade vividly depicts, suggests Carter, is the enduring 
fact that pornography trades in human flesh, chiefly, female human flesh. What is a 
scarce and rationed commodity in Sophie becomes an object of gluttony in Sade's 
pornography. Whereas sex is mediated through romance in Sophie it is through the 
carnivorous appetite of the sadist who "surrounds himself, not with lovers or partners, 
but with accomplices" (Carter, 1979, p. 146). The accomplices, of course, are often 
female, like Juliette, and, like contemporary sex workers, they are always vulnerable 
to a demotion to victim. 
The correlate, division of sex from love is that of body from mind. This, argues 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1979), is an enlightenment dissociation that Sade carries to 
a logic: 
The unavoidable consequence, already implicit in the Cartesian 
separation of man into cognitive and extensive substances is quite 
explicitly expressed as the destruction of romantic love, which is actually 
a disguise, a rationalisation of physical impulse (1979, p. 108). 
The rationalisation of physical impulses, divorced of emotional or social 
readings could describe much pornography generally. From such an assessment, 
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Adorno and Horkheimer lead us to a chilling comparison of the fictitious, sexualised 
genocide of Sade with the real genocide and enacted sadism of German fascism. 
Cold reason is manly prowess and in divorcing from its realm, love, compassion and 
pity (read as womanly cowardice) it can do its deeds in "serene command over the 
emotions" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, pp. 101-108) No bloodletting has been nice 
but both Foucault (1990) and Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) have suggested that 
modern bloodletting connects sex warfare with warfare generally and with racism. 
Such a suggestion leads us back to Irigaray's comments at the beginning of this 
chapter on the importance of grasping how attacks on the integrity of womankind 
ramify in many destructive ways. 
Finally, on this question of manly prowess, Carter notes that Sade featured 
excrement in most of his dramas and this contributes significantly to the stomach 
churns his readers must endure. Instead of soiling nappies, Sade turns to soiling the 
reader for whom there are many retch-inducing passages to get through. This feature 
of Sade's writing, Carter suggests, returns Sade's men to the state of babies who 
'play with their own excrement' but present such play as transgressive perversion in 
an elaborate avoidance of mutual, adult relations, particularly with women. " The 
libertine's perversions are the actings-out of his denial of love" (Carter, 1979, p. 147) 
and his refusal to grow up. Indeed, it has been suggested that Sade's 
unmothered/unparented childhood structured his erotic choices. Sade's infantile rage 
with his mother and later his mother-in-law were reputedly at the heart of his heartless 
sexuality and his apparent arrest at the anal stage of sexual development. Sade, it 
has been suggested, was a love hungry child who learnt to cover this formative 
wound with violent lust (Hayman, 1978). 
Giddens (1992) argues that men who cannot connect to women intimately are 
forever love-hungry but do not know it. Instead they endlessly chase women's flesh, 
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discarding each conquest for another in an impossible quest for satiation. 
(Giddens, 1992, pp 84,85) This is the womaniser, the office Romeo, Don Juan, 
Casanova, the man women warn each other about. Similarly, in Carter's analysis of 
Sade's world, men are typically carnivore and women herbivore; they can neither 
communicate nor sit at the same table. They hunger for different things. There is no 
mutuality, no possibility of love, respect or "any durable form of human 
intercourse"(Carter, 1979, p. 141). Sade has one of his libertines declare that "all men 
want to molest women during sexual activity.. that is the sign of their natural 
superiority to them"(in Carter, 1979 p. 143). Because women are flesh to be had and 
because having flesh is-emotionally vacuous, the manner of the having has to be 
varied and rendered ever more cruel and objectifying to give it a semblance of 
emotionality for the man starved of female ( maternal) response. Meanwhile 
women, who are herbivores go quietly to slaughter because they do not understand 
the meaning of meat and their connection to men's yearnings since women eat grass. 
In Sade, "Flesh is used instrumentally" to provoke a "dreadful pleasure" the arrival of 
which is never negotiated 'as gentle lovers do'(Carter, 1979, p. 150). It follows from 
this, that the absence of dialogue creates the space for 'snuff pornography and the 
tragedy of real sex murders. If there is nothing to say and if flesh has been used 
instrumentally, disposing of the 'flesh' afterwards logically concludes the act. 
The pursuit of loveless sex is an important aspect of sexual inequality because 
it keeps women as flesh and at bay. Strictly speaking, loveless sex prevents sexual 
inter-course and facilitates sexual abuse. Love, it may need noting here, is a 
synonym for regard and respect rather than a romantic sentiment. Respect, Fromm 
(1993) reminds us is to "look at to see a person as he (sic) is, to be aware of his (sic) 
unique individuality" (p. 30). In the case of pornography, which trades in loveless sex, 
men can have women without the presence of women in the flesh and blood and 
without the necessity of talking to them or of negotiating forms of pleasure. The lone 
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pornographic reader has both the 'abstraction of flesh' and its mystification before 
him, (Carter, 1979, p. 16). Pornography teaches that flesh can be had without 
consulting or indeed speaking to its owner. As McGahern (1979) had his fictitious 
pornographer reply to his nudge-nudge-wink-winking friend on the question of his 
trade "it's heartless and it's mindless and it's a lie"(p. 109). 
When sexworkers make their flesh available in pornography, they inescapably 
offer more than themselves. As an office worker, complaining of sexual harassment 
put it: 
I felt humiliated every time I came into work and saw this picture of a 
woman with her legs wide open, looking passive and provocative. I felt 
it reflected on me, my work, even my ability to do my job 
(Hadjifotiou, 1983, p. 14). 
Pin-ups are put-downs. This woman was demeaned by imagery that robbed 
women of dignity and 'virginity' (in Irigaray's sense) and she felt the theft personally. 
Arguably, this woman would thrive better in the shadow of the Madonna for the Virgin 
Mary was at least a Goddess of sorts (Warner, 199 ). In truth, of course, this 
complainant could do with a better mirror altogether, one that supports rather than 
undermines her incarnation (Irigaray, 1993(c), p. 65). 
In Sade, women are interminably available, malleable, teachable, killable. 
While it is true that Sade only offered one variant of the pornographic genre, whether 
hard or soft, whether written at the dawn of modernity or in contemporary times, 
pornography invariably represents male sexual freedom as sexual freedom. That is 
not to say, that all men identify with pornographic conceptions of 'their' freedom, 
indeed many, like Stoltenberg (1992) find them restrictive for men, heterosexual or 
homosexual, precisely because offences against women are offences against the 
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other half and thus to the whole of which they are the other half. Put more plainly, 
men who make humanist identifications with women abhor offences to their species. 
10. Equality and the erotic 
Egalitarian sexual relations and the formulation of interpersonal ethics between 
men and women, men and men and women and women are all antithetical to the 
purpose of pornography, argues Stoltenberg (1992), because " pornography keeps 
sexism sexy" (p. 159). Even in much gay and lesbian pornography, he argues, sexism 
informs its erotic appeal through the representation of passivity and activity, parodied 
as female and male respectively in the insistence that someone 'be the man there' 
(1992, p. 159. ). 
As I touched upon in chapter 3, there are heated debates from many quarters 
about censorship and the benefits or damages of pornography (Izin, 1992). 
Feminism and sexual liberationists are divided on this issue. Paglia (1992) who 
argues from an anti-feminist corner, claims that the merit of Sade over Rousseau is 
that the former confronts the dark side of sexuality which the latter cannot 
acknowledge. This 'naughty-but-natural' binary of dark/light is as proven as that of 
heaven/hell with which it shares a superstitious dependence upon the centrality of 
punishment in human sexuality. How can we know the shade of our sexuality? How 
can we know what is really 'there' or whether there is a 'there' and if there is what 
constitutes it from 'here'? In contrast to Paglia, Stoltenberg (1992) speculates that this 
so-called dark side is not so much an 'honest' underworld of desire as a 
hyperconformist assimilation of power structures. Pornography does not unleash 
trapped libidinal forces, rather it contributes to their entrapment by consigning the 
erotic to hierarchical relations: 
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The political reality of the gender hierarchy in male supremacy requires 
that we make it resonate through our nerves, flesh and vascular system 
just as often as we can. We are supposed to respond orgasmically to 
power and powerlessness, to violence and violatedness; our sexuality is 
supposed to be inhabited by a reverence for supremacy, for unjust 
power over and against other human life. We are not supposed to 
experience any other erotic possibility (Stoltenberg, 1992, p. 161). 
What Paglia sees as nature, Stoltenberg sees as quasi-nature. What we think 
is in our flesh, he argues (as does Foucault, 1992) is socially inscribed. In any 
event, we may not know how desire is constituted entirely, but what we do know from 
the surveys of researchers into women's erotic life (Hite, 1976, Friday, 1976, Wilkinson 
and Kitzinger, 1993) is that many women are unhappy with what they get in the field of 
desire, as are men for that matter (Friday, 1980). Whatever we may think about the 
uses and abuses of pornography, it seems to me that its overwhelming problem lies in 
its inability to contribute to a discourse shift in sex relations. As Acker writes of 
Sade's pornography, "Sade is a patriarch who hates patriarchy but has nowhere else 
to go" (Acker, 1994). Its not just the Sadean journey that teaches nothing (Gusset, 
1994, p. 120) for contemporary pornography suffers similar circularities. Pornography 
is stuck erotica. Its refusal of intimacy is a refusal to entrust men and women with 
mutuality and this is linked to its frequent drifts into violence, however subtly played 
out or transacted. 
11. Pornography: violent and conservative 
Catherine Itzin's (1992) survey of research into pornographic material in Britain 
and the USA reveals the considerable presence of scenes involving explicit violence 
of some kind. The evidence she and other contributors in her edited book provide, 
points to the deep connectedness of sex and violence in pornography, including the 
psychological violence intrinsic to degradation and subordination. For instance, an 
American professor of law reported to a US Commission on Pornography as follows: 
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A person who learned about human sexuality in the 'adults only' 
pornography outlets in America would be a person who had learned 
that .... one out of every five sexual encounters involves spanking, whipping, fighting, wrestling, tying, chaining, gagging, or torture 
(Itzin, 1992, p. 39). 
Itzin (1992) evidences the eroticisation of racism too. There exist, for instance, 
magazines called 'Auschwitz Bitch', 'Latin Babes' and 'Custer's Revenge' (in which 
whites rape American Indian women) and a widespread use of black people in 
degrading postures (pp. 32/3). Children are also exploited and where pornographers 
keep to the law, models are frequently dressed as girls with 'pigtails and knee socks' 
(p. 32). It would seem from these examples, that pornography never transcends a 
master-slave dialectic. For some, like Paglia (1992), this is a natural, libidinal hook. 
For others, like Stoltenberg (1992), it is pornography's failed imagination and its 
inherent conservatism. 
Behind its dare-to-live, libertine mask, then, lies a deep network of 
hyperconformist messages about the necessities of inequality that 'desensitises 
sexuality', (Moorcock, 1992, p. 538). Pornography denies men and women adult, 
moral identities and places women, in particular, in a dilemma about their libidinal 
energy. Should they expend it for themselves for the hopeful reward of pleasure? 
Hopeful, because the sexually available woman is available generally to the other 
more than to the self (Irigaray, 1985(b)). Or should a woman convert/pervert her 
sexuality into currency which will at least produce measures of safety, respect and 
marriage? It is to this second possibility that I now turn in a further discussion of the 
kind of romanticisation of sex relations such as we find in Sophie. 
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12. Women's pornography 
Though it may be true, as I note later, that the Madonna/whore binary is less 
formative in women's lives, women can still model themselves on a variant of the 
Madonna through a romantic narrative that collapses sex into masochistic love. 
Whereas Sade's pornography finds renewed expression in the contemporary 
versions cited by Itzin, the sentimentalised sexism such as that of Rousseau's, is at 
the centre of romantic pulp fiction. 
Some writers on pornography (Kaplan, 1991, Coward, 1984 ) have described 
romantic fiction as women's pornography. Romance, it is argued, offers women the 
chance to eroticise their subordination. If men are responsible for sadistic scripts, 
women have played their role in writing masochistic ones. Kaplan (1991) suggests 
that despite moral adjustments over the years from this genre, the formula remains 
much the same: 
As the novel begins, the heroine is on the alert to the hard muscularity 
of the man into whose arms she will soon be surrendering her body. As 
we meet this venturesome young lady, she is on the verge of knowing 
the unknown. The reader attends as the virgin patiently peels away 
each of the many shells of phallic hardness until at last she arrives at 
the soft custard of domestic desire at the centre of the man's being - the 
caring, protective, loving, husband (Kaplan, 1991, p. 325/6). 
This certainly seemed the case in the example I shall use to support Kaplan's 
view. New Surgeon at St. Lucians by Elizabeth Houghton (1966) is a Doctor Nurse 
Romance which I selected randomly from a large Mills and Boon collection at a local 
bookstore. That there is a sub-genre to this romantic genre entitled 'Doctor Nurse 
Romance' already reveals a great deal. In the male pornographic world, there is a 
magazine called Hard Boss (Itzin, 1992, p. 33) which is entirely devoted to the 
presentation of secretaries in the sexual service of their bosses. Clearly what Doctor 
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Nurse Romances and Hard Boss have in common is the eroticisation of workplace 
hierarchies. It is useful, perhaps, to place this commonality, alongside the location of 
sexual harassment in workplace authority relations. 
13. The Story of Fiona 
The new surgeon at St. Lucians is Mark Castle. "A tall dark-haired man with a 
smile just lighting up his grey eyes and softening his strong features". Fiona, a nurse, 
is in sole charge of a special. recovery unit, a responsibility, we are told, a little ahead 
of her twenty-three years. Mark is stern and bossy and we can presume much older 
than our virginal heroine. The path to love in this workplace romance is littered with 
the many misunderstandings and denials of attraction which comprise foreplay in this 
genre. The climactic moment lies in the dismantling of these gendered defences by 
the masterful seizure of initiative from the hero. In New Surgeon.. this happens when 
Fiona says something imprudent to Mark: 
Mark stepped swiftly towards her (Fiona) and put one hand over her 
mouth as his other arm held her firmly. 
Fiona felt herself going limp in his hold, and then to her 
consternation her eyes brimmed over and slow tears spilled down her 
cheeks and across Mark's hand.... 
Without warning he bent and kissed her hard on the mouth and then 
released her abruptly. "Don't ask silly questions! he snapped. 
He was gone before she could say another word. Fiona sat down 
weakly, her head in a whirl, Mark's kiss still warm on her lips (Houghton, 
1966, p. 181). 
As we can see, Fiona does not act for herself. Mark pounces masterfully and 
Fiona duly swoons. Her desire is not active, it is activated and when it is, it leaves 
her weak. As Coward put it in relation to this genre: 
The heroine may well be 'in love' with the hero. She may well adore him 
and admire him. But her desire is only ever triggered as a response, 
crushed out of her, as it were, as a series of low moans (Coward, 
1984, p. 194). 
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Thus after a bout of crying from Fiona, Mark "kisses her hard on the lips", 
after which Fiona sits down weakly with her head 'in a whirl'. Later and. on being 
"smothered with kisses" Fiona remains unsure. Does she want such advances? 
Indeed she resists but , 
"her resistance weakened" until she finally " responds" 
(Houghton, 1966, p. 191). This scenario mirrors a key theme in pornography. As 
Moorcock (1992) confirms from the post he received while working in the 
pornography industry, there were many letters from men about breaking through a 
women's resistance, "I made her do it and now she likes it"(p. 542). Similarly, Sade's 
women are inducted into acts which they initially find repulsive but ultimately crave to 
repeat. A drive for mastery characterises romance and pornography. As we have 
seen, in pornography, the relentless search for different kinds of female availability 
and posture find ultimate logic in her murder. In romantic fiction, the denouement 
frequently positions the woman within 'anal ontology'([rigaray, 1985 (a)) in that she 
disappears behind the man. In New Surgeon, there is a bondage drama that leads to 
this: "I take it that you've been obeying my orders, he (Mark) said dryly. Fiona felt 
suddenly shy. 'Yes', she admitted in the same husky whisper" (Houghton, 1966, 
p. 177). 
In Coward's (1984) view these kind of scenarios resonate with women's primal 
relations with their fathers. Indeed, romantic fiction accomplishes the daughter's 
seduction of the father. Tarzan is daddy. What women accomplish in such a 
seduction, argues Coward, is a return to dependence on the father: 
In the adoration of the powerful male, we have the adoration of the 
father by the small child. This adoration is based on the father as all- 
powerful, before disillusionment and the struggle for autonomy set. in 
(Coward, 1984, p. 191). 
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When women succumb to controlling men, they give up themselves and spurn 
the struggle for autonomy. Thus in Fiona's case, Mark colonises her future (or rather, 
Fiona allows Mark to do so) and she submits eagerly to this unindividuated path: 
Fiona knew that the new surgeon at St. Lucian's had indeed settled in, 
and her part, whatever it might be, would be at his side for always. 
(Houghton, 1966 p. 191). 
As Coward puts it: 
Romantic fiction promises a secure world, promises that there will be 
safety with dependence, that there will be power with subordination 
(Coward, 1984, p. 196). 
14. The meeting ofpornoaraphies, male and female 
In both male and female pornography,. then, women do not know themselves. 
They are aroused by subordination; sexual initiation is never in their hands; male 
advances render them weak but compliant. Men do know what women want and it is 
their manly task to teach woman to penetrate their natural modesty to discover it. 
Romantic fiction moves through the passive/active binarism common to male 
pornography. The first is consensual subjugation (masochistic) the second tends to 
be more coercive (sadistic). 
It should be recognised that just as not all men buy into pornography and its 
messages, nor do all women buy into the pornography of romanticised sexism. This is 
not my suggestion. There has been, after all, a sexual revolution, or at least as 
Ehrenreich et. al. (1986) suggest, a partial sexual revolution in which some women 
and men have made considerable progress. But, as these authors point out too, 
there remain many who are unaffected by this revolution and remain entrenched in 
traditional sex roles. There are too, many women still struggling for a self-assertive 
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identity and many men who are, to use Giddens' language, the 'laggards' in these 
gender transformative times (Giddens, 1992, p. 59). 
Sexual harassment policies target, of course, the laggards, the men who 
cannot mediate their desire through acceptable courtship rituals, who cannot talk to 
women as equals, who can only disclose their desire in macho gesturing which 
includes a stubborn refusal to accept rejection. Conversely, there are women who 
wait for their prince to transform their lives into happy ones. Such women are the 
prey of the predator/prey binary. They wait for overtures, they do not make them. 
Elementally, the passive worpan invites the active man to take charge even where 
passivity is merely habit. 
15. The first move 
In their study of heterosexual relations in a college, Gilfoyle et. al. (1993) ask the 
following woman about her role in the making of a relationship with a man: 
I don't think, come to think of it, that I've ever really been looking for it 
(heterosexual relationship) but it just sort of happens, you know, there's 
always someone about, so I've never needed... 
G. (interviewer) To make the first move? 
Yeah, I suppose (1993, p. 191). 
In Gilfoyle et. al's (1993) interviews there seems to be a strong linkage between 
this kind of unreflective induction into heterosexual relations and women's low sense 
of themselves as desiring subjects. Clearly passivity and the self-determination of 
one's sexuality are antithetical. The. evidence of this recent research suggests that 
the sexual revolution- has only reinvented the passive/active binary of heterosexuality, 
it has not abolished it. Women continue to expect to 'give themselves' and men 
continue to expect to 'take' in what the researchers refer to as a pseudo-reciprocal 
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gift. It is pseudo because it remains oriented on what the man wants and does and 
on the woman complying more or less passively. In particular the researchers' 
interviews suggest that the achievement of orgasm for the woman is a mark of the 
man's prowess, not her desire: 
Women are conceived of as giving themselves or giving sex to men, 
while men give women orgasms. This, we have suggested, reinforces 
the oppression of women by encouraging their passivity in the face of 
the activity, and crass notions of technical expertise, it encourages in 
men (Gilfoyle et. al. 1993, p. 199). 
This kind of transaction in erotic life, therefore, does not 'transform intimacy' as 
Giddens' (1992) work might imply, rather it introduces a contractual element. to it. 
Thus the problem of an estrangement of the sexes is not overcome because this 
approach attends to sexual mechanics more than the relational. In short, Gilfoyle et. 
al. (1993) suggest that while many men have found the clitoris, they have yet to find 
its owner and women are not helping them to search. While women may not be in 
dark Victorian ignorance any more, the light remains dim and there are still plenty 
who hide in the shade of passivity. Adding weight to this is the research which reveals 
the preponderance of masochistic scripts in women's fantasies. "Read any book 
describing women's sexual fantasies, and you will find many devoted to sexual 
activities rooted in the eroticizing of powerlessness" write Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 
(1963, p. 17). 
16. Women and the presentation of self 
Without wanting to suggest at. all that the victims of sexual harassment 
precipitate its arrival, I do want to raise the problem of female passivity as one that 
belongs to questions of sexual harassment. There are many documented cases 
(Hadjifotiou, 1983 and Curtis, 1993) of strong, assertive, women bearing the brunt of 
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sexual harassment. Indeed the very fact-that these are documented has something 
to do with the confidence and courage such women possessed to bring cases of 
harassment to public attention. 
Research has revealed that most women suffer sexual harassment at some 
point or points in their lives. As Curtis puts it "Virtually every woman has a story" 
(1993, p. 10). Research recently commissioned by an employment agency reported 
that "over 60% of their employees had suffered sexual harassment; a good many of 
them suffered this in silence" (Hadjifotiou, p. 10). Indeed many women endure sexual 
harassment as an irksome but unavoidable part of being female, like period pains 
(Bagilhote, et. al. 1995). This kind of dull acceptance - which may include an inability 
to name the problem - produces an unpeaceful gender positioning. Female becoming 
is a very self-conscious affair. Generally speaking, men are expected to do and 
women to appear (Berger, 1972). How to appear can be quite nerve wracking for 
women and sexual harassers are often able to exploit a pre-existing tension about 
appearance by commenting upon it incessantly (Curtis, 1993). They can be 
particularly good at locating a woman's Achilles heels and destabilising her security 
by making this a target of comment. Such men know that discontent with her body is 
a woman's conditioned condition. Bagilhote et. al. (1995) instance one of their 
respondents who reported "I'm told by my colleagues that I'm not pretty, that's why I 
can be an academic" (p. 49).. The extent to which women focus negatively upon parts 
of their body, is the extent to which they sexually harass themselves, perhaps, but 
many are assisted in this self-degradation. Since women are encouraged into a 
rocky relationship with intelligence, competence and femininity (Kaplan, 1991), the 
striking of a balance between doing and appearing is an important objective. From a 
report by a London Evening Standard journalist, it would seem that women are more 
likely to opt for a model of sexless professionalism: 
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The striking asexuality of the female achiever's wardrobe is explained 
by this apparent inability of the British male to deal with female sexuality 
(Lowri Turner in Curtis, 1993, p. 55). 
This pronouncement, which relies on an abstracted and determinist concept of 
the British male, excuses women from the struggle to differentiate as women in an 
equilibrium of doing and appearing. The arrival of the shoulder-padded woman in the 
boardroom is surely the arrival of unisex equality. She enters the workplace as man 
or at least as phallic woman. Perhaps this is why, too, women are often ambivalent 
about submitting to female management. While 'joining them' may be an 
understandable defence against sexism, it requires that women deny themselves 
female substance to prove that they are equal to men: In Irigaray's terms such 
substance would concern what women desire which "may or may not coincide with 
those of some other, man or woman" (1985(b), p. 204) but which needs more space to 
respond to that in/famous question: what do women want? 
A good illustration of the crisis women may experience between achievement 
(doing) and acceptance (appearing) comes from a psychoanalyst case (Kaplan, 
1991, p268). An extremely successful academic, would routinely deliver excellent 
lectures but as soon as she descended from the lectern, she sought out an older man 
for approval and then younger men, in front of whom, she would: 
... transform 
herself into a hip-wriggling, eyelashbatting seductress... In 
contrast to the magisterial style with which she had commanded and 
captivated her audience, there suddenly appeared at the back of the 
auditorium a flirtatious girl, a silly chatterbox, a pure and simple 
coquette (Kaplan, 1991, p. 270). 
In psychoanalytic terms, this woman experienced success as theft of the 
phallus and she was never able to celebrate her ability without 'returning' it to men 
afterwards. It would seem from this case and more recent research (Coward, 1992) 
that male and female are weighted, burdened oppositions more than they are 
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celebrated ones. This is evident in Coward's analysis where she suggests that if men 
and women are to meet each other in a more promising dynamic than that held out by 
romantic or pornographic narratives, they will have to assess what gendered loads 
they should carry and what they should discard (Coward, 1992). 
17. The entanglement of the sexes 
Coward (1992) writes of the deep splitting of emotional attributes among men 
and women. Each sex projects on to the other sex certain gendered burdens. Men, 
for instance, will expect women to carry the nurturing needs of a relationship and 
women will expect men to carry the necessary ambition for a materially comfortable 
partnership. Instead of integrating elements of ambition and nurturing within 
themselves, the partnership will work like a Siamese twinned pair. Not so much with 
each other as stuck with each other in a relationship of dull heterosexual compulsion. 
In such an arrangement, concludes Coward, honesty must be sacrificed to 
manipulation. 
Women, Coward writes, "do not have a straightforward relation to their needs, 
desire and ambitions"(1992, p. 139). This is because people in positions of 
subordination cannot communicate clearly and honestly what they want and often 
have to be manipulative. Women, Coward suggests, must acquire the habit of 
dishonesty. "In moments of honesty, many women will admit to having resorted to 
illness or some other form of 'weakness' to make certain gains in a situation" (1992, 
p. 139). 
Coward recognises that men have their own manipulativeness, not least in the 
manipulation of power for sexual favours that is characteristic of some sexual 
harassment cases. Inequality on both sides demands manipulation precisely because 
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neither side confronts each other as equals. As Lerner (1993) put it, "truth telling 
cannot co-exist with inequality"( p. 219) A particular challenge in relation to this point, 
lies in the reliability of the feminist insistence that 'no means no'. If it is true that 
women remain subordinated within heterosexual relations, that their sexuality 
continues to be underdetermined by themselves, then their abilities to communicate, 
bodily and verbally, to themselves as much as to men are bound to suffer. 
Ambivalence, confusion, shame, aggression, reticence, shyness, denial, fatalism may 
well be features of such underdetermination. The widespread phenomenon of the 
female faked orgasm is perhaps the most obvious testimony to this ( Lerner, 1993, p. 
51/2). For many generations, women have been culturally attuned to communicate a 
massive dishonesty to men and themselves in which they do say yes when they 
mean no. The recent research I have. discussed above (Gilfoyle et. al. 1993) 
indicates that women are more, likely to lie by omission (omitting what they want) than 
commission, an indication that converges with Irigaray's view that one way or another, 
women continue to fake love because they remain out of touch with themselves 
(Irigaray, 1985(b)). 
Generally speaking, men and women are dispositionally framed by inequality 
and this must ramify into the question of sexual harassment. I do not thereby suggest 
that men and women are rigidly positioned against each other on an active/passive 
divide so that one is fated to be predatory and the other prey. This would be much 
too simplistic and would squeeze out any power and political differentiation within the 
sexes as well as between them. It would also suggest that no pleasure, warmth or 
support resides in the hetero-sexual/heterosexual world. As I have indicated, my 
exploration has leant upon models and these are rarely, neatly replicated in real life. 
When men and women make transactions. with each other, sexual or otherwise, they 
rarely do so from a textbook, pornographic or romantic. Or if they do, they have to 
adjust theory to fit practice. Happily, human beings muddy pristine theories with a 
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bountiful variety of footprints. The models I have used are too embedded and too 
coherent. Having drawn upon the abstract narratives of pornography and romantic 
fiction to facilitate my discussion on inequality, it is important to finish with a more 
uneven and hopeful reality. 
18. Resexualising the workplace 
Giddens has suggested that women. are taking a lead in 'the emotional 
reorganisation of social life '(1992, p. 182). Giddens argues that generational changes 
are creating a contradictory picture of sex relations. In particular, females are 
developing self-reflexive sexual identities in unprecedented ways. Giddens cites 
recent research to illustrate: 
When we look at teenage sexual activity today, the good girl/bad girl 
distinction still applies to some degree, as does the ethic of male 
conquest. But other attitudes, on the part of many teenage girls in 
particular, have changed quite radically. Girls feel they have an 
entitlement to engage in sexual activity, including sexual intercourse at 
whatever age seems appropriate to them (Rubin in Giddens, 1992 
p. 9,10). 
If such trends are underway - which can be indexed partly by the kind of new, 
assertive woman. promoted by many popular women's magazines - it suggests that 
renewed attention be given to this cultural shift in educational institutions. As one 
teacher complained: 
Some people still complain that children have too much sexual 
information. I still feel the reverse. Girls are still. lacking in knowledge 
about themselves and their responses. I feel very strongly that we 
should be educating girls about sexuality and sexual response 
Coward, 1992, p. 151). 
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This comment has pertinence for establishments whose characteristic student 
body will be at crucial stages of a 'narrative quest' (Weeks, 1993) in terms of sexual 
identity. As I have raised at the beginning of this chapter, sexual harassment 
policies subtextually call for a desexualised workplace which it is presumed will free 
women from the pain of sexual harassment. This subtextual message is contained 
more in silence than in pronouncement. Sexual harassment policies assert the right 
of individuals to be free of unwanted sexual advances, they do not assert the right of 
individuals to make ones that might be wanted. Such a question calls to mind the 
Freudo-Marxist critique of the capitalist work ethic, particularly from Marcuse (1955). 
For Marcuse, the work ethic of capitalism requires a de-eroticisation of the body and a 
refusal to sensualise everyday life within the workplace. In Marcuse's view, sex has 
been retired to the private sphere and to 'genital tyranny' at the cost of a wider 
aesthetic and sensual appreciation of life. For Marcuse, the repression of the sexual 
and its narrow representation as 'the act' refuses its relation on a continuum with the 
sensual and the aesthetic. The creative sublimation of desire, then, requires that 
desire is owned. 
In my experience of teaching young adults in particular, the sexual 'noise' in 
the classroom presents serious challenges to effective teaching/learning. Such 
'noise' is generally regarded as an irritating distraction from the real business of study. 
hooks reports this question from the student point of view too: 
I remember reading an article in Psychology Today years ago when I 
was still an undergraduate, reporting a study which revealed that every 
so many seconds while giving lectures many male professors were 
thinking about sexuality - were even having lustful thoughts about 
students. I was amazed (hooks, 1994, p. 113). 
In Marcuse's view of course, the real business of study (creativity) requires a 
relationship with the libidinal not severance from it. An ideology of minimal 
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sexual/sensual expressivity in the workplace turns learning into an austere discipline. 
How can students sublimate their desire, if its articulation is confined to the smutty, 
the stolen, the forbidden? One of the difficulties here is in the de facto sexualisation 
of the workplace, despite the hegemony of a work ethic which Marcuse may have 
overconceptualised as asexual. However hard people may try, they cannot leave 
their sexual selves behind (hook, 1994). A rough marker of this lies in the high 
number of opposite sex relationships that are developed at the workplace (Morris, 
1978). Generally, people do not meet the people they desire but desire the people 
they meet. Colleges and universities are meeting grounds as much as they are 
anything else. Sexual expressivity is not necessarily 'wrong' if it is subterranean. But 
what is the terrain of which it is sub? 
What is at stake by the logic of these questions, is not the desexualisation of 
the workplace but a resexualisation that recognises the presence of women and men. 
Paradoxically, the effectivenes of a sexual harassment policy could be augmented by 
an increased attention to the sexual, the sensual, the aesthetic and sexualised 
equality . 
If such attention is mindful of the need of each sex to respect the other, 
women must be permitted to emerge as owners of desire and not the de/graded 
stimulus for it. 
"Think about what you wear. " (p. 61) advises Hadjifotiou (1983) to the potentially 
harassed woman. "It is easier to get support from others if your clothes are 
considered suitable for work" (1983, p. 61) she continues. Such advice, which 
communicates to the woman that she must minimise her sexual expressivity in order 
to "avoid giving anyone the excuse not to take you seriously" (1983, p. 61), may be 
counterproductive. It restores the problem of prey; it counsels the woman to lay low, 
to be still and in appropriate disguise. The woman must reduce herself to a sexless 
operative by this advice. In Irigaray's (1993 (b)) analysis, there can be no "respect for 
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otherness' if otherness is not given full reign. "Forgetting that I exist as a desiring 
subject, the other transforms his need into desire" (1993 (b), p. 213) I understand this 
to mean that if the man cannot recognise woman's desire (which is not merely sexual 
of course) as other than his, he will identify with what he desires of her (his need) but 
not with her (her desire). On their part, if women assimilate into men's desire, faking 
their own, rather than articulating it, they will renounce female-becoming and the 
initiative to act. 
Suppose we turn the spirit of Hadjifotiou's (1983) advice on its head. Suppose 
we advise women to dress as they please, according to their own sensual, aesthetic 
proclivity, that they assume sovereignty over their body and their desire. If a woman 
receives unwanted advances, supposing we advise her to declare squarely-to the 
harasser, "I do not desire you" and to develop, at the same time, the skills to 
articulate what she does desire, generally as well as sexually. If women want no to 
mean no, they will have to say yes when they mean yes and relieve men of the 
burden of initiation. Clearly, as Giddens (1992) has observed, many are fracturing 
the predator/prey binary and there is a case for engaging with this. 
If sexual harassment policies are to encourage a shift in male and female 
relations or indeed in heterosexual/homosexual relations, the question of what women 
want needs to be given space. If Giddens (1992) is right to claim that women are 
becoming more sexually proactive, (of which women. harassing men is one outcome) 
doubtless, they will not want to be dragged back by victimist messages about women 
generally. Nor will they want 'proactive' to be read as 'promiscuous' as it so often is. 
They may want, however, more support for their emergence as desiring subjects. 
Needless to say, such an emergence would entail more than a new sexual identity for 
it would beat the heart of self-identity itself. If Irigaray's drift is right, the more a 
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woman can be herself, the more she can meet men on equal ground and, in turn, the 
more men can develop respect for the otherness that is female. 
Having given full reign to the view that our otherness is primarily a sexed one, I 
now move to a more disorganised view of our differences. In the end, I would like to 
defend a conception of our uniqueness and a conception of equality based on 
oneness, not sameness. In other words, I want to hold on to the realities of racism, 
classism and sexism as problems for the flourishment of humans and humanity; but I 
want to advance at the some time the view that if we amplify the meaning of these 
problems, we are left with an and view of people's ability to dig where they stand and 
find treasures beneath their feet. Or conversely, there will always be those who will. 
encounter woes that are relatively autonomous from 'isms' or indeed the question of 
sex difference. 
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Chapter 6 
THE LIMITS OF EQUALITY DISCOURSES 
1. The unique and the general 
Those who object to classification as such forget that some kind of 
classificatory order is necessary for the world to be named and understood. 
Children, for instance, sort and select in their early attempts to comprehend and 
name the general and the particular. Conventionally, pre-school children are 
introduced to all kinds of game-tasks to aid this process: square bricks for square 
holes; red shoes with red socks; matching cards and so forth. These are among the 
first and necessary definitional and perceptual tasks of the young child (Leach, 1977). 
Problems arise, of course, when this kind of cognitive ordering is transferred to 
humanity as a final explanation of its nature. Essentially, such a primitive ordering is 
nominal and does not proceed to the relational; an exploration of this question has 
been a key theme to the preceding chapters. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on a classificatory imagination that 
cannot accommodate a dialectic of the private and the public in self-construction. In 
chapter four, I have attempted to qualify generalisations about women and men with 
the observation that familial and intimate emotional entanglements position people 
alongside social determinants. Such a principle has general application too and I 
finish my discussion on equality with a critique of an equal opportunity discourse that 
thinks exclusively in terms of laws of causation which are seen to be objectively 'out 
there'. In its extreme form, such thinking has been called 'politically correct'. In the 
past decade, initially from the United States but also here in Britain, there has been 
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an opposition to equal opportunity policies which is based on a refusal to accept the 
legitimacy of its categories precisely because they are perceived to be socially 
overdetermined and inattentive to measures of human autonomy. While I think this 
refusal has been founded frequently on a denial of the existence of oppression 
(Singh, 1994), objections to political correctness do need answering at a more 
analytical level. 
Every human being is launched into the world as both a social and an 
emotional being. Experiencing, feeling, understanding, perceiving and acting are 
deeply interconnected and interdependent. As we have seen in the preceding 
chapters, these elements will be socially influenced but it is an impoverished social 
theory that is insensitive to the particularities of private and emotional life. There is 
always something that is unique about family histories and romances that resists 
sociological simplifications. Disadvantaged circumstances do not guarantee 
disadvantaged outcomes and privileged backgrounds do not always yield privileges, 
or they yield dubious ones. One of the great levellers lies in our common emotional 
vulnerabilities for we are all born greedy, needy infants. The ways in which our needs 
and greeds are shaped, tempered and met is another way in which humanity is 
differentiated. This is not to deny social and cultural factors here, for even elemental 
activities such as breast. feeding are shaped by them (Belotti, 1973) but alongside 
these, a child's ego formation will be subject to the intimacies and patterns of 
carelneglect peculiar to the private circumstances of family life or its absence. The 
subjective is related to but does not respect in any automatic or uniform way an 
'objective' reality. Indeed since each realm influences each other, the very categories 
subjective/objective require cautious treatment. This is not to advance a reduced 
phenomenology in which humans construct meanings without the presence of 
structural determinants. Rather, it is to caution against reading 'subjective' and 
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'objective' as discrete experiences. Racism exists 'out there' but how I have 
experienced its scope, its boundaries, its impact on me and my impact on it conjoins 
the 'out there' with the 'in here'. In pointing to this, I do not wish to abandon the 
concept of victim within oppressive practices. Rather, my discussion concerns a 
victimist logic, not one that denies the coherence of the category victim. Such a 
denial would disavow the potency of violence and the impotence of its object. 
Broadly my suggestion is that political correctness is a victimology. 
2. Political Correctness: a victimology 
The victimist thrust in political correctness can be found in its tendency to drive 
out the subjective realm of responsibility with counterproductive consequences both 
for those it designates oppressed and oppressive. Firstly, this perspective works 
within a victim/victimiser dualism which many find insultingly reductive of who they 
really are. This is a very involved question because there are those who are 'victims' 
of social circumstances but not of family circumstances and vice versa. There are 
those, for instance, who are inducted into human life with love, support, trust, humour 
and intelligence by significant others. Often such people are better able to meet the 
challenges of oppression with hope and creativity and thus to move beyond its 
confines. Indeed, those who triumph over difficult social circumstances invariably 
track the origins of their transcendence to a significant parental figure or a supportive 
home environment which inspired it (Angelou, 1984). And there is evidence too of the 
reverse case. The field of psychology is littered with the cases of brutalising 
individuals who have been brutalised themselves. The evidence of case histories 
from psychology and psychotherapy skew sociological evidence. On the one hand, 
there are studies into the psychic development of tyrants, bullies and racists (Adorno 
et. al. 1982), on the other hand, there are the studies (Skynner and Cleese, 1993) 
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which trace the ways in which 'healthy family development' produces open-minded 
and indeed egalitarian-minded people from any possible social background. While 
the former research has tended to find common factors in the making of authoritarian 
personalities, interestingly, the latter have concluded that although there seem to be 
essential elements in the making of a successful human being, there is, to use the 
researchers words, 'no single thread' that leads to such a making (Skynner and 
Cleese, 1993, p. 3). It would seem that people arrive at human decency from many 
routes. 
What I want to stress here is the basic psychological premise that humans 
develop moral careers from an early age and under influences that are societal but 
played out within the walls of their home. For instance, a victimising family culture 
can originate in the pattern of any family life. Anyone can feel picked upon 
(Berne, 1964). It is possible that some people attracted to equal opportunity 
discourses bring to real issues of discrimination a victimist predisposition that adds to 
the unhappiness of their predicament. There are some, for instance, who identify 
themselves as socially determined at the expense of their uniqueness. While it is 
positive to honour one's life experiences as consequential, sometimes the preface "as 
a woman" and so forth, overwhelms co-determining variables that remain allusive by 
such an emphasis. In similar vein, there are those who are over-identified with a 
sphere of oppression that does not 'belong' to their own experiences, as if, perhaps, 
carrying the pain of others is more bearable than confronting their own. In Chapter 
two I raised this problem with respect to class. Generally, one has only to attend 
events dedicated to themes of equal opportunities to discover that there are all kinds 
of emotional investments in this particular minefield of the personal and the political. 
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Fanon's (1986) work captures eloquently the struggle between the subject's 
sense of self and his objectified (which the racist takes to be objective) self. 
Dramatically speaking, the meeting between the two is the site for a struggle between 
morbidity and vitality; if the force of the objectifying powers is strong enough, it can, to 
use Goffman's (1968) language, 'mortify the self. In education, elements of this 
predicament are processed through a self-fulfilling prophesy; tell people they are 
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stupid and they will become stupid; tell people they are worthless and they will feel it. 
But if the small voice within (planted, perhaps by parents or a teacher) can be heard 
against the noise of prejudice, it competes successfully with it. In chapter three, I 
gave the example of Hanif Kureishi (1986) born to a white, English woman and a 
black Pakistani man, who reported on his own responses to Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of 
Blood' speech. "I was comfortable with the different elements of myself' (p. 11) 
protests Kureishi. This was the teenage boy's response to objectification. Later 
Kureishi was to turn these different elements into an art that explored the many 
surprising outcomes of oppression. Tillie Olsen. (1980) addressed this question too in 
her assessment of the struggles of writers, mostly female, to acquire the right to write. 
And David Vincent's (1981) social history of nineteenth century working class writers 
reveals the considerable number of men and women who defeated enormous 
material and emotional hardship in their struggle to live their lives as full humans. All 
these examples bear witness to the defeat of oppression and the triumph of "I can" 
over "you can't". A focus on the misfortunes of oppression, then, neglects the 
capacity of humans to get beyond them. Connected to this neglect, is the risk of 
celebrating oppression. 
3. Oneness against sameness 
Every individual is born in unique circumstances and political correctness does 
much violence to this fact, particularly in its tendency to split human forces into evil 
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and good. It is as well to remember, as I have already suggested, that there is no 
social group that has a monopoly on human decency for like its opposite, it is a 
product of many and, at times, unknown forces. Because political correctness 
refuses these forces within a moralist equation of oppressed equals good, I will 
examine this question further in the example of a common gender equation, namely, 
woman equals good nurturer. 
The view that women derive caring skills from their conditions of oppression 
suggests that all women respond to oppression in the same way. The evidence is 
much more varied than this which is as well because it rescues women from a 
conceptual ghetto about natural virtue. Firstly, there are numerous cases of women 
who appear to convert their rage about their social restrictiveness into a rage against 
their children, many of whom are reared in an endless round of maternal swings 
between soothing and shouting, hugs and whacks. By way of illustration, I am 
reminded of an action-research project (Beale and Cousin, 1992), I worked on with 
mothers of children on at-risk registers or in care. In the course of this research, I 
asked a group of women to identify the phrase they most used with their children. 
"That's easy" they said, "We say sugar and shit if they ask what's for dinner/tea". 
Whence the phrase I asked. "Our mothers", they said. Perhaps this evocation of 
something sweet and something noxious succinctly states the women's ambivalence, 
matrilineally transmitted, in terms of their love/hate relationship with parenting and 
with their children. A love/ hate split, incidentally, which social workers may find hard 
to accommodate within their professional judgements of a bad enough mother. Such 
a woman is related to the whore who also bears the stigma of the woman who 
violates her natural virtue. In the case of mothering, the woman's transgression is to 
care less. If women were natural carers, of course, they would not need the vigilant 
quality control of social workers. Adrianne Rich (1977) gives the more dramatic 
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example of a mother of ten children who, to the surprise of her husband and 
neighbours who thought her an exemplary carer, decapitated her two youngest on the 
front lawn of her house 
Caring is a crisis ridden occupation and if in women's case the capacity to care 
is the fruit of oppression, we must accept too that, at times the fruit is bitter or even 
poisonous. Bauman (1993) suggests that "there is a thin line between care and 
oppression" (p. 92 ) wherein the cared for become oppressed by the overwhelming 
solicitations and powers of the carer. I think this is right but the carer. doubles her 
own oppression too. There are, for instance, those women who turn their entire 
selves into exclusive caretakers of others. I do not suggest that this is women's 
'fault', a matter of an unwise choice that she has taken freely. Indeed, we only have 
to look at how 'famous' women are represented in history to know that caring is 
presented to women as their key source of heroism: . 
Elizabeth Fry, Florence 
Nightingale, Mother Teresa - these women are valued for their selfless caring of 
others. 
The Madonna is not a taker. Arguably, if women want to be let into the 
religious symbolic order, they can do so only as its sacrificial meat. In this sense, 
pornography and religion are a meeting of extremes with respect to women. To be 
saintly, a woman must give from the bottom of her soul, except to herself. Notably, 
the only two professions permitted to women in the nineteenth century were those of 
nursing and teaching. In this century, nurses (frequently called 'angels') had to enter 
a painful struggle to assert their material needs against the forces of a mythology 
about their vocational purpose in the world. Connected to this is the enduring 
assumption in adult education that disadvantaged students should be rescued by 
women's philanthropic labour. 
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As Irigaray, has argued, if women give to others as their raison d'etre, they 
cannot give to themselves. Though I think that Irigaray is right to question the extent 
to which women are expected to give freely, we should not assume that others (men 
and children) can be realised through the sacrifices of women. If women are rotten 
carers of themselves there will be damaging consequences for those within their 
orbits too. There are women, for example, who strive to meet the needs of others in 
an attempt to meet their own covert needs to be cared for (Eichenbaum and 
Orbach, 1983). Eat my child for I am empty! Caring, to conclude, should not be 
owned as a woman's virtue or even as a virtue per se. Social circumstances and 
discriminatory practices may throw people into certain worlds but there is no 
guarantee that they will acquire skills or virtues from them. 
4. Privileged knowledge 
The many problems associated with women and caring dislodge the idea that 
oppression equips the oppressed with special attributes. It may, it may not. Quota 
systems and targets are often burdened - and sometimes justified - with this idea. 
Connected to this, as I raised in chapter 3, is the assumption that oppression equips 
the oppressed with special glasses, all the better to see the rest of the world with. 
This idealisation of oppression can be found in standpoint feminism 
(Ramazanoglu, 1988) and certain brands of class analysis (e. g. Lukacs, 1971). 
I have discussed the case of women and their presumed strengths in caring 
because these are often invoked as reasons for women's inclusion where they are 
underrepresented. I do not wish to thereby debase the value of experiences of 
oppression with respect to generating knowledge about it or to acquiring certain skills. 
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What I would contest, however, is the proposition that to have lived certain conditions 
is to know them in superior and definable ways at all times. Or to have learnt 
something from them in superior and definable ways. Experience is a mixed. 
blessing; at times an advantage, at times a mire from which one cannot see at all 
clearly and from, which emotions may stultify understanding and produce all kinds of 
crisis-ridden outcomes. A salutary reminder of the latter case, lays in the tragic 
example above of the two American toddlers summarily executed when the angelic 
energies of caring became demonic. 
Though it is a vicious philosophy of resentment itself (as I suggest in chapter 
1), there is truth, I feel, to Nietzsche's (1956) objections to the 'moralism of the meek', 
to the view that (which Nietzsche would see. as natural of course) ressentiment 
towards the apparently powerful can inhibit engagement with self-construction and 
responsibility. More mildly, there is also a truth to that old adage that if you want to 
understand England, leave it. If you sit too comfortably in your social experiences, 
you may see few horizons beyond them and few inner resources that you can bring to 
bear upon them to turn yourself into something more thrilling than a socially 
determined category. Though it is undeniably affirmative too, there can be a poverty 
of imagination to the preface "as a woman" (meant as object of oppression) and like 
statements. Such declarations contain a suggestion that to speak from a wound is 
to. speak with wisdom acquired from pain. Not that this claim is entirely false as 
Sojourner Truth's (1989) famous 'Aint Ia Woman' speech exemplifies. I merely want 
to-stress that pain does not always produce wisdom and that invoking experiences of 
oppression as privilege may at times conceal more than it reveals. These themes 
need expansion and I will do so firstly within the case of positive discrimination politics 
and secondly largely within Gidden's concept of 'life politics'. 
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4. Enforcing equality 
The debates about representation and black and female quotas within the 
political arena present a good example of the problem of the objective/subjective 
split. As I write this, Bradford Labour Party, for instance, is currently troubled by 
pressures on the one hand, to provide an all female shortlist of parliamentary 
candidates and, on the other hand, to have black representation in parliament which 
would mean including black men on the shortlist (Milne, 1994). The entire debate 
here seems to me to exemplify problems of political correctness. Because 
experience and knowledge, particularly experience and knowledge of oppression, is 
seen to be tied to particular bodies, the 'wrong' body is perceived to be 
unrepresentative. In this particular debate the most wrong body would be a. white, 
middle class male one and then, depending on which quota faction you are on, it may 
be a male, black or white,. or a female. In lending support to the very idea of an 
anatomically and/or colour-coded organisation of a shortlist to redress imbalances of 
democracy, the Labour Party cannot promote the more advanced idea of a politically 
informed representative, nor can it explore fully sex difference because it rests on 
man or woman, not both. There is a case here for re-launching the enlightenment 
concept of the cosmopolitan who straddles ethnicities with a travelled mind that will 
strive to overcome the local and the particular. Should not the colour of the mind 
count more than that of the body? There is also a case for exploring representation 
in terms of sex complementarity rather than sex competition. 
While it is true that the absence or low presence of certain groups in politics is 
an issue of social justice, can this be remedied by the call for formal exclusions to 
correct a history of substantive inequalities? Historically, the struggle for formal 
equalities has always been a necessary step towards the weakening of substantive 
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inequalities. This has been particularly so on the question of suffrage. Getting the 
vote does not achieve equality but it is a basis for it. A reversal of formal equality to 
exclude the 'over-included' (white, males in the main) may be an attempt to quick fix 
the problem of substantive inequality, producing, in the process, more problems than 
it solves. Perhaps history cannot be forced in this manner. It seems to me that 
there are two alternative strategies for the increased representation of the under- 
represented. In the first instance, much must be done to cultivate and support the 
mobility of the' underrepresented. Gramsci's (1971) conception of 'organic 
intellectuals' fits well with this strategy in that it stresses the need for an outstanding 
marriage of experience and knowledge that can be fed back into the field of 
oppression it addresses. It may be that quota systems hide the absence of such a 
strategy because it collapses experience with knowledge. Secondly, there should be 
a requirement that whoever represents the people must truly do so which means that 
they must be appraised for their capacities to relate to their own physical and social 
location creatively and transcendently. An Irigarian logic would suggest that in the 
case of sexed representation, the orientation must be on women's need to come into 
subjectivity to avoid their assimilation into men's rights, read as human ones. It 
would also suggest that women orient more on their desire and less on their 
oppression to effect their emergence as subjects. 
Giving primacy to specific experiences of oppression reverts to a reliance on 
ascribed status. The idea, of course, that people are born into their status is a feudal 
one which political correctness has turned on its head in response to the oppressive 
categories of modernity. Underclasses are moral aristocracies capable of the clarity 
of vision formerly attributed. to priests and kings. Environmentalism replaces God in 
this logic for all is fixed by social determinants. Political correctness has little trust in 
the plasticity of humanity and gives into a pre-modern fatalism about social destiny. 
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Black people, women and other categories of the oppressed are today's serfs though 
bound no longer by the land but by the gazes to which their bodies are subjected. In 
political correctness, as in pre-modern society, the reflexive self is hard to discover. 
In many respects, I think the ideas recently developed by Giddens with respect to 
self-identity and its linkages to democracy offer a partial route out of dogmas on 
oppression without abandoning the realities of oppression. 
6. 'Life Politics' 
In making sense of 'late-modernity', Giddens (1992) revisits classical 
sociology's preoccupation with what is distinctive about the modern and the pre- 
modern. Whereas earthly matters were fixed and predictable in traditional societies, 
post-traditional ones are characterised by social mobility, multiple choice and 
globalisation. In today's world, argues Giddens, the media and communications and 
the global production and distribution of commodities shatter the local and the 
communal. A family may stay at home but their television, for instance, will take them 
abroad. And if they can do more than subsist economically, they will be presented 
daily'with a variety of choices, many of which will be mundane consumer ones (e. g. 
which soap powder? which bread? ) but others will be more consequential on both. 
mind and body (e. g. which educational course? which diet? ). It is within this context 
that human beings of 'late modernity' make history in part, of their own choosing: 
The more tradition loses its hold and the more daily life is reconstituted 
in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global, the more 
individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of 
options (Giddens, 1992, p. 5 ). 
Giddens describes a society in which 'lifestyle choices' have become the 
means by which individuals secure their sense of security. For Giddens, the 
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conditions of 'late modernity' enable individuals to situate themselves, to find their 
own roots and their own path and so long as poverty is absent (in most cases) to self- 
actualise by making full use of modernity's choices. If traditional societies erected 
clear boundaries and clear rite de passage which guaranteed a sense of security and 
destiny, post-traditional societies have necessitated that humans become individuals 
and in doing so set their own boundaries and their own 'life cycle progressions. 
"What to do? How to Act?. Who to be? "(Giddens, 1992, p. 70) increasingly, these are 
questions for the individual in late modernity. And if she answers them successfully, 
the individual grounds herself as much as she is grounded by others. The central 
idea in Giddens' interpretation of late modernity lies in the concept of the self-reflexive 
individual: 
Each of us not only 'has', but lives a biography reflexively organised in 
terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible 
ways of life (Giddens, 1992, p. 14). 
By this logic, of course, one cannot speak simply 'as a gay. man' etc. if this 
refers only to the biography that is foist upon us rather than the one we live. 
Essentially, Giddens suggests that the realm of interior meaningfulness has 
expanded in the present period. What is noteworthy for Giddens is that we 
construct a narrative of our past to inform our present and to shape our future. We 
reform, we take risks, we self-examine, we plan the stages in our lives: 
The self forms a trajectory of development from the past to the 
anticipated future. The individual appropriates his past by sifting 
through it in the light of what is anticipated for an (organised) future. 
The trajectory of the. self has a coherence that derives from a cognitive 
awareness of the various phases of the lifespan (Giddens, 1992, p. 75). 
240 
Though he is aware that it is not an available resource for all individuals, 
Giddens instances the growth of therapeutic options for lifestyle planning and 
examination. Therapy gives people a chance to explore themselves and reinvent the 
bits they want to work better, casting off old habits, dependencies and self-abuses in 
the process. Even if people do not use therapy in its expensive forms, late modernity 
has developed a pervasive ethos of self-reform and self-construction. One can work 
out to a television muscleman; join weight-watchers; write to advice columns; ring 
advice lines; join courses and support groups or buy from a huge range of 'how to' 
and self-development literature. Though its size may differ because access is 
socially structured, the world of late modernity is our oyster. 
In making linkages with the subjective and the inter-subjective, Giddens 
stresses the existence of negotiated relationships. Though common social variables 
like class may bring people together, more important commonalities will be forged in 
what Giddens calls the 'pure relationship'. A pure relationship (marriages or 
friendships in the main) is one that is for itself, that survives only on the willingness of 
the parties to sustain it. In such a relationship, the parties develop 'shared histories' 
which ultimately congeal it more than external factors. Commitment to the other 
comes from within and thereby opens up more potential for real intimacies between 
the parties. I have raised problems with this conception with respect to 
heterosexuality (see chapters 4 and 5) because it leaves intimacy too usable and 
abusable for men, not women. With this qualification in mind, I do want to lend 
support to the Giddens' sketch of late-modern possibilities because I think it grapples 
with a growth of intelligence, including emotional intelligence, within humanity that 
victimist perspectives ignore. We live, writes Giddens (1994) in a world of clever 
people (p. 7). This cannot be right if we look at events like ethnic cleansing in Europe, 
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or the failure of wealthy nations to share their bounties with starving ones, but I think 
there is truth to Giddens' claims in relation to the management of private life. 
Generally, Giddens presents the late modern individual as one who is always 
in a creative and formative relation with his significant others and with social 
determinants. That is not to say that everyone is relating, joining, doing, reflecting, 
making, reforming and creating; some are pulled back by the 'inertial drag' of 
oppression; some remain driven by compulsive behaviour; some over-routinise their 
lives in a search for security; some simply do not dare to risk and some cannot afford 
to. A good summary of Giddens' (1992) position lies in a passage he cites from a 
woman recovering from anorexia nervosa, itself an option, albeit a negative one, 
provided by contemporary society: 
I trusted her (the woman's doctor). I needed her; this person who 
listened so carefully to what I said..... But in the end it was up to me. It 
was so hard to accept. She would help me but she couldn't tell me how 
to live. It was my life after all. It belonged to me. I could cultivate it. I 
could nourish it or I could starve it. I could choose. It was such a 
burden, that choice, that sometimes I thought I could not bear it on my 
own... It is a risky business being a woman. I have found different 
strategies to cope; ones that are under my control. The struggle to be 
myself, autonomous and free, goes on (Giddens, 1992, p. 104). 
It seems to me that this statement captures a much better relationship between 
oppression and self-development than the politically correct equations I have noted 
above. Quite simply, this woman is stating that oppression places her at risk and that 
whether she can free herself from a restrictive model of femininity, is a matter of 
private struggle from which she may triumph or not. In her case, the struggle is 
literally a life and death one because her concept of femininity and bodily 
attractiveness may kill her. Such a view of private struggle in a dynamic with a 
public one contrasts with a fatalism about womanhood that admits very little 
opportunity or indeed responsibility into the lives of women. Moreover, if individuals 
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can live with more self-reflexivity than before, any private life, wherever it is socially 
positioned, is capable of reinvention many times over. Nobody but the very 
marginalised is stuck of necessity. This is not to say that most people can or do 
behave self-reflexively. Much depends on market position too. 
Giddens gives recognition to socially differentiated access to self-actualisation 
and like Fromm (1993) and Bautnan (1993,1995) links this, inter alia, with a problem 
of market value. Fromm argues that what we put together in the making of 
ourselves is often linked to a sense of our marketability as a 'personality package'. 
As part of a capitalist logic, Fromm suggests, we take ourselves to a marketplace for 
spouses, partners, friends and colleagues. The anorexic woman quoted above, for 
instance, reported that she decided to slim herself to life-threatening proportions 
when a man casually remarked that 'she looked good thin'. This drive to reshape 
herself was directly connected to a sense of her exchange value; the thinner she was, 
the more likely she would be to net in a good male catch. "Modern man" writes 
Fromm "has transformed himself into a commodity" (Fromm, 1993, p. 88). As is 
evident in Irigaray's analysis of women's position within the market, more so modern 
woman! Thus what looks like self-reflexivity may be more of a relentless pursuit for 
self-improvement which alienates people from themselves: 
(Modern man) experiences his life energy as an investment with which 
he should make the highest profit, considering his position and the 
situation on the personality market. He is alienated from himself, from 
his fellow men and from nature. His main aim is profitable exchange of 
his skills, knowledge, and of himself, his 'personality package' with 
others who are equally intent on a fair and profitable exchange (Fromm, 
1993, p. 88/9). 
Giddens (1992) agrees with this position generally speaking, arguing too that 
'Self-help books.. stand in a precarious position with regard to the commodified 
production of self-actualisation' (p. 198) but he sustains a sense of people's resistance 
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and self-interested relation to the market. Having said this, Fromm (1993) provides a 
useful reminder that a contemporary meaning of being in touch with oneself is to be in 
touch with a particular kind of market. Such an interpretation is well represented in 
the title of what is now a classic of the self-development genre, namely Dale 
Carnegie's How to Win Friends and Influence People. In Fromm's view, adherence to 
the behaviourist advice of such writers removes individuals from who they really are. 
Far from increasing potential, it reduces it because it creates 'authoritarian 
conformism'. Fromm's picture of the capitalist individual certainly resonates with 
particular groups of people spawned by the recent reorganisations of capitalist 
economies. On the one side, there are those for whom the market, both consumer 
and producer, is of overwhelming importance in their identity constructions; on the 
other, there are those marginalised by market-forces and thus for whom a 
subsistence package is more pressing than a personality one. I have discussed this 
state of extremes in chapter one with respect to Gorz 's view of contemporary 
capitalism. There is perhaps an underestimation of this side of late modernity in 
Giddens. On the other hand, Fromm conceives of the market negatively only. 
Perhaps the market is empowering too. In pursuit of this possibility we need to ask 
whether the walls of prejudice and discrimination In the market prove more potent 
than a man's/woman's successful construction of self? ' There is no general answer 
to this, of course, because it is a context bound question. Which market? Which 
place? Which person? Which era? What can be discussed generally in response, 
however, is the tension inherent in oppression between constraint and complicity. 
How much have 'they' prevented him and how much has he 'co-operated' in 
this prevention? This is a problem of scale as well. When sanctions are very life- 
threatening (e. g. commit adultery and we will stone you to death) fear may reduce the 
option of complicity or turn it into fundamentalist zeal or frightened withdrawal. This 
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is the dynamic of terror and not a moral issue of course. But where power relations 
are secured, apparently, consensually and where challenges can be made relatively 
easily (e. g. do that again and I will divorce/leave/call the police) there is an ethical 
question that centres on complicity. 
This question has been well understood by that self-development literature for 
women on assertiveness training. While it is a literature that suffers some of the 
weaknesses of the 'positive thinking' genre, it also teaches women that reality, 
including their own and their relationships, is malleable and that they need not 'if only' 
their lives away. Unlike the slimming industry, assertiveness training (e. g. Dickson, 
1982,1985) is not so much about increased marketability as its object as it is about 
increased efficacy on the market as a buyer/seller. And in this connection, 
assertiveness training requires as a first step that women examine their own possible 
collusion in their oppression. Though its methods may prove too behaviourist to 
succeed, there is an attempt in this literature to pull women out of a master-slave 
dialectic. Women are encouraged to formulate what they want and need; to insist 
on what is essential for self-realisation and to negotiate for what is desirable. While 
even the perfection (if that were possible) of emotional position and skills here will 
not will away oppression, it clears an important path and reconfigures the relationship 
between oppressed/oppressor. Oppressive behaviour needs oppressed behaviour. 
I do not want to posit an even-handed interdependence between the oppressor 
and oppressed; this would deny an imbalance of power and historic rootedness. It 
would also refuse an integrity of meaning to oppression because with such an even- 
handedness, the slave will always be willing, even if the willingness is subconscious. 
Abuse will always be self-abuse. With this qualification, I do want to suggest some 
interdependence between the oppressed and oppressor. Moreover, this 
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interdependence is not simply the one with the other as if everybody were neatly 
positioned on either side of the oppressed/oppressor binary. Rather, it concerns an 
appreciation of the multifarious ways in which humans, wherever they are, invest in 
relations of dependence and in struggles to overcome them. This view avoids also 
the easy, conflation of privileged with oppressor that I have discussed in chapters 
three and four in terms of 'white' and 'male' respectively. 
Rose (1993) has critiqued the conceptions of the other which polarise-the self 
from the rest. In restoring a condition of humanity to the so-called Other, Rose 
contests the moralist view that some humans are there to remind others of . 
themselves negatively: I'm not because he is. 
The Other is misrepresented as sheer alterity, for 'the Other' is equally 
the distraught subject searching for its substance, its ethical life (Rose, 
1993, p. 8). 
We can no more find ourselves through an appreciation of others as 
'unequivocally Other' (p. 8) than we can through a negation of Others. Political 
correctness and racism, for. instance, are equally dependent on 'the Other'. Each 
deny interrelations. In Rose's view, we are all implicated in each others' lives and to 
ignore this with a commitment to a victimist logic is dangerous. In the first place, it 
ignores that: 
The Other is both bounded and vulnerable, enraged and invested, 
isolated and interrelated (Rose, 1993, p. 8). 
In the second place, Rose, writing in the first person as the non-Other, writes 
that regarding the Other as 'sheer alterity' means that: 
I continue to be naive and miserable, because the insistence on the 
immediate experience of the Other leaves me with no way to 
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understand my mistakes by attempting to recover the interference of 
meaning or mediation (Rose, 1993, p. 8). 
The refusal to grasp how dialectical and invested relations of oppression are, 
argues Rose (1993), produces an 'unhappy consciousness' (p. 8). This point recalls 
the paradox of sameness and difference I have discussed in relation to sex difference 
in chapter four. The simplistic abstractions of political correctness in which alterity is 
starkly separable, leaves the consciousness with seething uncertainties deriving from 
disowned similarities with the other. Superficially at least, classificatory projections 
, are easier than self-examination but they are more likely to lead to judgmentalist rage 
than compassion founded on sameness as well as difference. The other side of this 
coin here, is to run away with this commitment to interdependence so that victims are 
always implicated in their damage. Such a view has to be contested as much as that 
of political correctness lest we forget and dishonour those who were dragged onto 
slave ships, thrown into gas chambers, ambushed, raped and murdered, killed by 
fatal illnesses and so on. Not all victims are invested in their victimisation and there 
really are others, at times too powerful to successfully contest. 
Giddens writes that "we are now in a world where there are many others; but 
also where there are no others" (Giddens, 1995, p. 235) Differences becomes 
sameness for humans because they return them to their ability to choose. 
Differences are forged existentially. In prospect at least, our differences will be the 
differences we make of ourselves. Less 'out there' and more 'in here'. Giddens 
refers to this movement as one from 'emancipatory politics' to 'life-politics'. In the 
former, there is an emphasis on establishing a break from the fixities of tradition and 
custom. In the latter, the stress is on "political decisions flowing from freedom of 
choice and generative power" (Giddens, 1995, p. 215). The former is a precondition 
for the latter and Giddens does not claim that we are in the presence of unfettered 
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lifestyle choices. His thesis concerns a much more patchy movement from 'a politics 
of life chances' to a 'politics of lifestyle'. In reflecting back on the recovering anorexic 
exampled in Giddens there is a case for recognising such a movement between these 
two kinds of politics in the lives of some people. . 
Though in the face of the increased marginalisation of sections of society, we 
should be wary too, of the extent of such a transition, Giddens work provides a useful 
account of the tension between self-formation and the social formation of individuals 
in contemporary society. His suggestion that emancipatory politics are a baseline for 
a more developed political world in which the scope of human self-reflexivity can 
contest social divisions may seem premature to some. Have we really arrived at this 
possibility? Or are there still too many oppressed groups dragged down by the weight 
of their oppression to give scope to this? We can present equality politics either 
way. We can pull downwards with the weight of oppression or we can place our 
hopes and confidence on the ability of human beings, wherever placed, to get beyond 
the categories constructed 'for' them. This chapter has sought to make the latter 
case. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
I will conclude briefly with a summary of the key themes of the foregoing 
chapters and a few comments on their overall purpose. 
In chapter 1, I sought to defend the politics of equality against those who would 
argue that they run counter to human nature. In so doing, I derived a framework for 
supporting policies of equality of opportunity that is both mindful of its limits as well as 
its potential. At the least, I argued, policies of equality of opportunity can open up 
questions about how people perceive themselves in relation to others and can inspire 
reforms in the sphere of the interpersonal. 
In chapter 2, I took up the question of individuation in the context of social 
class. I tried to demonstrate that although prejudice against working class people is 
widespread, it is ill-recognised even by those who bear its brunt. I suggested that 
equality discourses need to take account of problems of classism in order to tackle 
how people regard each other in a stratified social order. My focus on individuation 
was prompted by a sense that class is an overworked concept, particularly with 
respect to working class people. I urged that we hold on to an understanding of 
individual, human potential as one that does battle with class restrictiveness. In 
short, I argued that the concept of social class and the collectivist view it conveys 
cannot offer an exhaustive explanation of any individual or group. 
Chapter 3 took up a similar theme to that of chapter 2 in that it focused on a 
restrictive classificatory imagination.. In taking ethnic monitoring procedures as my 
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case study of this theme, I pointed to the tension that arises in giving recognition to a 
problem (in this case racism) by a deployment of the. very category constructs that 
have created it. There is nothing new in this observation, of course, but I explored 
the ways in which this question of reverse discourse ramifies both in monitoring 
processes and the conceptions of ethnic identity that are brought into education. An 
important theme to my discussion centred on the case for increased recognition of 
anti-Semitism alongside other racisms. This chapter urged a revision of how we 
gauge the problems and scope of ethnic identifications and how we promote an 
awareness of differences that avoids simplistic generalisations. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I cast my vote with theorists of sex difference as an 
originary difference that needs to be recognised. Aware of the controversial nature 
of this view for many involved in equality politics, I straddled my own commitment to 
this with a broader discussion on ethical hetero-sexuality. My assumption here is 
that wherever one stands in the gender equality debate, there is likely to be a 
consensus on the view that the intersubjective sphere of opposite sexness, private 
and public, could do with an ethical overhaul. I leant on the French feminist Irigaray 
and like-minded Italian theorists to explore the profanation of women and how this 
affects the representation of the female. In particular, I sought to restore meaning, 
and to give sexuate substance, to the conception of the sanctity of human life in 
terms of equality politics. My dictionary offers 'sacred' and 'inviolate' against the 
definition of sanctity; I made use of these associations in defending a deeper 
conception of sex alterity and commonality. I centred my discussion of this defence 
around the question of threatened female vitality in relation to female infanticide and 
the suppression of female desire, meant socially, spiritually and sexually. 
Essentially, these chapters. supported Irigaray's view that rights and rites cannot be 
dissociated because the material and the symbolic are part of each other. 
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In chapter 6, I explored the classificatory imagination that is latent in many of 
the 'isms' of equality of opportunity work. Although I made the case in the preceding 
two chapters that men and women needed to review how they gazed at each other, 
here I sought to temper the fixities of any gaze of the other with the reminder of our 
multi-dimensionalities. Quite simply, who we are comes from a complexity of the 
private and the public and this defies classification. I situated this discussion in one 
of political correctness because it is an orientation that misses this simple point. This 
chapter resisted a victimology in equality discourses, exploring instead, complicity, 
responsibility and interdependent relations between the oppressor and oppressed. I 
finished with a brief discussion of Giddens' 'life politics' which attempt to captures a 
dynamic between the 'private' and the social. 
I have desisted from making any clear policy suggestions with respect to 
equality of opportunity work. My purpose has been to point to potentially new ground 
rather than attempt to break it single-handedly in terms of what is to be done. What I 
think is clear is that the field of policy development in equality of opportunity needs to 
keep abreast with contemporary theorising about sameness, difference and others. 
Indeed there are debates now about the very term equality of opportunity with some 
preferring 'managing diversity' and others 'human resource development' (Kandola, 
et. al. 1995). Undoubtedly, such debates reflect an unease with some of the 
theoretical orthodoxies beneath the conception of equality and which I have sought to 
challenge. I remain agnostic about. the terminology we should use in combating 
prejudice and inequalities, but I do think that we need to avoid theoretical closure in 
assessing these problems. In negotiating a path through theories of oppression that 
range from enlightenment inspired ones to the post-modern, I hope that this thesis 
has contributed to this necessity. 
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